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Abstract 
 
Since 2001, there are more than 50 national border barriers around the globe — 
proposed, under construction, or finished. My dissertation considers this new 
infrastructure inside larger questions of sovereignty, governance, immigration, and 
security in the “borderless” age of globalization. To approach this work I used an 
epistemological framework of border thinking, a “third space” hermeneutics that locates 
the border as a central place to theorize the complex geopolitical and postcolonial 
relationships. I conducted two case studies of this fortress infrastructure, one along the 
U.S.-Mexico border and another along the Costa Rican border with Nicaragua, 
considering how new border walls are material manifestations of inchoate sovereignty, 
occupying claims in the borderlands — one of the latest frontier zones of global capital. 
Broadly, this project calls for us to consider the global proliferation of national border 
walls and fences in a way that invokes collective action against the persisting operative 
logic of race/culture thinking that underpins securitization as both a form of governance 
and an ideology. It situates the urgency of this intellectual work inside the expanding 
sovereign jurisdictions of capital and opens up new sets of questions about how national 
border barriers are integral structures inside the changing ideo-political frameworks of 
war, sovereignty, and governance in the age of the drone. 
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Prelude 
 
May we dedicate ourselves to hastening the day when all God’s children live in 
a world without walls. That would be the greatest empire of all. 
 
— Former U.S. president Ronald Reagan at the installation of “Breakthrough,” 
an art piece made from a fragment of the Berlin Wall at Westminster College in 
Fulton, Missouri, on Nov. 19, 1990 
 
Warehouses of Steel and the Bounded Present 
In the Río Grande Valley in South Texas, 27,000 tons of unused steel worth US$44 
million sit in a storage facility (Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General 2011). This surplus of fencing supply, which contains more steel than 
the Statue of Liberty, has already been stored for five years, and eventually it will be 
used to complete additional miles of the U.S. fence on the border with Mexico. The 
future fencing will go up in several border towns along the delicate ecosystem of the 
Río Grande near the Gulf of Mexico, even though previous U.S. government studies 
have shown that this type of fencing compounds and exacerbates flooding (Nicol 2013). 
A group of borderland residents-turned-activists who organized under the banner “No 
Border Wall” to protest the initial waves of government land seizures and the fence 
construction outlined in the U.S. Secure Fence Act have continued to show up to almost 
every public meeting for years, requesting through the Freedom of Information Act 
documents outlining the government’s plans, and to sound the regional and 
international alarm that more border walls are coming. 
 Since the early 2000s, there has been a new, intensive proliferation of national 
border walls and fences around the world. There are 55 new national border barriers 
around the globe — proposed, under construction, or finished — since 2001.1 This 
                                                
1 See Appendix for a table of contemporary border barrier projects. 
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border buildup is indicative of a shift in the way the world is being divided and 
organized that goes beyond reified cartographies of the “global North” and “global 
South,” but instead is more in line with Bauman’s millennial forecast of “planetary 
frontier-lands” (2002). Nation-states now have the countenance of frontier-lands — ad 
hoc, provisional spaces of perpetual acquisition where “fences and stockades announce 
intentions rather than mark realities,” and for many people “entrench the new 
extraterritoriality of the human condition” and test the limits of human submissiveness 
inside these new arrangements (Bauman 2002: 90–114). Terrestrial national borders are 
one of the places where the closing routes of human mobilities and increasing mobility 
of capital converge in the same space. More and more often these border spaces are 
vertically organized with walls or fences built at key human crossing corridors in order 
to create a wider horizon for surveillance and entrapment of certain groups of people 
unauthorized for entry. Simultaneously, new roads and bridges are built nearby to 
facilitate authorized flows of increased commerce and goods, and new immigrant 
detention centers also go up in the borderlands and beyond to incarcerate captured 
human crossers. The closure and controls in the borderlands, the traditional laboratories 
for new forms of nation-state policing and surveillance, are a particular place to think 
about our bounded present — a contemporary reality where we experience the growing 
ontologies of walling that range from gated residential communities (Blakely and 
Snyder 1999; Low 2003) to portable protest walls deployed in metropolitan squares 
(Hancox 2011) to national border fences.  
 This project asks what walls might tell us about the shifting social organization 
of state power through infrastructure of policing and surveillance. It documents a 
particular moment, situating what contemporary border walls mark out inside the rapid 
buildup of a new aerial order of the power of drones. It studies how walls are a mutant 
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form of colonial management, a disembodied, low-intensity terrorstrafe — recreating 
and improving practices of “nonlethal” human control in service of new political 
economies. It is a form of rule that relies on discretionary force to instill fear and terror 
in both the hearts of the people who find themselves behind the idea of protective walls, 
and also the “others” who find themselves as objects of management. The hallmark of 
neoliberal governance buries the magnitude and costs of this infrastructure between the 
layers of shell companies, entangled in webs of private contractors working to provide 
security as a “public good” so that the wider social, cultural, and environmental 
damages are often hard to name with any accuracy or precision. Some of the places 
where we can locate this disenfranchisement are in the spatial alterations: the long lines 
in the hot sun, the everyday interrogations and searches, the illegal questioning, and the 
beyond-the-border checkpoints. The defining characteristic of land along the border is 
not whether it is public or private, but rather the prevailing sense of insecurity that 
reigns there. The global changes in border security are critically interconnected with the 
larger state of insecurity inside discussions and protests about policing, racism, and 
inequalities, which are confined almost exclusively within the margins of domestic 
national discourse. People have to navigate the latest “technologies of pain 
compliance,” not only the barbed wire, rubber bullets, and chemical tear gas, but also 
the more abstract distancing powers of these forms of control that translate into the 
everyday aggressions that eat away at the physical and emotional well-being of even the 
strongest and most resolute (Arike 2010). 
 Walls are historically one of the oldest tools and practices of segregation and 
control. The aporias and ambiguities inherent to any border space make it difficult to 
decipher the new measurable increase in barriers from what actually might be “new” 
about the social processes surrounding them. The clarity and legibility of a line that a 
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border wall is supposed to inscribe effectively creates ambiguity on the ground. A state 
boundary line is a baseline of national truths, which sets the limits of legal state 
violence in relationship to a neighboring set of sovereign truths. However, when a 
national border fence is erected firmly on the builder’s territory, away from the actual 
boundary line, a zone of ambiguity emerges between the boundary line and the fence. It 
is the physical space where might becomes right — where the truth of the international 
boundary line no longer defines the legal limits of the builder-state’s force and violence. 
Instead, the threat of violence and force redefines the boundary line into a flexible 
apparatus. Often this zone is functionally extended inside a secondary special radius for 
border enforcement, beyond the immediate vicinity of the border fence. These spatial 
changes allow for violence and threat of force to define the truth, rather than the fixed 
truth of a boundary line defining the limits of force at the given moment a person enters 
that zone. For example, on several occasions, U.S. Border and Customs Patrol agents 
have shot through the U.S. border fence into Mexico and killed men and young boys 
who were innocent bystanders (Borunda and Ybarra 2010; American Civil Liberties 
Union 2014). None of the agents involved have been found guilty of violating 
international sovereignty, and all have been exonerated from these extrajudicial 
murders.2 
 The discourses of migration in the era of globalization have reflected on the 
shifts in sovereign practices and tended to theorize and think about these changes in 
relationship to the symbolic and material importance of national boundaries, and how 
these boundaries pertain to the concepts of citizenship, sovereignty, and ultimately, 
deeper questions of belonging and exclusion. These discussions usually look at the 
                                                
2 There have been 67 Border Patrol shootings since 2012, which resulted in 19 deaths. In all but three 
pending cases, the agents involved have been absolved of misconduct. Only two agents were disciplined 
by verbal reprimand. There were still three pending cases under investigation by the U.S. Department of 
Justice as of June 15, 2015 (Bennett 2015). 
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limits of who can and cannot move inside the new networks of production and 
consumption inside the changing geographies of the neoliberal organization of capital, 
and how these boundaries relate to identity formation, questions of security, and the 
organization of labor. Often these changes are considered in the context of urban 
centers or inside planetary binaries, where different kinds of worlds rub up against each 
other. This sociological account of walls situates the social practice of state-based 
boundary initiatives inside a longer archeology of hedges and barbed wire, one that 
troubles the ways in which our understanding of border walls is often framed. 
 Specific instances of walling at the edges of the overdeveloped world hold 
primacy in theorizing these changes in a “First”-World-fits-all approach that applies the 
same conceptual tools and ways of thinking about the militarization and 
reconfigurations of borders in Europe and the United States to subaltern places where 
barriers and fortifications are also deployed. The early discussions and reportage about 
contemporary border walling share a common intuition about some of the underlying 
congruencies between very disparate manifestations of national border barriers in the 
world, but fall short by qualifying these material structures’ symbolic currency and 
exclusionary functions. Frequently, discussions reference the spatial shifts in the “war 
on terror” as a part of this telling; however, these shifts are located or talked about 
almost exclusively in connection with the United States and Israel, two of the 
pioneering governments leading the way in creating extra-national forms of governance, 
control, and social imaginaries of terror. Although the contemporary proliferation of 
walls is quantitatively measurable, it is very difficult to capture the kinds of social 
changes that this architecture indicates and what these changes mean in relationship to 
other neoliberal geographies of enclosure crafted through “lawfare” to develop new 
confinement practices deployed in fields of war in places like Guantánamo, 
 
 
11 
Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Iraq, Yemen, and many other 
locations (Khalili 2013; Weizman 2011; Gregory 2004; Mamdani 2004; Cole 2003). 
Eyal Weizman (2011) has even used the term “wallfare” as a way to describe how a 
wall can become a tool of enacting violence and control in growing “securitocracies” 
and the changing configurations of citizenship and nation-state sovereignty that 
formulation implies. This work asks how national border barriers figure as integral 
structures inside the changing ideo-political frameworks of war and governance. And it 
explores how these are connected with the everyday realms of citizens and non-citizens 
living far beyond the traditional geographies of terrorism. 
 To do this, it revisits the standard account of contemporary border walls, which 
usually begins with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the symbolic and 
powerful juncture that was supposed to mark the advent of the “borderless” age of 
globalization, but that instead, gave witness to new planetary geographies of enclosure, 
incarceration, and segregation. Since then, we have begun to talk about borders in terms 
of networks, flows, and mobilities (Urry 2007; Castells and Cardoso 2005), which are 
constitutive of a new spatiality of politics (Bauman 2002; Sassen 1996; Rumford 2006). 
The liberal human right to the freedom of movement, a right that was first formulated in 
relationship to walls and enclosure, is increasingly tenuous inside more heavily policed 
human mobility regimes. And though mobility politics (Squires 2011) are very much at 
stake inside these changes, there are also other pressing politics caught up in these 
formations: the politics of family and community separation, the environmental politics 
of devastation and habitat fragmentation, and the politics of xenophobia and racism. 
 There is a need to theorize contemporary border walls from the borderlands, an 
epistemological position (Anzaldúa 2007; Mignolo 2000) that yields very different 
kinds of questions and ways of understanding these changes. This is a way of thinking 
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that works from the unnatural space of a border — a space that is simultaneously real 
and fictive, invisible and spatial, economic and emotional, physical and existential. It 
destabilizes views from the center, engages all of the paradoxes that are inherent in a 
border space, and troubles the novelty in recent accounts that do not always 
successfully access the historicized formations of borders. The central claim of this 
work is that we have to understand the contemporary configurations of border walls and 
the context of the securitization of national borders more broadly, not as new, dramatic 
changes, but rather consider them inside the historicized, co-constitutive formations of 
sovereignty, security, and territorial boundaries, where the technology of walls and 
barriers was developed as a racialized tool to control the spheres of labor and other 
human participation, a process of boundary-making that was made explicitly in the 
service of developing new inter-state, free-trade networks. The chapters in this thesis 
survey the new material manifestations of inchoate sovereignty, occupying claims in the 
borderlands, one of the latest frontier zones of global capital. Some of the same 
historical places where the “coloniality of power” first foraged state borders to create 
new spheres for the emergence of a global free trade are now the places where more 
intensive forms of vertical and digital surveillance, policing, and state-sponsored 
violence occurs (Quijano 2007). This telling troubles the telluric register of sovereign 
national borders in the age of “terror” by historicizing walls as a key marker of spatio-
political reconfigurations of extractive economies that set limits for labor and other 
human participation globally. 
 My intellectual work draws from the deep well of transatlantic writers and 
thinkers who have charted with precision and clarity the real stakes in dividing lines, 
“the veil” of the color line, and compartments of colonial rule, especially Frantz Fanon, 
W. E. B. Du Bois, and Aimé Césaire, but also many others writing back against 
 
 
13 
imperial and neo-imperial powers, both then and now. My return to their writings is 
certainly from a situated time and place precipitated by a different set of planetary 
circumstances. However, the historical grain of their insights is still useful to dissect the 
newest, yet same old lines of race today. I also have drawn inspiration from a more 
recent body of contemporary diasporic postcolonial and borderlands literature as central 
to my theorization and understanding of walls and borders. These texts not only offer 
rich and nuanced understandings of oppression, domination, and power, but also 
provide us with valuable resources and critical vocabularies to discuss forms and 
responses of human liberty in relationship to that “caging force” of walls (Loyd, 
Mitchelson, and Burridge 2012). 
 There is a growing tendency in contemporary social theory to look more broadly 
at borders as a central site to understand and examine the changes wrought by the new 
sovereignty of capital in the changing power configurations of neoliberalism and 
globalization (Rumford 2006). Perhaps this is because borders are traditionally the 
space where the normative configurations of the nation-state have always started to 
unravel and breakdown, or because borders are the one place that these concepts could 
never fully reach or account for in the first place. The wall itself serves as a major 
meridian to orient this analysis inside a milieu of theoretical renegotiations of the 
conceptual characterizations of the nation-state and its territory, sovereignty, and 
nationalisms in a residually ungovernable, third-space place rich with hybridities, 
pluralities, and postcolonial possibilities (Mignolo 2000). This orientation is strategic. It 
attempts to carefully engage with the persisting undertones of ethnic nationalism and 
ethnicization of political violence that underpin discussions of “us” and “them” that 
insidiously creep back into our very attempts to disarticulate dialectics of difference in 
our accounting of globalization’s discontents (Brubaker 1999; Brubaker and Laitin 
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1998). And while walls are not the only place where these considerations are important 
and useful, they are sites where concentrated formations of disciplinary powers dwell 
and transform at the epicenter of questions around citizenship, sovereignty, and borders, 
offering a rich theoretical space to think about these formations, a place that has been 
largely neglected empirically. 
 My engagement with this work was born out of an encounter I had while living 
and working in South Texas as a journalist in 2006, when former U.S. Homeland 
Security director Michael Chertoff made his first visit to the U.S.-Mexico border in 
Laredo, Texas, to announce a series of border security initiatives (Doerge 2006). At the 
time, the other border reporters and I laughed at the preposterousness of the idea of 
building a fence along the entire U.S. border with Mexico, but watched in slow and 
drawn-out horror as construction began cutting across our communities. In the years 
after this event, new studies and news reports detailed the construction of border walls 
in other places around the globe. However, the early discussions I found emerging in 
some of the academic circles looking at global borders were very quick to locate the 
discussion of contemporary walls inside the civilizational “culture talk” of post-9-11. 
The construction of the U.S. border fence was not an unprecedented moment in the 
borderlands, but rather the dynamics of this major change registered to me as something 
quite familiar in the historical memories of Mexican and Mexican American 
communities, especially in the U.S. Southwest. In the early 1920s, the Texas Rangers 
— one of the country’s first paramilitary organizations — roamed the state with the 
license to kill Mexicans and Mexican Americans with impunity to open up the way for 
Anglo settlers to take their landholdings (Texas Legislature Committee Proceedings 
1919). In the 1940s and 1950s, as U.S. soldiers started to return home from World War 
II, Mexican Americans and Mexican bracero workers were rounded up into full train 
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cars and deported en masse to Mexico when their labor in the Dakotas or Montana was 
no longer needed. The history of U.S. border enforcement practices historically relied 
on an ideological praxis of the racialized politics of American imperialism. Many of the 
recent changes I saw happening fell along older, more recognizable lines of violence 
and exclusion. The early aim that oriented my approach to this work was to uncover the 
real substrata of contemporary border walls. 
 New border barriers are not built solely by democracies, or restricted to 
countries in Fortress Europe and other parts of the overdeveloped world, nor are these 
barriers built exclusively to fend off extra-territorial terrorism, although often terror’s 
expanding territoriality is crucial in upholding a rhetoric of security with no limits. This 
work builds on and moves beyond some early claims about this fortress architecture 
(Davis 2005, Brown 2010, Jones 2012, Till et al. 2013) to look specifically at what 
constitutes border walls, and how different national border barriers might be alike or 
different inside a global tendency toward walling and closure. The account begins by 
looking at how border walling is a kind of “legibility of statecraft,” and it outlines an 
early archeology of state-based walling practices, looking at how walls historically 
telegraph or mark changing configurations of state organization of power and systems 
of closure (Scott 1998). It uses nomos, a socio-political concept of spatial ordering, as a 
theoretical starting point operative in uncovering the updated trappings of postmodern 
and postcolonial race/culture logic that continues to make human segregation via 
walling a salient practice in spite of its costly ineffectiveness. Methodologically, this 
work required an engagement with a wide range of issues: the changing signification of 
border walls over time, the uneven and unilateral nature of wall building, and the use of 
the interpretative practice most conducive to working inside the unique spatialities and 
contested histories particular to borderlands.  
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 This is an inquiry into the bounded present, a political sociology of walling that 
looks specifically at the contemporary infrastructure characteristic of the changing 
territories and sovereignty of the nation-state through a series of descriptive 
engagements with several different walls around the world. The chapters look at walls 
mentioned in occasional news briefs, in relationship to one of the archetypes of 
contemporary walling initiatives — the U.S.-Mexico border fence, with drones and 
sensors — to address the interconnected socio-political forces that segregate certain 
kinds of people and build walls in other places. These chapters ask questions about what 
these monolithic barriers might have in common with smaller border barriers in places 
like Costa Rica, and how the legacy of the fall of the Berlin Wall continues to define the 
discursive horizon for understanding walls in a field of war making. This work looks at 
an instance when a border barrier does not go on to become a major symbolic point of 
reference in an ongoing national border controversy. It also looks at countries that are 
walling out neighboring labor forces, even as their own citizen migrant populations are 
encountering similar barriers in their movement to other places. 
 The specific context of each contemporary barrier and the physical and material 
infrastructure and technology that accompanies it are profoundly different. However, in 
the process of looking at the underlying formations and political architecture of wall 
building, I found a very similar pattern of events. Most national border barriers are built 
after an exceptional amnesty or a demographic increase in economic immigrants from 
the neighboring country. And although the unilateral act of wall building is widely 
criticized, it still goes up firmly inside the sovereign bounds of the builder’s national 
territory. In the aftermath of the wall, there is a growing climate of xenophobia and 
racism in the wall-building country, and escalating tensions on the border lead the 
destination country to declare a state of emergency and redraw national security 
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policies, which require new and intensive rounds of public funding expenditures for 
border security. Following the infrastructure changes, increasingly expensive and 
restrictive migration policies are rolled out, often directed specifically toward migrants 
from the neighboring country. In both cases, a border wall marks the beginning of a 
changing configuration in the respective borderlands. 
 This sociology of walling offers better kinds of questions, rather than any 
conclusive findings or answers. As with most work of this scale and scope, this account 
is provisional and limited. It is my hope that the present work will be a contribution to 
our understanding of the bricks and mortar of the division and human segregation of 
contemporary borders in ways that open up intellectual resources and vocabularies on 
bordering, which are necessary to do the more difficult work of imagining a more 
convivial world (Gilroy 2004) where new forms of hospitality (Derrida 2000; 2001) 
surpass the limited and problematic global system of human rights secured in state-
based configurations and humanitarian interventions (Weizman 2011; Arendt 1968). 
 Over the ongoing course of my research, several new national border walls were 
announced and built in places like Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Israel, Kenya, and the 
Dominican Republic. And certainly, as I write this text, there are no signs of this trend 
slowing. We should remain attentive to frontiers in the carceral era, characterized by the 
increase in physical systems of enclosure and confinement through growing webs of 
punishment that manage human submission. The simultaneous rapid democratization of 
drones has required me to situate my findings about the “vertical sovereignty” of 
walling regimes in conversation with other recent literature looking at the implications 
of the expanding asymmetrical aerial jurisdictions of drones and the proliferation of 
domestic “no-fly zones.” This project calls for us to consider the global proliferation of 
national border walls and fences in a way that invokes collective action against the 
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persisting operative logic of race/culture thinking that underpins most securitization as 
both a form of governance and an ideology. Walls isolate spaces of struggle inside 
national frameworks, but the larger global practices operative of the infrastructure of 
power are precisely what connects these struggles. 
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Chapter 1: Border Methodology 
 
To survive the Borderlands  
you must live sin fronteras3 
be a crossroads. 
 
— Gloria Anzaldúa, from her poem “To live in the Borderlands means you” –
(2007: 217, emphasis in the original) 
 
The colonial world is a world divided into compartments. … Yet, if we examine 
closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines 
of force it implies. This approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its 
geographical lay-out will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized 
society will be reorganized. The colonial world is a world cut in two. The 
dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. 
 
— Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (2001: 29) 
 
A national border is a line of sovereignty, one that is drawn through treaties and accords 
by political powers, enforced through military might. Most border studies scholars point 
out that nation-states are a relatively recent historical development, and that the creation 
of more than 70 new countries in the last 50 years has dramatically increased the 
number of national borders, which has been generative of many more experiential 
border zones. Although borderlines sometimes correspond to physical geographies or 
linguistic patterns, these artificial limits are generative of the borderlands — the unusual 
social and spatial formation where two systems of power exist in immediate proximity 
and where inhabitants can often access resources on both sides of the line. Border 
barriers are exclusively constructed within the builder-state’s geographic jurisdiction. 
However, sometimes they are built at significant distances from the actual sovereign 
boundary line. A borderline does not have to have a wall for it to manifest the larger 
official apparatus of the border, but walls and fencing always produce and manifest 
                                                
3 sin fronteras: without borders. 
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borders in symbolic and material ways. 
 At the primordial heart of border work lies the foundational idea of the dividing 
line that separates the collective “Self” from the “Other.” This manifests as an inherent 
dualism in borders that pervades work on contemporary nation-state borders. Often it is 
a normative way of dealing evenhandedly with “both sides,” two nations, two sets of 
laws, two peoples, et cetera. This dualism is capable of objectively recognizing the 
existence of mixed inhabitants, border communities, border economies, and 
transnational flows. But this recognition is still confined inside a closed Hegelian 
dialectic, one that does not offer reciprocal recognition, but instead is rooted inside an 
irreciprocal, racialized, and asymmetrical power relationship. To theorize and to do 
research on the border requires unsettling this normative and underlying dualism in 
order to access the geopolitics of knowledge particular to the borderlands. That is, to 
use “third space” epistemology as a methodological bypass to trouble and to draw out 
the aporias inherent in doing political and intellectual work from an in-between place, 
where fictive arrangements consolidate real, oppressive, and destructive social systems.  
To do this I draw on the “critical vocabulary” of a Fanonian antidialectic, one 
that facilitates a deeper understanding of walls as a kind of social space inside the open 
discourse of borderlands (Sekyi-Otu 1996). I understand this to be a quality of thought, 
a way of thinking outside of the system, even while that very action is formed and 
ultimately locked inside the constraints of dialectics. This methodological approach 
allows me to work from imaginative horizons, even if only for a moment in time, 
accessing perspectives that undermine the terms of discussion and the forms of thought 
that reproduce the systems of power as forms of knowledge. It is a practice that is at 
best only partial because it is constantly fractured and disrupted by the carceral and 
oppressive realities. However, this Fanonian critical practice is still relevant in the ways 
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it allows us to address the lingering and persisting colonial ecologies in the present. 
The implications of doing border research in this way are that it opens up an 
entirely different kind of genealogy of fencing as a practice of power. This reassessment 
of the history of walls requires us to consider the recent spate of border buildup with a 
familiar eye for the continuities of state-sponsored violence and policing, 
problematizing the ways that violence is rendered as politics. I approached the questions 
of the global phenomena of border wall building by starting from a sociological 
imperative of looking at the whole picture of global border walling through detailed 
descriptive accounts of two very different barriers: one of the world’s longest and most 
militarized fences, built by the United States on its southern border with Mexico, and 
the world’s smallest, a one-kilometer cinder-block wall built by Costa Rica on its 
northern border with Nicaragua. In building the architecture of this research project, I 
had to confront the limits of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
2002) and face the challenge of selecting case studies from more than 30 potential 
fieldwork sites. This work was conducted over several years across continents, with 
cross-institutional affiliations, and in different languages, bringing up important 
reflections for me on some of the ethical dimensions of building and executing this kind 
of intellectual project. These procedural underpinnings shape and inform the larger aim 
of this project. 
 We internalize national borders as a priori social and political configurations 
that condition our existence in the world, often in ways we do not consciously consider 
or label as such; and we approach border research inside the dynamic and living reality 
of these assumptions. When doing research and work on national borders, the inhabitant 
who is not from the borderlands, but from a more distant political center, confronts his 
or her social and political imaginaries and experiences of the border in new and novel 
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ways, often as shocks and shifts to his or her worldview. This newfound knowledge of 
self in the world that takes place at the border often evokes a hyper-sensitivity and 
alertness to the difference and limits that a borderline inscribes and the constant changes 
that occur there. For the border resident, the person who lives in the immediate vicinity 
of either side of the boundary line, these subjectivities are intimately familiar and 
routine. Writing and reading this work requires us to situate ourselves at “perpetual 
crossroads,” a position of both reflexive and situated knowledge of ourselves in space, a 
constantly open position, which Anzaldúa (2007) described. The ever-changing rules, 
regulations, and rhythms shape the contours of everyday life on the border. People must 
constantly respond to the always-shifting and ever-present division, and it is their 
collective and personal lived rejoinder to the border that is constitutive of a particular 
kind of knowledge of the borderlands. 
 
The Geopolitics of Knowledge in the Borderlands 
The borderlands are a “third space” configuration, the creative formation born of a 
border, but which also transcends a border. Borderlands are places, often referred to as 
peripheries, that are historically ungovernable and neglected by capitals and centers of 
national power. Often the different options for local mobility in the borderlands 
between two countries open up all of these other emotional, intellectual, cultural, 
political, and spiritual resources that are also generative of and constitutive of a “third 
space,” which is a priori to the imposed divisions of nation, territory, and capital. New 
barriers in the borderlands cut apart families, communities, and friendships, and 
segregate a habitus in service of bridges and roads that privilege and secure the cargo of 
semitrailer trucks. But it is not just mobility politics at stake in the securitization of 
borders, nor is it simply the political economies of security, labor, or nation building — 
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all of which intersect inside this new architecture — but it is the ongoing ecologies and 
ontologies of the “emotional residue” of unnatural boundaries (Anzaldúa 2007: 25). By 
this, it is not just the feelings of “otherness” that are inscribed by a border, but it is the 
terror and fear that marshals and confines people inside unnatural formations of 
asymmetrical power that are drawn up by dividing lines. 
 Chicana/o theorizing, more than any other discipline, began to elaborate the 
border as a central place to theorize the complex geopolitical and postcolonial 
relationship between the United States and Mexico, emphasizing the ways in which the 
borderland also serves as a “heartland” for new political horizons of hybridity, 
creativity, and moral possibilities (Michaelsen and Johnson 1997: 3, 22). This 
decolonial epistemology disrupts the formulations of knowledge that privilege and 
maintain Eurocentric, Western modalities of power that rely on the rhetoric of 
modernization and prosperity (Mignolo 2009). The geo- and body-politics of delinking 
imperial knowledge, both epistemologically and politically, challenges the entrenched 
lines of power and global distribution of resources and work opportunities, which still 
fall along old colonial matrices of power that continue to be made and remade (Mignolo 
2009; Quijano 2007: 168–169). Border theory (Hicks 1991; Rosaldo 1993; Saldívar 
1997; Anzaldúa 2007) offers a unique framework premised in resistance that privileges 
the border as a site of “creative cultural production” that calls out the “mixed” border 
inhabitants’ (fronterizo4 and mestiza5) birthright and expert knowledge in crossing 
physical, intellectual, linguistic, and cultural barriers (Rosaldo quoted in Michaelsen 
and Johnson 1997).6 It is a kind of critical outlook or wisdom, rather than an exclusive 
sensibility. The pluralities available in accessing border spaces at physical, psychic, and 
                                                
4 fronterizo: border inhabitant. 
5 mestiza: mixed-race woman. This terminology invokes the mixed origins of Mexican Americans 
(African, Indigenous, Anglo [see Anzaldúa 2007: 99–113]).	  
6 This partial paragraph was previously published in an online intervention on the Antipode website (see 
Mena 2013). 
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imaginative multidimensional levels are useful to unpack the complex temporalities and 
spatialities of the power formations that border barriers generate. Border work is not 
limited to a geographical spatiality created in the overlap space of two places, but rather 
it resides in a space not acknowledged by hegemonic power (Saldívar Hull 1991). This 
“third space” or “imaginary ‘third country’” is “disidentified from the actual site where 
the nation-state draws the juridical line, where formations of violence play themselves 
throughout miles on either side of the line” and opens the possibilities for new forms of 
consciousness about ourselves and the formations that cross and divide us (Alarcón 
1993–1994: 154). 
 This kind of intellectual work is often situated in between methodological and 
disciplinary boundaries. It is a critical form of engagement that was first forged by 
Chicana border feminists using methods and theories that draw on ideological analysis 
and materialist and historical research, as well as race, class, and gender analysis, which 
is developed from an awareness of a specific material experience of a historical moment 
(Saldívar Hull 1991). Border thinking is a locus of enunciation that takes into account 
the ways that the margins are also in the center (Mignolo 2000). Border hermeneutics 
also deal with both sides of the intellectual frontiers of European modernity and entail 
writing from a place and a time, a situated knowledge that draws on our experiences 
(Mignolo 2000). This is a way of seeing that comes from the borderlands, which is 
constantly in a state of transition; it is also the lived and embodied crossroads without 
borders described by Anzaldúa (2007: 25). It is a space that in many ways must be 
comprehended in its immediacy. 
 Some of the critiques of “third space” border work are that it risks being a 
reductive image of the border by espousing a panacea of hybridity, a tenor in some of 
the work that has corresponded with the rise of the discourse of globalization around the 
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turn of the millennium. These pitfalls are some of the same ones that appear in 
neoclassic studies of borders ranging from a complicit espousal and alignment with 
neoliberal, free-market universals (i.e., a “borderless” world) to a romanticization of 
particulars that is offered up as universal, which can be symptomatic of a theoretical 
narcissism or even an exalted cultural particularism or nationalism. These extremes also 
rely on a dialectics of difference, so to approach this work I invoke a Fanonian resource 
of antidialectics that I employ as a way of explicitly laying bare the persisting Hegelian 
dualism that tacitly undergirds so many of the discussions of contemporary national 
borders today (Sekyi-Otu 1996). This opening vocabulary pays careful attention to 
social power mediated through space in a way that opens up a different set of resources 
to understand and think about dividing lines. 
 
A Fanonian Return — Antidialectic as Space 
My return to Fanon is precipitated by a different historical moment and situation in the 
world (Gates 1991). And it is not a singular return, but rather a series of situated returns. 
The role of Fanon and other revolutionary Third World writing shifted the sites of 
discursive work, deeply informing the emergence of first Chicana/o Studies and later 
Border Studies as counter-disciplinary fields of study, which are foundational to the 
methodological approach of this investigation (Pérez 1999: 15). I revisit Fanon’s 
writing, which explicitly deals with the “narrow” world that is “delimited by fences and 
sign posts,” and the ways that he understood material divisions — the “compartments,” 
the “lines of force,” and the “frontiers” of the colonial world — as a critical typology of 
roles and relations of race and power (Fanon 2001: 29; and quoted in Sekyi-Otu 1996: 
96). Our understandings of contemporary walls need to be grounded inside this 
historical genealogy of coercive division to fully and meaningfully engage with this 
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persisting social and political state architecture. What is unique about Fanon’s 
engagement is that it completely refuses a dialectical understanding of colonial history, 
which is what makes his writing an ongoing resource for understanding colonial 
governance, policing, and violence, laying bare the organizing power of race (Sekyi-
Otu 1996). This refusal ultimately allows Fanon “to avow and to name the horizon that 
constrains and enables its speech” (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 51). This is the same stance we 
must take in doing border thinking and border work. The act of refusing to acknowledge 
a division as real is what clarifies the sociological functions of the border wall, as 
opposed to merely its symbolic meaning. Fanon’s writing provides a vocabulary that I 
center as pivotal to my understanding and discussion of the coercive power of borders, 
which fundamentally alter time and space inside a real social political order that is the 
economic order. This perspective simultaneously allows for the “apprehension of a 
historical object in its immediate mode of appearance, and yet prepare[s] us for a 
comprehension of this object — that is to say, a fuller knowledge of its appearance and 
its conditions of intelligibility” (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 52–53, emphasis in the original). In 
other words, it is a perspective that allows us to understand the immediacy of our 
contemporary moment as both a historical object and as a futurity. Most of the world’s 
borders on every continent were drawn by conquest; and they were shaped and reshaped 
by colonial occupation and colonial management and, more recently, reconfigured by 
neoliberal corporate governance and/or military interventionism. Instead of looking for 
what might be the “new” significance of the latest generation of border fences and 
walls, a task that is ideologically locked inside a teleological relationship with well-
defined hegemonic temporal schemas that include “post-Cold War,” “post 9-11,” and 
“globalization,” I want to take a step back to consider the continuities of age-old 
practices of state-sponsored violence in delimiting the world — a perspective where the 
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field of interactions becomes the focus, and where new objects of study can come into 
view. I think this is useful for understanding walls and for problematizing the 
semiology of walling, a spatial form of violence as politics, and all the conceptual 
problems this untenable schema poses. 
 What does the structure of domination look like? In the colonial context, it was 
the visible condition of sequestration, apartheid, and confinement to the “narrow world 
strewn with prohibitions” (Fanon 2001: 29). “[W]hat parcels out the world is to begin 
with the fact of belonging or not belonging to a given race, a given species,” said Fanon 
(2001: 30–31).The colonizer-colonized relation is an order of absolute difference and 
radical irreciprocity that is fixed and made manifest in space (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 72). The 
world is spatially organized through a coercive politics of race, not the Marxist 
economy of time and class, which is why Fanon tells us the Marxist analysis must be 
“slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem” (2001: 31). The 
colonial context introduces “dead time,” where labor is coerced and time is no longer a 
regulative principle in the narrative of social being and the critique of domination 
(Sekyi-Otu 1996: 76). The measure of the totalitarian nature of this social organization 
isn’t so much in the surplus value, but the magnitude of the physical and metaphysical 
division between colonizer and colonized (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 76–77). This is a coercive 
and forced existence, and one that is primarily connected to the human condition of 
existing in space. “Coercion as a compulsion presupposes coercion as restraint. One 
cannot begin to compel another to use a space in a certain way unless he has already 
restrained the other from using space in alternative ways. At the center of coercion is 
effective control of space” (Weinstein quoted in Sekyi-Otu 1996: 78). The critique of 
domination becomes an analysis of the spatial structuring of positions. Fanon’s writing 
assigns causal primacy to the political event of violent conquest that constitutes a social 
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reality. It is the conquest institutionalized in the “colonial system” to which the 
colonizer owes the very fact of his existence as a property owner (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 49). 
The consequences of the act of conquest and political domination are the system of 
property relations, and an entire universe of social, juridical, and symbolic practices and 
transactions (49). It is a world where the native lives in a “permanent state of tension” 
(Fanon 2001: 41). “The symbols of the social order — the police, the bugle calls in the 
barracks, military parades and the waving flags — are at one and the same time 
inhibitory and stimulating. … [T]hey cry out ‘Get ready to attack’” (41). “[T]he 
presence of an obstacle accentuates the tendency toward motion” (41). The references 
and depictions of the freeing power of bodily movement and motion present throughout 
most liberatory, Third World, revolutionary, anti-colonial, and postcolonial writing 
accentuate the moral and political power of the corporeal response in undercutting what 
we might call the arrested dialectics of isolating division and domination. 
 
Implications of Using Border Methods 
The question of the universal and particular is important to engage with, especially as 
this study tries to situate larger questions about the global practices of national wall 
building inside the particulars of specific projects and historical moments. What is 
universal about walls is the persisting idea of otherness that frames most of the 
knowledge production about changes in borders. Racism is premised in borders, divided 
by straight and clear lines (Du Bois 1984). Race supremacy is naturalized in the 
historical world, and the people in it and the categories of race are atemporal. Essence 
precedes existence for the colonizer, and for the “Other,” his or her existence decrees 
essence, an essence innocent of discrete particulars (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 52). Divisions are 
rendered as atemporal. It is an anti-narrativist manner of living and reliving the colonial 
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event and the insurrection it invites that allows us to understand the colonial context 
(Sekyi-Otu 1996: 51). This is a borderlands perspective. Borderlands work has to 
accomplish this subversive outlook. It is anti-modern, anti-dominant, and anti-
territorial. Border thinking can only be from a subaltern perspective, and never from a 
territorial one, because territorial perspectives are operative of appropriation, and 
ultimately make the study of the “coloniality of power” (Quijano 2007) or “colonial 
difference” an object of knowledge rather than an epistemic potential (Mignolo 2000: 
45). In the methodological and procedural architecture of my research approach, I 
continually refer back to this orientation, a perpetual crossroads, where I constantly 
question, probe, and challenge the normative assumptions that are embedded in this 
work. Because walls are social, spatial, symbolic, discursive, and even allegorical, the 
new geographies and configurations of power formations via walls implicate the need 
for a borderlands approach to looking at this phenomenon.	  
	  
Research Architecture 
Early on, as I began to plan the scope of research and to think about which 
methodological tools might be best suited for unpacking the social and political 
building blocks of very different contemporary border barriers — ranging from short, 
cinder-block walls near alligator-infested rivers to high-tech, virtual barriers with 
cameras and sensors in harsh desert terrain — it became clear that I would need an 
approach that would allow for macro-level inquiry, but one which would still capture 
the complexities and very different socio-historical contexts of each particular walling 
project. Also, the methodology would need to be able to accommodate the changing 
signification of walls and fences over time because most of the structures had already 
been built years prior to my investigation. 
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 In using a borderlands imagination that privileged the border as the center, I 
found that the contour of my questions was very different in relationship to some of the 
early literature on this subject. Rather than having a rigid commitment to a singular 
methodology, I explored different ways of making these walls “speak,” looking at not 
only the “nature” of walling in the present, but also how they related inside a larger 
history of state-based walling initiatives. This kind of framing allowed me to home in 
on what these material structures might mean for the ways we talk about the social 
space or the “geo-body” of the nation-state and its borders in the context of the rising 
sovereignty of global capital (Winichakul 1994). In particular, this approach privileges 
the borderlands as a key site where changes in securitization, policing, and violence 
against both citizens and noncitizens offer clues about the continuities, the 
contradictions, and the reconfigurations of racialized regimes of power in the era of 
“multiculturalism” and universal human rights. Comparisons of different walls through 
case studies, which involved mixed, qualitative methods, proved rich in findings that 
forced me to revisit my questions again and again. Each wall and the sociopolitical 
scaffolding that surrounded its construction and ongoing existence served as a unit of 
study. Strategically limiting the scope of this comparative project required careful 
considerations of the timeframe of the analysis, representative fieldwork sites, and 
which side of the walls I would ultimately work from. 
 
Understanding Walls as Social Space 
In order to assess if the new genre of border walls is indicative of a new kind of social 
organization of space, it was necessary to characterize the term space as it relates to 
walling. Drawing from different bodies of work about the logic of capitalism in the 
construction of social space (Lefebvre 1974; Jameson 1991; Etlin 1994; Virilio 1994; 
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Fanon 2001; Massey 2005) opened up a broader set of means to help distinguish 
between ideology and knowledge in the context of understanding space — the lived, 
perceived, and conceived — and deciphering its interrelationships, oppositions, and 
dispositions that are all messily bound up in a simultaneous web of past, present, and 
future (Lefebvre 1974). Architectural space, in this case as it pertains to walls, is a way 
of thinking that offers a kind of cognitive, problem solving, and philosophizing in the 
postmodern. Walls telegraph the changing socio-abstract into a spatio-concrete inside 
the spatial formations of capitalism, which operatively renders an in-between space that 
simultaneously contains an appearance of security and constant threat, and experiences 
both overt and latent acts of violence (Lefebvre 1974: 57). This sociological approach 
in looking at the spatial situates border walls as paradoxical superstructures, 
characteristic of late capitalism, where the cultural and economic collapse back into one 
another in new spatial relations of power (Jameson 1991: 125, xxi). 
 The spatial relations of the present are profoundly shaped by the “coloniality of 
power,” a concept that underscores how modern management of people in relation to 
space has a neocolonial core (Quijano 2007). Imperial and colonial relations have 
created deep interconnections between places via architectural, spectacular, 
performative, and lived spaces. Even now, this spatial relationship tends to be 
characterized inside updated binaries of the imperial “center” and colonized 
“periphery,” like the “Third World,” the “developing world” and the “global North,” et 
cetera, obscuring the hybridity of place — the idea that places are constituted in 
relationship to other places, as opposed to some intrinsic quality of location (Driver and 
Gilbert 1999; Massey 2005). Also, images and attitudes persist about different kinds of 
spaces: the city, the country, the border, et cetera, even as they are reconfigured and 
reconstituted by new relationships of labor, capital, and violence (Williams 1973). 
 
 
32 
Geographer Derek Gregory has described this as the imaginative geographies of the 
colonial present: 
 
… constructions that fold distance into difference through a series of 
spatializations. They work by multiplying partitions and enclosures that serve to 
demarcate “the same” from “the other,” at once constructing and calibrating a 
gap between the two by “designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is 
‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs.’ (2004: 17) 
 
Often these are constituted in linear narratives that have roots in universality. Even 
when political action and alternative configurations of power are reformulated in linear 
narratives, they end up in a theoretical aporia somewhere in a primordial locus for 
modernity in Greece and France, or in the case of border walls, back in Berlin. This 
telling of contemporary border walls carefully looks at different local and situated 
histories of border barrier projects, contextualized inside the respective histories of 
colonial power through several case studies. 
 
Case Studies 
To answer these questions about the contemporary global tendency to wall national 
borders, I started from a sociological imperative of looking at the whole picture through 
detailed and descriptive case studies. Case studies are in-depth, multifaceted 
investigations using qualitative research methods of a single social phenomenon. 
Conducting multiple case studies of border walls constructed during roughly the same 
period created a framework for an inter-subjective and comparative basis for my 
observations (Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg 1991: 2, 18). Following Geertz, these case 
studies consist of “thick descriptions,” an interpretative practice that asks questions 
about these structures’ social grounding and importance (1993). Descriptive method 
involves conceptual and methodological assemblage in a creative, innovative 
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observation, which can yield new insights (Savage 2009: 170). Many different 
qualitative approaches could have proved equally engaging and useful as the method I 
ultimately decided to use for this project. For instance, I could have framed my 
investigation to look narrowly at only the physical structures themselves, or conducted 
ethnographic fieldwork with communities impacted by the border walls. But at the heart 
of my inquiry were core questions about some of the early claims that have been made 
about this as a global architecture (Andreas 2000; Davis 2005; Brown 2010; Jones 
2012). Does the latest wave of wall building actually mark out something “new”? 
Beyond the highly symbolic roles of walls, what are the lived, sociological, and 
material functions of border barriers? Do these barriers present contradictions or 
paradoxes about state sovereignty, or are some of these contradictions inherent to the 
dialectics of bordering? To ask some of the deeper theoretical questions about how 
nation-state sovereignty might be changing, and what significance border walling might 
have in relationship to new formulations of securitization, terror, and globalization, I 
needed an approach that was more than an isolated, in-depth depiction of one wall. 
 Due to the lack of primary sources on less studied walls, the “thick description” 
in these case studies derives from mixed, qualitative methods of investigation. These 
rely primarily on three main sets of archives: government documents, judicial 
documents, and media coverage. I also examined some of the borderlands literature, 
fiction, and music from each country that specifically addressed social and cultural 
memories of national boundaries, or that offered alternative futures or conceptions of 
these contested spaces. The span of these archives corresponds with the changing 
spatiotemporal changes of the wall itself, tracing from when a border barrier is first 
conceived as an idea or “solution,” through its construction and its ongoing existence. 
Secondary methods, including supplemental interviews and observational visits to the 
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actual walls helped to fill in the spaces or gaps in the “descriptive assemblage” of these 
cases (Savage 2009). Limited additional interviews were conducted with adults living 
or working in border communities crossed by walls. These voices accounted for a daily 
reality of the actual processes that take place at the wall, which tempered the official 
narrative in the archives, and often drew out some of the functional aspects of state 
sovereignty and power embodied in the wall that are not mentioned in the headlines or 
policies, but are functional on the ground. This helped me to create a deep, descriptive 
analysis of the “structures of signification” in walling, a process that relates quite 
literally to the physical wall itself, and also to the national and social context 
surrounding the construction and presence of the wall (Geertz 1993: 9). This kind of 
“triangulation” of literature analysis, interviews, and empirical observation opened up 
the possibilities for me to critically study different border walls with very different 
historical positions, and to interrogate in what ways they are similar and dissimilar 
(Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg 1991). 
 
Project Scope 
The first step in this project was to begin with an archeology of state-based walling 
initiatives. This helped me to identify the emergent temporal markers that the early 
work on contemporary national border walls laid out within a particular ideological 
framing, a set of assumptions that use post-Berlin and, later, post–September 11, 2001, 
as a sort of shorthand to demarcate the age of border walls. Peter Andreas and Tim 
Snyder’s early considerations about “the Wall after the Wall” in the late 1990s offered 
some of the first insights into the new border walls springing up after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and marked the changes in an “increasingly important era of state 
regulatory activity, which involves ideological redefinitions of border functions and 
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territorial policing” (2000: 2). Even though the political popularity behind walls 
persists, the “nature” of these walls and the threats they are built to repel have changed 
(Andreas and Snyder 2000: 1). The new walls deter a perceived invasion of 
“undesirables” — unwanted immigrants — a phenomenon that Andreas located on the 
“geographic fault line dividing rich and poor regions” and, specifically, on the U.S.-
Mexico border and the eastern and southern borders of the European Union (2000: 1). 
However, since these early reflections, contemporary nation-state walling has not really 
emerged in the world or in scholarship as a single historical phenomenon. New walls 
were often discussed individually, but not as part of a global and common event until 
very recently (Brown 2010: 26–27). More often this phenomenon takes the form of 
more specific case studies or area or regional studies like Nevins’s (2010) and 
Andreas’s (2000) work on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands or Gregory’s (2004) work on 
Gaza and the architecture of colonial occupation. Mike Davis (2005) was one of the 
first social scientists to talk about the singular contemporary global phenomena of 
border wall building. In an essay titled “The Great Wall of Capital,” Davis explained in 
a thesis similar to Andreas’s how “the global triumph of neoliberal capitalism has 
stimulated the greatest wave of wall building and border fortification in history” and 
how globalized border enforcement is as much in the sea and in the air as on land, 
including digital, geographical, virtual, and architectural borders (Davis 2005: 88–89). 
He situated the current walling regimes as analogous to the Roman Empire’s transition 
into the second century from relatively open borders to massive linear walls, like a great 
wall of capital on the edges of the overdeveloped world. He outlined three continental 
regimes: U.S.-Mexican Frontera7, Fortress Europe, and what might be called the 
“Howard Line,” separating Australia from Asia, noting that since the fall of the World 
                                                
7 Frontera: border (but this has a double meaning, as frontera also means frontier, a terminology that 
references U.S. imperial practices in the West and Southwest). 
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Trade Center towers, these mega-borders have become the ramparts of empire in 
several literal and paradoxical senses (90). According to Davis, these borders enthrone 
the borderless sovereignty of capital upon the physical fortification of inequality and the 
criminalization of labor migration (98–99). These prime meridians, so to speak, occupy 
a large space in contemporary literature about border securitization and migration in the 
era of globalization, but still orient our knowledge production about these processes in a 
particular way that privileges theorizing inside a hegemonic telos of Western 
civilizationism. This plays out when a civilizational wealth axis is used as a primary 
means to understand and think about contemporary divisions between nations, and it 
becomes even more problematic when this is mapped onto “terror talk” that extends and 
legitimizes concepts of cultural orders tacitly in this framework. This is often expressed 
as a kind of “novelty” that there is something inherently new about the latest round of 
border walls and what they inscribe or do, and especially how these practices 
reconfigure state-based power. 
 The Berlin Wall was the last major wall in the twentieth century, and when this 
wall was taken down in 1989, national border walling fell out of favor as an acceptable 
practice, except along lines of very sharp conflict. However, in the late 1990s, early 
incarnations of new walling projects like the pilot wall in San Diego along the U.S.-
Mexico border were already underway. September 11, 2001, has become a kind of 
bookend reference to the fall of the Berlin Wall in much of the literature that describes 
globalization. Contemporary walling initiatives were born out of this convergence of 
the cultural/race logic of the Cold War, and also out of a contemporary legal shift in 
which military justice was extended to citizens in the United States after 9-11 and also 
in Europe, where new labels of alienage based on nationalism and religion became 
guises for race and new forms of ethnic profiling and policing (Mamdani 2004; Cole 
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2003). I begin with 2001 as the starting point in my query as a way of intentionally 
engaging this taken-for-granted temporal scape and thinking about it differently. 
 Geographer Reece Jones examined several controversial border security projects 
in leading democracies and the consequences of physical barriers on those who live in 
these “newly securitized spaces” and “how the process of locking down and closing 
political borders should be theorized in terms of state-making, nationalism and 
sovereignty” (2012: 1). He said that these physical and symbolic changes will remain 
the most durable and profound consequence of the global war on terror, shifts that have 
occurred as the “enemy-other” is represented as no longer constrained by geography, 
but a figure that can strike anyone, anywhere, and at any time. However, the global war 
on terror discourse does not explain the whole picture, he explained. Feelings of fear 
and vulnerability of a globalized terrorist network were reanimated and focused through 
representations of neighboring countries as ungoverned spaces with uncivilized 
populations (Jones 2012: 2). The narratives that justified barriers in places like the 
United States, Israel, and India focus on the external factors of terrorism, violence, and 
instability, while the underlying causes and significance of the barrier are internal to the 
barrier-builder state (3). In Jones’s framework the construction of the barrier legitimizes 
and intensifies the other internal exclusionary practices of the sovereign state in 
material form (3). The lasting significance of walls, Jones suggested, is the context of 
the long-term expansion and consolidation of sovereign power in the state system (3). 
 Political theorist Wendy Brown (2010) wrote one of the first books discussing 
the global scope of contemporary walling initiatives in the context of the 
reconfiguration of nation-state sovereignty, which is increasingly dividing the economic 
power from the political power in a way that makes capital the new global sovereign 
and requires the state to take on an increasingly theological formation of political 
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powers in religiously sanctioned political violence. Contemporary border walls are 
situated in an economy-security nexus where forms of biopower and governance 
intersect in an updated Realpolitik where the nation-state boundary is a border to limn 
non-state transnational actors (Brown 2010: 94, 21). There are paradoxes in these new 
walls: the simultaneous opening and blocking; the universalization mixed with 
exclusion and stratification; and finally, a network of virtual power met with physical 
barricades (20). And walls in this context are iconographic of the predicament of state 
power and the increasingly corrupted divide between internal and external policing with 
both police and militaries (24–25). According to Brown, walls have temporally and 
spatially ad hoc and provisional qualities, and walls often undo or invert what they are 
meant to inscribe and generate an increasingly closed and policed collective version of 
identity instead of the open society they are intended to defend, which constitutes new 
forms of xenophobia and parochialism in a post-national era (24, 40). In the context of 
late modern subjects’ psychic-political desires, anxieties, and needs, walls offer 
reassurance inside the shifting horizons, orders, and identities in the face of the decline 
of state sovereignty. The transnational specter of terrorism is insufficient to account for 
the state’s vulnerability to be transformed into the vulnerability of the subject citizen. 
Brown suggested that it is the circuitry established by the social contract that achieves 
this. The sovereign state brings into being and secures the sovereign social subject, even 
as it appropriates the subject’s political sovereignty (108). She concludes her reflection 
on how walls fail to repel or block transnational flows, but instead are effective in 
producing psychic containment (109). 
 The meaning-making of walling and fencing projects is usually couched in 
symbolic terms, a discussion that is situated in the modernist tradition of the older 
aesthetic absolutes of the symbol, which is in crisis (Jameson 1991). This is a juncture I 
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approach carefully with a thoughtful tension to avoid a narrative where border walls are 
either reduced to symbolic terms of psychic engagement or to merely the material 
violence. For instance, understanding the U.S. border wall as a symbolic monument is 
problematic when most of the taxpayers underwriting the ongoing costs of the wall’s 
maintenance never even get to see it except in pictures, news reports, and the occasional 
reality TV show like “Border Wars,” where U.S. Border Patrol agents are a new kind of 
frontier hero. I have not seen accounts of conflicting configurations of sovereignty, 
between the version that is trying to protect the state from terror and the other kinds of 
sovereignty that have a more everyday quality, that border residents have to negotiate. 
For instance, I met an Arizona rancher who lives along the border wall who has to file a 
tort claim with the federal government every time he tries to get compensation for the 
cattle that U.S. Border Patrol agents on all-terrain vehicles run over and kill. 
 This work engages with some of the complexities of doing border work by 
starting from the contradictions that are inherent in “third space” work at a 
methodological level in order to be more precise about the “paradoxes” of border walls 
and frame these a bit differently. I have cursorily staked out some of the junctures in the 
early literature on contemporary national border walls in this section to better situate 
points of departure in my own case studies looking at the importance of the disciplinary 
and exclusionary power of walls in our contemporary moment. There are no clear 
answers in this kind of inquiry, but rather, different kinds of questions about how we 
think about contemporary walling in relationship to some of the broader implications of 
the changing configurations of national borders. 
 
Selecting Fieldwork Sites 
The next step was to try to decide which of the more than 30 border barriers to include 
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as case studies in the project. I decided to look at walls that had already been built, 
because finished walls and fences harbor some initial clues about their functionality, 
and also their failures. My aim was to have several case studies in countries with 
different socio-political contexts of boundary making. Initially, the plan included: the 
tiniest border wall, built by the Costa Rican government on its national border with 
Nicaragua; the longest border fence in the world, under construction between India and 
Bangladesh; and one of the archetypal and heavily militarized barriers, the U.S. border 
fence with Mexico. Ultimately, the decisions around the final fieldwork sites were made 
within the constraints of access, contacts, safety concerns, language abilities, and 
funding. I was able to successfully conduct the Costa Rican and U.S. case studies as 
planned, partnering as a research affiliate at the national university and a well-known 
state university, respectively. The Costa Rican barrier is situated inside a complex 
postcolonial history, which includes highly contested historical flows of human 
migration. However, unlike walls in the United States or Fortress Europe, this barrier is 
not at the edges of the overdeveloped world, and it offered a rich comparative space to 
interrogate what kinds of social forces inform state border-walling initiatives. This 
space offered an opportunity to look with a comparative lens at the different socio-
cultural conceptions of nation and citizenship that these walls produce, and the ways in 
which these particular scenarios intersect and diverge inside a larger global tendency to 
build border walls. 
 Border walls are always built unilaterally by one country, and my primary 
orientation and focus in this research was to look at the builder countries. The uneven 
nature of wall building, in the context of the unique spatiality and contested histories 
particular to borderlands, required a nuanced frame for my research. Borderlands are a 
neither here-nor-there space that is crossed by national boundaries, many times 
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violently drawn, in ways that separate and divide historically connected communities. 
The nature of this kind of space required that I situate myself as researcher in such a 
way that did not privilege the imaginary borders of the nation-state, even while I 
investigated a state practice of border walling within the typical funding and research 
constraints of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). So while 
I oriented my research to look at builder-states, I also consulted archives and resources 
as needed from countries that have been fenced out. 
 
Ethical Dimensions of Border Research 
Some of the major ethical dimensions, beyond complying with all of the appropriate 
institutional regulations guiding ethical research practices, were specific to doing 
research on a border, considerations that go beyond traditional institutional review 
boards’ frameworks. The recently developed “Code of Personal Ethics for Border 
Researchers” is one attempt at a document laying out the political and activist 
framework that should ground scholarship and research activities in border 
communities, and it gives examples of what such a framework might include (Ochoa 
O’Leary, Deeds, and Whiteford 2013). Often, scholarship on borders draws on and 
reproduces regional and linguistic borders in research (Ochoa O’Leary, Deeds, and 
Whiteford 2013: 279). This project attempts to draw on multilingual sources from 
different regions, even while focusing on builder-states. Another related dimension in 
maintaining excellence in border research is creating binational collaboration, which 
includes binational peer-review processes and multilingual publications in the 
dissemination of research findings. I am grateful to the research communities that I 
have connected with in my respective fieldwork sites, who have required me to present 
my work, encouraged me to publish my findings in Spanish-language journals, and 
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provided important feedback, suggested resources, and agreed to read final drafts of my 
work to critically assess it. 
 
Delimitations 
The goal of this project is not to conclusively answer these questions — an 
epistemological position that would reproduce some of the very systems of thinking that 
I am trying to engage with and critique — but rather to interrogate the way we talk 
about the “nature” of national borders and to address the racialized logic that underpins 
the construction of these superstructures built at the crossroads of globalization and 
securitization. The results and findings of this kind of methodology are new sets of 
questions that challenge the ways we talk about space, sovereignty, the nation-state, and 
the human right to mobility inside contemporary systems of closure and enclosure. And 
while border walls are not the only space or place where this kind of inquiry can 
happen, the politics of place and the Western academy privilege the study of certain 
configurations, which functionally obscure the operative social mechanics of neoliberal 
ideologies in updated versions of the same old racisms, oppressions, and violence with 
new, socially acceptable, and politically correct veneers. 
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Chapter 2: Hedges and Barbed Wire: An Archeology of State Walling  
 
In the beginning was the fence. Fence, enclosure, and border are deeply 
interwoven in the world formed by men, determining its concepts. The enclosure 
gave birth to the shrine by removing it from the ordinary, placing it under its 
own laws, and entrusting it to the divine. 
 
— Jost Trier, German linguist during the Third Reich, quoted in Nomos of the 
Earth by Carl Schmitt (2003: 74) 
 
The men who first laid out a road between two places accomplished one of the 
greatest feats. By coming and going between the two they may have linked them 
subjectively in a manner of speaking, but those places were not objectively 
joined until they had impressed the Road onto the surface of the earth: the will 
to connection had become the Form of things, Form which was offered to the 
will for each repetition, without this being dependent any longer on its 
frequency or scarcity. 
 
— Georg Simmel, “Bridge and Door” (1994) 
 
Sacred Dividing Lines 
The practice of dividing is strictly a human endeavor. The ability to be able to see 
things in nature as spatially separate means that we have already related them to each 
other in our awareness, or put another way, “separating and connecting are only two 
faces of one and the same action” (Simmel 1908). This chapter begins with a reflection 
on these sacred dividing lines and otherness, looking at thresholds, limits, and 
transgressions, concepts that are at the core of many enquiries in philosophy and social 
theory and are constitutive of the histories that are deeply embedded in the psychic and 
socio-spatial creation of walls and fences. Next, it outlines an archeology of state 
walling practices, uncovering how walling and fencing have historically taken on new 
meanings in the context of extractive capitalism and have evolved as a tool to enact 
violence and formalize racial segregation. This account tends to the social practices of 
power vis-à-vis walls by highlighting the operational, ideological, and even physical 
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details of barriers in order to more clearly recognize the continuities and political stakes 
in the contemporary case studies that follow. There are numerous other examples and 
instances that could also be considered in conjunction with what is outlined here. 
However, this survey lays the historical groundwork for a critical engagement with 
nomos, Third Reich theorist Carl Schmitt’s geo-philosophy of appropriation, which 
understands a fence as the spatial order that organizes all political and social human life 
and will be examined in the next chapter.  
 Most discussions of division and separation go back to the primordial locus of 
separation between the sacred and the profane. The location of the threshold is 
especially pregnant with meaning and symbolism. Etlin describes it this way: 
 
Passage across the boundary between the profane world without and the sacred 
domain within acquired special importance. Even today the threshold, any 
threshold, retains a symbolic character that extends beyond its merely functional 
purpose. It seems likely that the basic configuration of early settlements 
organized according to a cosmogonic ritual, which privileges the perimeter and 
the center, is grounded in the human psyche’s need for orientation related to our 
own body sense. (1994: xx) 
 
Humans seek different meanings simultaneously in the same space, which Etlin talked 
about in three ways: “the primal, experiential space of ‘deep structure’; the 
hierarchically organized space according to social codes; and the multiple, simultaneous 
layering of meaning given to a particular place” (1994: xx). This is interesting to 
compare with Gloria Anzaldúa’s (2007) work on borders, which echoes this 
configuration of space and understands it as simultaneously a psychic, personal, and 
collective experience. In her explanations of the creation of space — and borders as an 
unnatural space, in particular — she talks about how humans fear both the ordinary — 
the animal impulse of sex, the unconscious, the unknown, and the alien — and the 
supernatural — the divine, the superhuman, and the god in us (2007: 39). Culture and 
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religion seek to protect us from these two forces. She discusses the woman — who 
creates life and bleeds but does not die, as closer to the undivine — and who becomes 
the stranger and the “Other” (39). The common, originary root in most texts talking 
about the “Other” continues to circle back to the line that divides between sacred and 
profane (Kant 1795; Simmel 1908; Bauman 1990; Derrida 2000 and 2001). 
 Other theorists have framed these discussions of separation in terms of limits 
and transgression, where the transgression of a limit or line becomes the threshold. If 
Kafka’s story “The Great Wall of China,” a fictional account of how a wall is built on 
mythical foundations, is considered in relationship to his parable of the doorkeeper 
guarding access to the law in “Before the Law,” the alterity engendered by walls is put 
in contrast with the exclusionary function of doors (Leach 1997: xix). It is the door that 
breaches the wall opening up to the “Other,” an act that ultimately exposes the wall for 
what it is (Simmel 1908; Leach 1997: xx). The act of breaching or transgression is often 
a place where language fails (Foucault 1977: 40). Foucault uses a metaphor of the 
transgression as lightning, which lights up the night sky “from the inside, from top to 
bottom, and yet owes to the dark the stark clarity of its manifestation, its harrowing and 
poised singularity” (1977: 35). He describes the relationship of transgression with limits 
as a spiral, which is generative of a multiplicity of spatialities and different kinds of 
horizons. “Transgression is neither violence in a divided world (in an ethical world) nor 
a victory over limits (in a dialectical or revolutionary world); and exactly for this 
reason, its role is to measure the excessive distance that it opens at the heart of the limit 
and to trace the flashing line that causes the limit to arise” (35). This metaphor accesses 
the multiple temporalities and spatialities of crossing a borderline and the complexities 
in categorizing or capturing the illusive significance of the line itself. 
 Many of the semiotic frames and psychoanalytical discussions of the “Other” 
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often focus on this primordial relationship of oneself with the world or with the cosmos, 
to understand and frame questions around what or who has the power to divide, and the 
spatialities of otherness. Most of this intellectual framing has historical roots in 
Enlightenment thinking, where the philosophical production of knowledge was 
crucially constitutive of the production of new rationales and powers to divide humans. 
The writing and essays by Kant, Hume, and Hegel drew up realms of “reason” and 
“civilization” as synonymous with “white” Europe, and savagery and unreason as 
located outside Europe among non-white people (Eze 1997: 5). The remnants of this 
spatial schema of knowledge often lurk just beneath the surface of theoretical 
treatments of borders, in particular. As a historical period, the Enlightenment produced 
a scientific and philosophical vocabulary that built and continues to undergird larger 
sets of analytical social, political, scientific, and philosophical categories of the world 
(Eze 1997: 7). The knowledge of social space reproduces and expounds on these 
processes and categories of production (Lefebvre 1974: 36). The Western “self” in the 
philosophical and political study of borders has to be understood as a central aporia in 
undertaking new studies that take up primordial questions of boundaries. 
 
[T]he experience of the Other, or the problem of the “I” of others and of human 
beings we perceive as foreign to us, has almost always posed virtually 
insurmountable difficulties to the Western philosophical and political tradition. 
Whether dealing with Africa or with other non-European worlds, this tradition 
long denied the existence of any ‘self’ but its own. (Mbembe 2001: 2, emphasis 
in original) 
 
Even the later philosophical attempts by Heidegger and others that have tried to resolve 
this problem have “ended in pluralist idealism that leaves the foundations of the 
Western solipsism intact” (Mbembe 2001: 18–19). This privileged understanding of self 
has to be founded instead on a set of absolute and eternal beliefs (de Beauvoir 1953). In 
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order to think about walls and what they might mean, I have looked for words and 
approaches that unpack and get to the heart of the power configurations at stake in these 
spatial formations. 
 
Monumentality 
For this work, it is useful to think about national border walls as monuments in the 
Lefebvreian sense. Monumental space offers each member of society an image of 
membership in a collective mirror (Lefebvre 1974: 220). The monument effects a 
“consensus” about power and wisdom generally, rendering it concrete, and the 
repression that is required to enact this consensus is transformed into exaltation (220). 
The collapsing of repression and violence into a material homage makes a semiology of 
the symbolic dialectics of knowledge of this space difficult to envisage (220). Many of 
the discussions about specific walls, and also the early comparative global accounts of 
contemporary border walls, emphasize the symbolism or meaning of walls in regard to 
nation-state sovereignty and enacting the lines of alienage of the transnational “Other.” 
New walls are described as mapping threats or fears about terrorism onto existing 
civilizational binaries, reanimating or “newly” invigorating old, exclusionary 
imaginaries and behavior toward populations on the “other” side of hardening borders 
(Jones 2012). And while monuments embody symbols, even archaic and 
incomprehensible ones, they are not merely objects or an aggregation of diverse objects, 
but rather they act as strong points or anchors in webs and textures of social space, 
capturing the layers and levels of perception, representation, and spatial practice across 
time (Lefebvre 1974: 222–224). This is why “border zones” and “borderscapes” exist in 
a wide array of spatial configurations outside of the border itself, but studies of these 
spaces frequently refer back to the actual boundary line or fence. These structures 
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transcend death and have an atemporal quality, where appearance and reality converge. 
However, this convergence is incomplete and not lasting, and this underlying 
contradiction undermines the structure itself. Thinking of border walls as a kind of 
monument, a site of memory, and a space where a will toward power is enacted, and as 
a space that is determined by what may or may not take place there, makes this the kind 
of space where there is a continual back and forth between private speech of ordinary 
conversation and the public speech of discourses (Lefebvre 1974: 224). 
 This perspective is useful because it does not reduce walls to a symbolic or 
discursive realm. Instead it allows for us to access the multiplicity of ways that a wall is 
a social process, a nation, a tool, a form of control, a memory, a symbol, and even a 
material object. For example, shortly after World War I, the French and British military 
surveyors placed deep cairns to mark the border between their respective colonial 
mandates in Lebanon and Palestine. Today these old colonial markers visibly capture 
the shifts in time and space. The markers no longer distribute the horizons of territory, 
even though they recall operative truths of geopolitical entities and realities like 
Palestine. These markers serve as “geopolitical yard sticks” because they also vertically 
reveal the differential stains of missing soils, the physical trace of the land theft during 
the late 1990s, when the Israeli government removed fertile topsoil from an occupied 
“Security Zone” of Southern Lebanon and transferred the fertile soil to Israeli 
settlements (Nyers 2012). 
 As the following chapters will explore, not all barriers are acknowledged, nor 
does a barrier always go on to become a deeply symbolic marker in and of itself, even 
when the national boundary line is strongly contested. Some barriers are most symbolic 
in the temporal moment, when people and politicians protest the physical act of its 
construction. Looking at walls as part of a monumental space opens up ways to 
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understand how consensus is coercively enacted across time and space. So even though 
a wall can be overgrown with weeds and does not functionally exclude or divide 
anyone, it is still possible to access the ways in which memories and the will toward 
power is enacted, extended, and embodied, mutating in other spaces, locations, and 
practices far away from the wall. 
 
“Legibility” of Statecraft in the History of Human Mobility 
In many ways the history of walls is a key part of the history of human mobility, 
because anything that prevents human movement has a bodily effect. Netz wrote, “The 
history of the prevention of motion is therefore a history of force upon bodies: a history 
of violence and pain” (2004: xi–xii). Historically, the functions of walling and fencing 
have been multifarious, but always connected and intrinsic to power relations and social 
organization. As such, the lens for looking at walling must first build from what Mann 
calls the “infrastructure” of power — how geographical and social spaces are conquered 
and controlled by power organizations (1986: 9). Because walls are the oldest human-
made structures on earth, the scope of the discussion here is limited to a survey of key 
moments where practices of walling and fencing as a formation of power developed, 
specifically in relationship to the emergence of the nation-state. 
 With a few exceptions, most walls from the first century BC up to the eleventh 
century AD were used exclusively for defensive military maneuvering. The earliest 
kinds of recorded walling projects were defensive architecture at the edges of conflict, 
rooted in projects of empire building like the Great Wall of China and the walls of the 
Roman Empire. In this context walls literally marked the limits of imperial power and 
served as a cost-effective defensive tactic, due to the prohibitive expense involved in 
maintaining and administering human infantry and supply chains. A major function of 
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these early barriers was to delineate and maintain the outermost limits of control over 
land. Some walls were built by the invading empires, while others were built to keep the 
invaders out. The length of the walls, the construction materials, and the features of 
ancient walling projects varied greatly. However, all of the walling projects required 
massive amounts of labor, much of it forced labor by soldiers, convicts, and peasants 
over long periods of time. Empire often expressed its power in relationship to walls, not 
only through expanding claims with new trenches or building walls to protect existing 
claims from invaders, but also through respecting boundaries as a demonstration of the 
excess of its might. By respecting boundaries, an imperial power could operatively 
expand the range of its force without passing beyond the limits of law, allowing a 
continuance of prior titles and boundaries (Heller-Roazen 2009: 57). Roman jurists 
developed comprehensive legal codes that defined the relationship between objects and 
the subjects who could claim them (59). City walls in this legal framework fell in the 
category of “sanctified things” (res sanctae), objects incapable of being appropriated by 
a single person. To violate “sanctified things” was to incur an exceptional punishment 
(60). In the founding myth of Rome, the twins Romulus and Remus could not agree on 
which hill to build the city. Romulus began to dig a trench or build the city wall of 
Rome. When Remus belittled the new wall and jumped over it, Romulus condemned 
him to death, saying: “So perish henceforth all who cross my walls” (Wiseman 1995: 
10). Most versions of this story turn Remus’s death into an exemplary tale, where even 
a family member’s life will be sacrificed for the safety of the city (Wiseman 1995: 125). 
This representation of the wall as sanctified, even above the blood bonds of fraternal 
solidarity, is a mythological foreshadowing of the disciplinary and brutal powers of 
walls. The advent of the European city-state in the Middle Ages offered a different 
resource and representation of city walls as spaces of refuge and community. 
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 Medieval city walls, while defensive in many respects, were also an 
infrastructure of community-based protection and peace that were intrinsic to early 
versions of citizenship, premised on increasing human mobility, changes born in the 
shadow of the wooden palisades put up around free cities (Mumford 1940). Banishment 
outside the walls’ protection was the form of punishment for social deviancy, which put 
the one who had been banished outside of the community, the law, and security 
(Chamayou 2012: 14). This social and legal dispossession proscribed the outlaw from 
any form of hospitality or solidarity, making the banished one of the walking dead, free 
to be killed and cut off from all human help (14).	  As the absolutist state began its 
decline, the modern state began to take shape in the fourteenth century, and the role of 
the wall and the free city was in transition. Technologies like gunpowder, better roads, 
and more mobile armies signaled the end of the free city (Mumford 1940; Giddens 
1985). In the English context, this movement was particularly significant. 
 
The Enclosure Movement 
England employed boundary making by hedges and fencing as “cultural practices of 
power” to create rights of ownership and possession in its colonial holdings (Seed 1995: 
15). Seed traces the English preoccupation with boundary making back to some of the 
earliest English records of sales and gifts of land from AD 600 (15): “By the early 
Middle Ages the cultural importance of boundaries was well established, widely 
understood, and utilized in acquiring property” (19). The English conquerors of Ireland 
set the most important medieval precedent in racial segregation through walling along 
with the infamous Statutes of Kilkenny of 1366, which prohibited English contact with 
Irish people (Nightingale 2012: 30). In the early 1400s, farmers were ordered to plow 
70 miles of earthworks, what came to be known as the Pale or stake around the English-
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speaking hinterland of Dublin, to keep out the “wild Irish” (31). English merchants built 
divided port towns in Ireland, and in the 1500s and 1600s, the English monarchs 
encouraged Protestants to take over and displace Catholic Irish from the more fertile 
lands, ordering settlers to wall in Irish towns in places like Derry and Belfast, while 
prohibiting Irish from living in other cities on the island (30). 
 Fencing and walling took on new kinds of meaning during the Enclosure 
Movement, where wood was the basis of material life (Linebaugh 2008: 33–34). 
Human mobility was enshrined as a persistent liberty in early republican laws like the 
Charter of the Forest and the Magna Carta, which granted key common rights: anti-
enclosure, travel, neighborhood, subsistence, and reparations. However, the growth of 
state power and its ability to make war arose directly from the state’s power to afforest 
and enclose (Linebaugh 2008: 33–45). The shift toward administrative power gave way 
to new forms of internal appropriations within a territory that constituted early versions 
of state authority that were divorced from spiritual right to the collective rights of 
community first outlined in republican laws (Rogers 2011: 186). Some of the early 
roots of the Lockean liberal metanarrative of citizenship are located in this historical 
moment — where civil society was starting to transform into an existence in a zero-sum 
dualism with the state, where the space of civil society would be both the location of 
property exchange and of individual freedom (Somers 2008: 29). Almost all enclosure 
required some kind of fence or hedge, and spatial access acquired a new importance and 
significance (Blomley 2007: 4–5). Although maps and surveys outlined new acts of 
enclosure, they often did not bear legal weight because often these claims were actually 
illegal. So Whitethorn or hedging hawthorn (Crataegus monogyna) — a plant name that 
literally derives from the Old English word haga, which meant hedge or enclosure — 
was used to create living maps of these boundaries (Blomley 2007: 4–6). These hardy 
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plants, which could be planted in single or double rows with a ditch running along 
either side, were to prevent human or animal access to newly privatized lands, and the 
visual order of hedging also signaled a new social and mobility order premised in 
private property (8). Husbandry and surveying manuals of the time capture and trace the 
functional and ideological shifts in hedging practices in England. Manuals described 
how to create hedges that were more difficult to break or suggested that the ideal hedge 
height should be grown to nine feet to prevent human incursions (6–10). They also 
included poems and descriptions in the pages that captured the paranoia of the newly 
landed class, which now had a strong interest in protecting their new property holdings 
from predations by the poor, the indigent, and their subtenants. This poetry and 
literature espoused a new proto-capitalist “rhetoric of improvement, productivity, 
ingenuity and profit” (6). The very word “improvement” had a shifting signification 
during this period. In the thirteenth century, it had the literal definition: “To make profit 
to oneself of (e.g. land), by increasing the value of rent. Esp. Said of the lord of a manor 
enclosing or appropriating to his own advantage the common land” (quoted in McRae 
1996: 136). By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this legal term meant: “To turn 
land into profit; to inclose and cultivate (waste land); hence to make land more valuable 
or better by such means” (136). Agrarian improvement consolidated these changing 
significations, encouraging landlords and tenants to understand land ownership inside a 
discourse that facilitated economic individualism and competition (195). 
 The same people who were displaced by the hedges were often forced to dig the 
ditches and plant them. There were many organized protests, and commoners would 
destroy ditches and level hedges, sometimes engaging in ritualistic digging up of fences 
and then burying them (Blomley 2007; Manning 1988; McRae 1996). The Midlands 
Revolt of 1607 happened in several towns. In Northamptonshire, a crowd of 1,000 
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people, including women and children, systematically destroyed the hedges of Thomas 
Tresham and up to 50 of the protestors were killed (Blomley 2007: 14; Manning 1988). 
In Leicestershire, 5,000 people assembled to tear down the hedges built by London 
merchant John Quarles (Blomley 2007: 14). The rules and punishments for destroying a 
hedge could be severe, even though people were increasingly reliant on the illicit 
gathering of wood for fuel from the very hedges that displaced them (Blomley 2007: 
11). In Ingatestone, Essex, hedge levelers “were to be whipped until they ‘bleed well’, 
while receivers of stolen wood were confined to the stocks all Sunday” (Blomley 2007: 
11). If three or more people trespassed near the hedge, making threatening gestures or 
speeches in the context of destroying a hedge, their actions would be considered a riot. 
And if more than 40 people were present, their actions would be classified as treason 
(Manning 1988; Blomley 2007: 14). The physical violence of the thorny hedges alone 
was not enough and still required additional marshal and penal force. The revolutionary 
power and political organizing of the landless traveled far, and only draconian measures 
of control could corral the people fighting the illegal and provisional appropriation of 
common land. Expropriation and terror is a key component in exerting control over 
people who are in a world without (or with only limited) work, private property, and 
many times, without law. In systems like walling that don’t respect people or animals 
that occupy a space, there is an inherent martial connotation that “terror sets 
boundaries” (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000: 35). Early versions of European statecraft 
during this period relied heavily on the rationalization, organization, and 
standardization of everyday life. However, the early mechanisms of state control, 
representation, and bureaucracy struggled to maintain pace with state growth (Scott 
1998; Mann 1993: 5). 
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Compartments of Colonialism  
When the need for economic growth outgrew the bounds of the nation-state, imperial 
conquest ensued. Colonization and domination through taking the land and through the 
extraction of riches and resources introduced the ideological effects of capitalism by 
breaking and transforming non-capitalist modes of production (Young 2001: 24). In the 
colonial context, Europeans had to deploy practices and mechanisms to assert imperial 
claims of control over the land and the people who lived there and to build bio-
economies using the coerced labor of prisoners and slaves. Appropriation required 
hierarchies of habitation and new policing practices, and fencing and walling was used 
more and more to control and contain systems of subjugation. The English practice of 
erecting a physical barrier extended the cultural connotation of separating the wild from 
the cultivated land, a configuration that mapped these differences onto people in a 
racialized schema of “savage” and “civilized” (Seed 1995: 25). The emerging collective 
articulation of white pan-European superiority over “infrahuman” colored bodies in 
Africa, Asia, and the Americas, which relied on this “savage”/ “civilized” binary, had 
physical, moral, and aesthetic dimensions. Mary Louise Pratt describes how these 
constructions of distinction were crucial to the creation of a “European planetary 
consciousness” — a change in European elites’ understanding of themselves in 
relationship to the rest of the globe (1992: 15). 
 Colonial cities often employed urban walls to segregate Europeans from local 
populations as a political act of control to defend their economic interests (Nightingale 
2012: 55). These were traveling practices and material geographies that circulated 
between the Americas, European metropolitan administrative centers, and holdings in 
Africa and Asia (Godlewska and Smith 1994). Following his arrival in the Philippines, 
the Spanish conquistador Don Miguel López de Legazpi assaulted Manila and its 
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inhabitants in 1570 and immediately erected walls on the burning ashes of the city 
(Nightingale 2012: 57–58). Spanish organization of the Philippines mirrored that of 
New Spain, which included separate native districts. Franciscan priests forced rural 
Filipinos into fenced locations called cabaceros, comparable to the colonial missions in 
the Americas (57–58). The Spanish colonial administration of Manila invested in 
building a massive walling infrastructure called the Intramuros, which marked out the 
Spanish settlement. After the walls were built, all of the Chinese merchants were 
expelled beyond the walls, and strict laws were enacted so that any non-household-
servant Chinese, Filipino, or Japanese person found within the boundaries of the 
Intramuros after dark would be put to death (Nightingale 2012: 58).  
 Often these experiments occurred in the context of early corporate colonial 
management practices. For example, in Madras — present-day Chennai, South India — 
British governor Thomas Pitt ordered surveyors to create the “White Town” and the 
“Black Town” in the 1660s. The “White Town” was heavily walled. East India 
Company officials drew from the “politics of color” coming out of the company’s 
holdings in the Americas as a basis to segregate a commercial port city in its colonial 
holdings in Asia (Nightingale 2012: 49). The administrators from London even tried to 
impose a “wall tax” to have “Black Town” fence itself in. However, local residents 
refused, and eventually Pitt forced the local Indian merchants to pay for the “Black 
Town” wall (67). It was in the colonial context that racial segregation was first used as a 
concept in the urban segregation of British imperial rule of Hong Kong and Bombay 
(Mumbai) and then evolved to be a more standard practice globally (3). The English 
Enclosure Movement had given fencing a political and economic significance. Not only 
was fencing often mandated by English authorities in their colonial holdings — 
especially in the Americas — but it took on a connotation of “improvement,” a 
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connotation that is still in practice through present-day U.S. housing and tax 
assessments that legally deem a fence as an improvement to a property (Seed 1995: 25). 
These historic cultural connotations of English walling and boundary making are 
embedded in the relics of imperial projects on nearly every continent, from the Great 
Hedge of India to the border cairns that French and British military surveyors placed 
deep in the ground to mark the border between their respective colonial mandates in 
Lebanon and Palestine. 
 The English were also the first to develop an organized preventive police force 
in the context of walling initiatives — the precursor to the contemporary border patrol. 
In 1798, a security initiative was deployed at the Port of London to protect the West 
India Company’s goods from “enormous pillage and plunder” estimated at £300,000 
per annum, which was carried out by “water thieves” and “mud-larks,” gangs of men 
who would lay in the mud of low tide and steal onto ships in the port by night 
(Radzinowicz 1956: 353, 376). Police were deployed in tandem with walling 
construction around the port in July 1799. The wall specifications required that: “The 
docks were to be surrounded by a strong wall no less than thirty feet high. Immediately 
to be a ditch twelve feet wide, filled with water to a depth of not less than six feet. No 
house was to be built within a hundred yards of the wall” (Radzinowicz 1956: 376). 
Security of the goods and vessels required intimidation and a state of fear. Dr. Patrick 
Colquhon, a merchant and magistrate who got his start in the colonial convict trade and 
who proposed the first Thames police force, described the need for police in these 
terms: 
 
Something is wanting in addition to the mere letter of the Law, which shall 
operate more effectually to the relief and security of Society. … [A]s in Military 
Warfare an enemy is intimidated by the power, strength, and superior position of 
the opposing army, so in the arrangements which are formed for the conquest of 
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Delinquency, are impressions excited in proportion to which it exhibits wherever 
danger is to be apprehended. (Radzinowicz 1956: 376) 
 
The specifications for this “rampart of the sea” called for the use of military tactics in 
populated civilian areas in order to create a climate of fear and intimidation in concert 
with the distancing aesthetics of a wall. In this scenario, the larger-than-life structure is 
physically unapproachable and legally uninhabitable, evoking a magnified 
configuration of civilian spatial control and spectacle. By the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, conceptions about walling were changing inside the shifting geopolitics of 
continental Europe. These ideological developments informed new understandings of 
world citizenship, borders, and difference. At every point in the evolution of the modern 
state, war and violence hastened massive transformations in the governance and 
management of people, and this was particularly true in the context of enclosure 
technologies like fencing (Giddens 1985). 
 Because walls spatially blocked access to natural resources like pastures and 
water, they also became de facto genocidal policies, but ones that ensured revenues and 
lucrative profit margins for early colonial companies. When the Dutch arrived at the 
Cape of Good Hope to set up a port of call, a waypoint for the United East India 
Company on its route to the Spice Islands, Jan van Riebeeck built an almond hedge 
around the Dutch settlement to keep out the indigenous Khoikhoi people (Nightingale 
2012: 53). He recorded in his diary that the Khoikhoi requested to be allowed to dig the 
roots and harvest the bitter almonds that grew in the wild: “‘This likewise’, it says, 
‘could not be granted them for they would have too many opportunities of doing harm 
to the colonists and furthermore we shall need the almonds ourselves this year to plant 
the proposed protective hedge or defensive barrier. These reasons were of course not 
mentioned to them’” (Hewison 1989: 2). In the early to mid-1800s, the British East 
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India Company started consolidating the scattered customs posts in India into a single 
line, one that changed routes many times as the British acquired more of India. But by 
the mid-1800s, it took the form of a giant customs hedge that was made of cactus, living 
thorn bushes, dead thorn brush, and even a small wall in places (Moxham 2001: 66). 
The customs line, much of which was hedged, stretched 2,504 miles from the foothills 
of the Himalayas to Orissa to sustain the collection of tax on salt coming into British 
India and to deter smugglers who would have jeopardized the British monopoly on salt 
manufacturing (Moxham 2001: 70). On the northern part of the line, noncommisioned 
officers would supervise guards, who apprehended salt smugglers that crossed the line. 
Sentries were stationed each quarter of a mile, and they would have to sweep the 
ground bare along the area under their vigilance at the beginning of their shift and be 
held responsible for any footprints found when they went off duty (68). As the line was 
solidified, people living alongside it had to make long detours to gateways situated 
every four miles to visit friends and family or their pastures that fell on the other side of 
the line (68). At its zenith in 1872, some 14,188 workers built the hedge and guarded 
the line, generating millions of pounds in revenue (113). In the end, it was the British 
consolidation of a total monopoly on all salt production in India that finally made the 
hedge irrelevant by 1879 (72–74). It was only when the British began to administer 
India in the late eighteenth century to collect taxes that the population was deprived of 
salt. The imposition of the major salt tax, along with the barriers to collect revenue, 
exacerbated death tolls during major droughts, resulting in the deaths of millions of 
people. Prior to British rule, salt distribution had never been a problem (143). 
 Colonial governance was a quasi-corporate form of governance that never 
distinguished between civil and military powers (Gilroy 2010b: 19; Hussain 2003). It 
was a semi-private form of public rule backed by imperial military might. The 
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corporate-government administration also blurred police and military functions, which 
pioneered new technologies and practices of surveillance to effectively control and 
police the native labor force. New technologies in fencing expanded and changed how 
the martial force of walls could be deployed, and one of the most significant 
developments was the invention and mass commercial use of barbed wire in 1874. It 
would become an integral technology for the disciplinary powers of the young nation-
state — including the prison, the reservation, and later, the camp — carceral 
technologies of enclosure and pain that were originally designed for animals but applied 
to humans (Netz 2004). 
 
Prisons: The Wall as Punishment 
While the Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus Act prohibited the British government from 
imposing exile, it was not illegal to be exiled “voluntarily,” and many English convicts 
would “choose” to go as indentured servants to the Americas to avoid the death penalty 
(Christianson 1998: 21). As much as a quarter of all British immigrants living in 
colonial America in the 1700s were convicts; and the transportation of criminals to 
penal colonies did not stop in Britain until 1867 (Christianson 1998: 25; Young 2001: 
22). Some of the first private prisons were in British shipyards, which would hold 
prisoners in cramped quarters called “press-rooms,” with little or no food, sometimes 
for months, until their departure to British penal colonies (Christianson 1998: 18). 
During the day the prisoners would be forced to do hard labor, before being locked up 
again in the ships at night. Jails and cemeteries were the first public structures built in 
new colonial land holdings, starting with Jamestown, Virginia, where Native Americans 
were the first people incarcerated in what would become the United States 
(Christianson 1998: 59). In the beginning, jails were simple wooden structures, but as 
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they became more secure and permanent, wood was replaced with reinforced walls 
made of stone and brick, and the buildings were fitted with iron (60). Often, jails were 
quite small and sometimes merely a cage. By the 1720s, every city in the American 
colonies had at least one detention structure, and many had several; and there were 
more jails than public schools or hospitals (60–61). Colonial governors would also set 
up new penal codes that would create hierarchies and distinctions of liberties for 
different categories of people: freedmen, women, children, foreigners, and servants 
(41). Denying human liberty was an individualized penal policy, deployed in measure 
with the crime, and meant to cut across class lines. However, it operated as a 
mechanism of class domination (Davis 2003: 69). In this colonial period, as long as a 
servant remained under contract, the person was considered moveable property and 
could be transferred from one place to another; jails were a key institution that 
simultaneously enforced the laws of bondage and the master’s rights and power over 
other men, women, and children (Christianson 1998: 43). With the growing use of 
African slave labor, these hierarchies became even more important to organize and 
maintain. 
 Prisons, dungeons, and human confinement were not new forms of punishment, 
but the institutionalization of prisons as a kind of penal system started in force in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The shift from torture and forms of capital 
punishment was hailed as a more “merciful” and humane option. However, from the 
beginning this was set up with racialized ideological moorings. One of the major 
treatises on the subject, authored by the wealthy Italian merchant Cesare Bonesana di 
Beccaria (1764), reserved “severe” forms of punishments only for the people “hardly 
yet emerged from barbarity,” as “strong impressions are required,” but for “men 
softened by their intercourse in society, the severity of punishments should be 
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diminished.” It was a penal reform outlook that served the interests of judges and 
colonial companies in need of cheap, indentured labor. This shift moved punishment 
from the spectral realm to a hidden part of the penal process, where “procedures of 
domination” operated as a depersonalized form of social control for the state to 
bureaucratically manage certain bodies across time and space (Foucault 1991: 231; 
Gilmore 2007: 11). The first penitentiary was built in Millbank, London, in 1816 with 
the panopticon design by Jeremy Bentham to create an environment of total 
surveillance of the incarcerated, where the guard could see any convict but the convict 
was unable to know the direction of the guard’s gaze. “Penitentiary” is a word that 
reflects the place of penance for an offense against society, “the physical and spiritual 
purging of proclivities to challenge rules and regulations which command total 
obedience” (Davis 2003: 69). 
 The incarceration of people in cages was central to expanding ideas of 
democracy, systems of individual rights, and ideas of freedom (Gilmore 2007: 11). 
During the rapid growth of cities and industrial production in the twentieth century, 
prisons developed increasingly as a form of extractive economy in an effort to control 
and manage people’s mobility and render their work inside systems and locations of 
capital production (11). Prison is a closed system that has neither an exterior nor an 
opening, forming an unceasing discipline around the organizational principle of 
isolation from the external world and also from other prisoners (Foucault 1991: 236). In 
this system, the wall itself is the punishment. It is a vertical organization of space where 
the wall blocks the outside and the horizon, and communication is organized in a 
vertical system of hierarchy. Foucault describes how the prison wall at Cherry Hill, 
Pennsylvania, was characterized as punishment in relationship to labor: “the walls are 
the punishment of the crime; the cell confronts the convict with himself; and he is 
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forced to listen to his conscience,” and in this schema, work becomes a kind of 
consolation (1991: 239). One seventeenth-century writer described how the material 
realities of walls prevented the wardens from having to exert force, and as a 
consequence their authority was accepted: “Walls are terrible, but man [the warden] is 
Good” (quoted in Foucault 1991: 239). 
 
Reservation Lines and Barbed Wire as Democracy 
One of the first border walls in the United States was put up during the colonial era by 
the peg-legged Dutch governor, Peter Stuyvesant, who built a protective wall along the 
northern border of New Amsterdam (New York City) to keep out Native Americans. 
This historical reference has been maintained; it is one of the most well-known lines of 
global capital, Wall Street (Nightingale 2012: 49). In the French and British colonies in 
New England, separate districts for Indians were established called “missions” and 
“praying towns,” respectively (Nightingale 2012: 51). One of the early and most 
significant lines that facilitated the appropriation of indigenous lands in the United 
States was established in the British Proclamation Act of 1763, which drew a 
demarcation line from present-day Canada to Florida, prohibiting colonial westward 
expansion and settlement in an effort to rein in the costly expenditures that had arisen 
from defending Britain’s colonial holdings during the ongoing French and Indian Wars 
of the late 1600s. This limitation was intended to prevent the administrative costs of 
further wars with indigenous nations and to advance the mercantilist agenda of 
maintaining the lucrative fur-trading industry and colonial dependency on British 
manufacturing (Banner 2005: 91–94). This line was issued as a provisional claim, 
unlike the rest of the proclamation — the ban on land grants beyond the line was issued 
by the British Crown, “for the present, and until Our further Pleasure be known” (93). 
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However, many of the colonial elites, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, and others, possessed considerable speculative interests in holdings 
beyond the line (Churchill 1992: 38). These prospective land interests were a 
precipitating factor in the U.S. Revolutionary War, because the only way that colonial 
elites could convert their tentative claims into profit was by settling and developing the 
land. Frequently, colonial rebels were convinced to join the fight against the British 
Crown with promises of western land grants (Churchill 1992: 38). Speculators acquired 
a lot of land west of the boundary line illegally, precisely because the temporary quality 
of the proclamation offered the promise that claims would be legalized in the future 
(Banner 2005: 93). However, the actual boundary line was not enacted, and settler 
encroachment onto indigenous lands continued. The Proclamation Act of 1763 had 
another important implication: it moved the acquisition of indigenous lands from the 
private sphere of contracts and concentrated the power to purchase land exclusively in 
the hands of the government, a power of treaty-making to take indigenous lands that has 
been a power exclusive to the U.S. federal government ever since (104–105). This form 
of second-class land ownership rendered indigenous peoples with less rights to their 
lands than colonial settlers. Effectively, the Proclamation Act of 1763 marked the 
beginning of the erosion of the political base for recognizing indigenous property rights 
(108).  
 The earliest treaties in the United States defined tracts of land reserved for 
Native Americans inside the realms of Anglo-European settlement. It was a system 
developed at the peak of federal land acquisition, as the U.S. government moved eastern 
Native Americans to lands ceded by western tribes (Banner 2005: 230). In the mid-
1840s, the land possessed by Native American tribes effectively formed a solid block 
from Minnesota to Texas, preventing white settlers from moving westward (230). Luke 
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Lea, the commissioner of Indian Affairs, described the solution to this obstacle in 
acquiring more land this way: “When civilization and barbarism are brought in such 
relation that they cannot exist together it is right that the superiority of the former 
should be asserted and the latter compelled to give way” (231). It took Anglo-
Americans 250 years to take over the eastern half of the United States, but it took less 
than 40 years for them to claim the entire western half (235). 
 Reservations were justified as the humanitarian lesser of evils for several 
reasons. Some said that Native Americans would be exterminated entirely if they stayed 
in the way of white settler expansion, and that reservations offered more permanent 
land tenure, even though forced removals took place time and time again. Another 
major justification was that Native Americans would learn the practices of Anglo-settler 
“civilization” (Banner 2005: 232–233). The U.S. government did not even keep up with 
the pretence of obtaining land lawfully, as massive waves of Anglo-American 
population rapidly took over places like California (239). Native American survivors of 
U.S. Army actions were forcibly marched into reservations at gunpoint and against their 
will. Even though the reservations were in theory to keep Anglo settlers off Native 
American lands, U.S. Army trackers would chase, capture, and frequently kill Native 
Americans who left reservations, effectively making reservations an open-air jail. 
Banner writes, “A reservation was a line on paper. It was no barrier to the appropriation 
of Indians’ resources” (2005: 242). White settlers diverted water from reservations and 
took minerals from under the ground, frequently robbing, killing, raping, and pillaging 
Native American property with impunity (242).  
 The prohibitive costs of wooden fencing in the newly appropriated lands posed a 
major obstacle to successfully occupying these claims. In 1871, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture estimated that the combined total cost of fences in the United States was 
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equivalent to the entire national debt, and that the annual repair costs for fences 
exceeded all federal, state, and local tax revenues (Basalla 1988: 51). The political 
economy of fencing in the United States was at the heart of the state-building project. It 
was the invention and wide-scale use of barbed wire, “the Devil’s rope,” that would 
become one of the most important instruments of spatial control and appropriation of 
indigenous lands, cutting off Native American traditional hunting grounds. This fencing 
strategy was central to the U.S. pacification on the plains (Krell 2002: 38). Barbed wire 
did not replace wood; instead, it allowed for even more areas to be fenced in that 
probably would not have been otherwise (Netz 2004: 29). The deforestation of the 
northern United States built the spatial appropriations of the West (29). An early major 
manufacturer of barbed wire, Washburn & Moen Manufacturing, published a 
description of the utility of its product in 1880, capturing the racialized ideological 
convergence of security, capitalism, and improvement, saying: 
 
Every man who builds a fence, does so, primarily, for his own greater 
enjoyment in his own lands, and the sense of better security in their exclusive 
possession enables him to protect his own improvements. In no part of the 
world, where the people have risen above the condition of the wandering 
savage, does the benefit of fencing fail to be understood and appreciated so soon 
as the inhabitants begin improvement and cultivation of the land and the 
establishment of home life. (Krell 2002: 11–12)  
 
A major part of this appropriation also required closing the open range with barbed-wire 
fencing, which happened intensively over a span of about five years, resulting in 
popular protests in Texas in 1883–1884. The fence-cutting wars, as they were known, 
were an organized movement among the Texas cattlemen, a class of holders who did 
not want to lease or buy land. They grazed stock on the open range in the middle of a 
severe draught, often cutting fencing that blocked access to water, streams, ponds, and 
watering holes for their livestock. In the spring of 1884, fence cutting in Texas was 
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declared a felony punishable by up to five years in prison (Gard 2010). Thousands of 
cattle died along the drift fences in the harsh winters of 1885 and 1886, huddled 
together against long stretches of fencing, and the physical and economic violence of 
the barbed wire was remembered in popular poems, songs, and even a novel as 
“creeping like a steel centipede across the prairies” (Krell 2002: 34–40; Moore Davis 
1997: 123). Fence cutters were called socialists and communists of Europe, and their 
conflict with the government was represented as the clash between the ideologies of 
labor and capital (Krell 2002: 43). After 1886, outbreaks of fence cutting would still 
occur, most frequently during droughts. And the Texas Rangers would be sent in to deal 
with fence cutters (Gard 2010). 
 The United States also used barbed-wire entanglement defensively during the 
Spanish-American War, and it quickly became the most efficient obstacle during 
warfare. During the First World War, the use of barbed-wire fencing fortification was 
unprecedented. Barbed-wire trenches stretched for nearly 1,300 miles across Europe, 
deploying fencing so deep that a single square mile of trenches would contain 900 miles 
of wire (Krell 2002: 55–58). In the lines of trench warfare, barbed wire and fencing 
took on another cultural meaning. They became the only source of protection in the 
fields of food production, but also the political fields of war. In 1958, the U.S. Steel 
Corporation published a sixteen-page comic book called New Frontiers, an illustrated 
history of barbed wire featuring an Anglo cowboy father and son happily narrating the 
history of Westward expansion: “Barbed wire is a first line defender of democracy. In 
the last war it was used on military posts — battlefields — research plants and on farms 
which produced our nation’s food” (Krell 2002: 44). It would be in the context of 
World War II that the absolute and totalizing power of barbed-wire fencing would be 
transformed. 
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The Ghetto: The Wall as a Conditioning Mechanism  
Before the death camps of the Third Reich, there were the walls of the ghetto. The word 
“ghetto” was first used in Venice, Italy, in 1516 to designate the mandated Jewish 
quarter of the city near San Girolamo, enclosed at night by two gates. Nightingale 
(2012) describes how the Jews had to pass through a tunnel so low they had to bow 
down to the Christian city as they entered through the gate. The local Jews were 
required to finance the Venetian patrol boats that monitored their movements. Once 
outside, Jews had to wear a yellow badge, and later a yellow hat, to visually distinguish 
their presence outside the ghetto (36). Nightingale writes, “Sacropolitical districts, city 
walls, merchants’ quarters and scapegoat ghettos all contained elements of class 
segregation” (30).	  The early ghettos in medieval Europe were organized so as to 
politically control the mobility of capital. Because moneylending was an activity 
prohibited by the Catholic Church, Jewish merchants played a critical role in growing 
economic systems.  
 Ghettos were also bio-political programs. Jews were frequently at the center of 
public hygiene campaigns, a trope that has historically accompanied any kind of 
coercive human camp for noncombatants since the first barbed-wire concentration 
camps of the Boer Wars (Stoler 2000). Using barbed wire and blockhouses, which were 
originally set up to protect the railroad as a defensive measure, the British military set 
up 3,700 miles of wire, which became an offensive net to capture Boer fighters (Krell 
2002: 49). The ghetto walls became socially understood as preventative cordon 
sanitaire, even as the very cramped quarters produced unhealthy and unsafe living 
conditions for the enclosed inhabitants. The coercive spatial control over Jewish 
communities in the twentieth century and the ghettos across Europe were the 
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institutional precursors to the lagers and death camps. The Third Reich’s Jewish ghettos 
were first physically defined by walls, which were later topped with barbed wire. They 
served as effective conditioning mechanisms of mistreatment, segregation, humiliation, 
forced migration, and habitus, and destroyed family bonds and community ties (Levi 
1986: 77). A Jewish ghetto was set up in an old industrial part of town in Lodz, Poland, 
in February 1940, and by May of that year the police were ordered to shoot Jews who 
came close to the fence (Netz 2004: 201). Primo Levi described the power of the walls 
of the ghetto in this way: “Willingly or not we come to terms with power, forgetting 
that we are all in the ghetto, that the ghetto is walled in, that outside the ghetto reign the 
lords of death, and that close by the train is waiting” (1986: 69). In Poland, where Jews 
were scattered in the countryside, ghettos were ordered to be constructed in urban 
centers next to railway stations. This, according to Netz, suggested a plan for future 
evacuation and facilitated mass movements of Jews to concentration camps, which were 
also situated along railways (2004: 201). The simultaneous condition of hypermobility 
with mass incarceration of people was a crucial pairing. 
 
The Camp: The Totalizing Violence of the Wall 
The ghetto was the precursor to the concentration camp — one of the most totalizing 
forms of violence of walling practices. Some of the earliest camps were the Soviet 
gulags established during the early 1900s, which started out as provisional measures, 
temporary self-supporting camps to house and liquidate prisons; however, they rapidly 
became a new form of penal system. Early on, officials had proposed transforming 
camps into northern colonization settlements and commuting prisoner sentences. 
However, they soon discovered that mobile camps could serve as a form of economic 
development, and they rolled out a construction-site-based labor camp with thousands 
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of workers deployed to build a canal between the White Sea and the Baltic Sea in 1930 
(Khlevniuk 2004: 23–24). Temporary, open-air, prisoner-of-war camps during World 
War I became a standard practice. Captured prisoners would be put inside a temporary 
pen, a structure made of posts and strung up with barbed wire. However, the German 
military made this provisional structure a permanent edifice in the death camps (Netz 
2004: 205). The Nazi regime set up its first concentration camp near Dachau in March 
1933 (197).  
 Like the prison, the first rudimentary step in securing power was to sever the 
camp’s contact and relationship to the outside world (Sofsky 1997: 47). The 
concentration camps were typically surrounded by a barbed-wire, electrified fence with 
guardhouses every 250 feet, and the whole scape was illuminated by floodlights (Netz 
2004: 209). Absolute power also required an internal structuring of space, which 
operatively did three things: it organized human contact by dividing the social and 
functional areas; it created zones of surveillance; and it created enhanced visibility 
(Sofsky 1997: 47). The material fence itself also served as a modality of enacting 
violence. There were several feet of prohibited zone immediately next to the camp’s 
external fence. In the early camps, this was marked by a low, barbed-wire barrier, but 
later it was left as a symbolically defined area, which effectively intensified the spatial 
function of this “death zone,” where anyone entering the area was shot (Netz 2004: 
214). Because of the tight passages and spatial zoning of the camp, it was an 
unavoidable lethal space for prisoners. Guards would order a prisoner to cross into the 
prohibited zone and shoot him or her, and some prisoners would commit suicide by 
running toward the electrified fence, an act described in Auschwitz-Birkenau slang as 
“embracing the wire” (Netz 2004: 214; Krell 2002: 78). 
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 The work camp was demarcated by the external border fence set up around the 
camp, but its operative effectiveness was precisely because it destroyed any kind of 
primordial boundary of interior “us” and exterior enemy “them” of the captors and 
victims inside. Primo Levi described the way “the enemy was all around, but also 
inside, and the ‘we’ lost its limits, the contenders were not two, one could not discern a 
single frontier but rather many confused, perhaps innumerable frontiers, which 
stretched between each of us” (1986: 37–38). He describes the initiation into the space 
as a kind of “concentric aggression” where people are sealed off and isolated from each 
other and forms of solidarity, and become collaborators with the ideological and terror 
practices of the camp. This collapse of boundaries of victim and perpetrator into a “gray 
zone” binds actors together “by the wish to preserve and consolidate established 
privilege vis-á-vis those without privilege” (43). The more power was restricted, the 
more proxies were needed to manage power. 
 The camps were also carefully internally bordered with barbed wire, separating 
each section of the camp from one another (Netz 2004; Sofsky 1997). The barbed-wire 
fencing was set up in lattice formations to create sub-camps, limiting the horizons of 
life to a few yards between one barbed-wire fence and another. The only passage 
between camps was a barbed-wire tunnel. The Sobibór camp architecture, which was 
used in the Treblinka death camp and became the standard architectural protocol for 
Nazi camp building, created tiny sub-camps that were 400 by 600 yards in size (Netz 
2004: 210). Netz notes that in Auschwitz, the barbed-wire fence towered over the 
landscape. It stretched 13 feet high so that the scopic horizon of the prisoner was so 
limited that even the sky was fenced in (210). The operating logic behind this compact 
“concentration” of Jewish bodies in German space was an organizational goal to limit 
the physical landmass and space that Jewish presence occupied to a minimum. The 
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German spatial policy of Lebensraum did not even allow for a reservation system, and 
Nazi military leader Hermann Göring lamented the fact that Germany did not possess 
an island where all Jews could be exiled. When the Third Reich defeated France, there 
was even a plan to deport all European Jews to the French colonial holding of 
Madagascar, so as to evacuate all Jewish presence (Netz 2004: 204). The walling 
practices of the ghetto and the camp were fueled by geopolitical ideologies of race and 
borders. 
 
The Border as an “Organ” 
The geopolitical ideology in Weimar-era Germany understood geography as connected 
to cultural and political developments in the aftermath of World War I (Murphy 1997: 
4–5). In this geopolitical ideology, borders occupied a critical role. German scientist and 
journalist Friedrich Ratzel conceptualized the state as an “indigenous organism” that the 
land or soil (Boden) called forth (Murphy 1997: 9). This idea of the “organic” state — 
made up of the state, land, and people — gained popular currency in German 
geopolitical thinking of the time. The neo-Darwinian concept of growing states equated 
a healthy state with expansion and growth, and a shrinking state with national decay. 
Swedish scientist and journalist Rudolf Kjellén expanded on the idea by saying that 
“amputated” states could recover lost lands in other areas via colonial expansion 
(Murphy 1997: 11). Ideologically, space — Raum, a supranatural force elemental in 
human affairs that framed, composed, and created the state — was deeply connected to 
struggle (26–29). In Ratzel’s naturalistic construction of the state, a border was a critical 
feature, the point at which the state’s struggle for existence was most tangibly visible. 
He described a border or frontier as the “skin of the state,” an “organ” that acted in 
concert with the state but maintained a separate organic identity (Murphy 1997: 10, 30). 
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Murphy writes, “The nature of the border and its correspondence to the changes in 
topography, language, or culture could determine the character of the relationship 
between the states separated by the border” (10). State size became linked to cultural 
development, and borders reflected the spatial conditions of the state. Karl Haushofer, 
who studied borders, wrote that geographical borders could constitute national borders, 
but often “the mediating effects of race, culture and politics, and will negated the 
importance of ‘natural’ physical barriers” (Murphy 1997: 31). Culture quickly became 
the mediator between geography and politics. Ratzel described it this way: “As the area 
of states grows with cultural advancement, so peoples at lower stages of cultural 
development tend to be organized into petty states. And in fact, the lower we descend in 
the level of culture the smaller the states become, and the dimensions of the state 
represent one of the measures of cultural development. No primitive people (Naturvolk) 
has ever created a great state” (Murphy 1997: 11). Murphy’s engagement of this 
genealogy of Weimar Germany’s geopolitical frameworks alerts us to the dangers in 
any sort of “naturalistic” or “organic” concept of state borders, terminologies that can 
still surface in contemporary discussions of borders as “natural” economic zones. 
 
None of the modern scholars who have dusted off geopolitics and given it a 
glossy new coat of varnish accept the “organic” concept of the state without 
qualification, a crucial and healthy departure from the Weimar variant of 
geopolitics. Despite its updated trappings, however, contemporary geopolitical 
discourse at times falls into patterns reminiscent of earlier geopolitical thinking. 
The argument that the borders of states in postcolonial Africa are arbitrary, and 
thus, bound to be sources of instability and conflict, for example, rests on the 
subtext that they do not conform to an ethnically or geographically determined 
“natural” (even “organic”) border pattern. This approach to understanding 
borders is similar to that of the early twentieth-century geopoliticians. (Murphy 
1997: 251) 
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The conclusion of this archeology sets up an entry to thinking about the ways the wall 
becomes the border. In the contemporary case studies that follow, I will take up both the 
construction and destruction of the Berlin Wall in great detail. 
 
The Wall as the Border 
Today, walling is a symbol that permeates everyday life and is intelligible in a visceral 
way that people see, feel, and understand inside a kind of ontology of walling that 
ranges from a neighborhood fence to a national border wall. The early 1990s gave rise 
to the proliferation of gated communities in North America and Europe in what Blakely 
and Snyder (1999) called the growing “fortress mentality,” where fencing, gated 
communities, and private security guards are part of a landscape of exclusionary land-
use policies that privilege developers and suburbs. These developments and other 
planning tools are used at a local level to restrict access to different kinds of urban, 
public spaces (2). This socio-spatial community building represents a longing for an 
“ideal community” — a foundational mythology that underpins the construction of an 
“imagined community” (Blakely and Snyder 1999: 2; Low 2003; Anderson 1983). This 
longing intersects with national wall-building initiatives. For example, popular political 
support to build the U.S. border fence and militarize the southern border has intersected 
with private-citizen-initiated fencing projects and intensified policing measures, 
including the practice of “citizen arrests” of noncitizens (Nevins 2010; Andreas 2000). 
At its zenith, the Minuteman Project raised funds to help border ranchers build 
extensions of the U.S. border fence through their private properties. Additionally, the 
state of Arizona has collected private and corporate donations through a government-
run website in an effort to close the gaps in the federally funded national fence. This has 
given way to the normative framework that started in Israel and the United States, 
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which conceives of a wall as the border. This framework alters the “cognitive, aesthetic 
and moral ‘spacings’” of the heterogeneous borderlands in a way that makes the map of 
the nation more like an archipelago than a line, physically delimiting who belongs and 
who does not in a material way (Bauman 1993: 145–158). Sorkin describes the Israeli 
wall in this way: “The wall ossifies a social physics that holds that the two national 
bodies cannot share the same space at the same time” and “pervades almost every 
interaction between Palestinians and Israelis, expressed in discriminatory property 
regulations, in restrictions on marriage between Palestinians in Israel and those in the 
territories, in the semipermeable membrane of withheld employment, in floating 
bubbles of armed and dangerous sovereignty, and in the permanent mobility of all of 
these boundaries” (Sorkin 2005: vii). As Eyal Weizman’s (2007) expert architectural 
examination shows, walls can be elastic tools that respond to changing para-political 
needs in securing land and people in different modalities. I repeat one of the specific 
examples he references because it precisely captures the intersection between the 
“fortress mentality” of a neighborhood and a border fence.  
 Alfei Menashe is a suburban, Israeli-settlement town of 5,000 residents east of 
Tel Aviv. Early on in the construction and mapping of the Israeli wall in the West Bank, 
Alfei Menashe became the first settlement to petition to be included inside the future 
construction when the original plans had it fall outside of the wall (Weizman 2007: 
167). Settlement lobby groups and settlement councils started to apply political pressure 
to have their communities fall within the “safer” bounds of the “Israeli” side, to not be 
“abandoned” to the Palestinian side of the wall (167). Ironically, the head of the local 
council did not ideologically support the wall, because he believed it would limit 
Zionist expansion. But he successfully convinced prime minister Ariel Sharon to have 
the wall’s path redrawn to protect his constituents (167–168). Settlements in the early 
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2000s were boosted by the construction of the wall: “With the de facto annexation of 
the West Bank lands lying between the Wall and the pre-[19]67 border, real-estate 
developers could now promise the luxury and security of gated communities to wealthy 
Israelis, as the local Palestinian inhabitants were barricaded out of sight” (Algazi 2006: 
30). This separation is accompanied by the new Israeli highway network around these 
walls, which is “a powerful allegory for continuity and progression, a historical 
teleology and vision of the future projected into the landscape itself” (Gregory 2004: 
101, emphasis in the original). 
 When Palestinians call the Israeli separation barrier the apartheid wall, it 
politically invokes the racialized violence and institutionalized oppression of South 
Africa as a way of locating the government-sanctioned violence and colonization of 
Palestinian land inside larger global struggles. In the wall and fence politics of apartheid 
and post-apartheid South Africa, skin was the signifier that located someone in space — 
it was what granted or denied social and political access and work inside an inhabited 
hierarchy (Bremner 2005: 131). In the mid-1980s, one of the first fortress enclaves, a 
well-off and walled-in gated community with 24-hour surveillance and armed private 
security guards, was built in the suburbs of Johannesburg. By 2003, there were 1,127 
gated communities in the city, a patchwork of militarized enclaves, and this trend has 
continued to increase (132). Characterized as a “necessary evil,” the wall opens up a 
process that Bremner (2005) calls “semigration,” which allows the white and wealthy to 
separate themselves from civic society and privatize public community and policing. In 
this context, walls are a portable instrument of control, one that expands to meet the 
growing and shifting populations, and also blocks and redirects flows of public access.  
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Conclusion  
This broad survey of the state practice of walling and fencing underscores some of the 
changing ways that walls and fencing have been used historically as a coercive form of 
power. Walls and fences are a technology of deprivation, which works by creating a 
line for extractive power and an economy of proximity — when a body or product 
enters within the vicinity of the line, it acquires value. To enact these economic effects, 
a wall historically required either the threat of death or a violent, even martial force, a 
stance that echoes the sacrosanct political powers of the mythological walls of old. The 
early forms of state power arose directly in proportion with the expropriation of the 
material basis of life — wood — and they deployed this material to enclose common 
land and limit the life chances of the excluded classes. These practices not only were 
operative of growing landed-class powers, but also fueled the emergence and economic 
model of multinational corporations. This site-specific form of rule was rhetorically 
extended, not only to ideological understandings of the nation-state and its borders, but 
also to ideas of individual human freedom and capital punishment. The deep ideological 
roots of racial segregation were grounded in early walling and fencing projects that 
were crucial to conquest, transatlantic slavery, and colonial land acquisitions. Remnants 
of these shifting significations of walling are embedded in how we understand the 
intensive proliferation of national border walls today. Walls did not suddenly change in 
1989, but rather we can begin to see the ideological continuations. It is not that state 
borders are only just now being intensively externalized in the contemporary global 
migration patterns that we often consider a key characteristic of globalization. The 
powerful narrative of globalization is a form of meaning making that rationalizes fence-
nationalism inside a vertical organization of the earth. 
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Chapter 3: The New Nomos of the Earth 
 
Where do we stand today? The earlier balance, based on the separation of land 
and sea, has been destroyed. Development of modern technology has robbed the 
sea of its elemental character. A new, third dimension — airspace — has 
become the force-field of human power and activity. Today many believe that 
the whole world, our planet, is now only a landing field or an airport, a 
storehouse of raw materials, and a mother ship for travel in outer space. That 
certainly is fantastic. But it demonstrates the power with which the question of a 
new nomos of the earth is being posed.  
 
— Carl Schmitt (2003: 354) 
 
A meridian decides the truth or at least the years of possession.  
 
— Pascal, quoted by Carl Schmitt (2003: 95) 
 
When German theorist Carl Schmitt wrote these words in the aftermath of the end of the 
Nazi regime, airpower and airwaves had just opened up, giving way to new global 
economic and political meridians of power. His early work on the spatial 
transformations of state power offers a strategic place to consider walls at the 
intersection of security, war, sovereignty, and the nation-state inside a shifting planetary 
spatial order — specifically, because he theorizes nomos as the underlying or originary 
act of rendering the spatial ordering of power visible, explicitly via fencing. This 
chapter traces the spatial power formations of nomos that Schmitt (2003) identified, 
carefully engaging the historical and theoretical implications that these spatialities open 
up in conversation with a broader canon of anti-imperialist and postcolonial literature to 
situate a different political economy of borders in order to pose questions about the 
significance of contemporary national border barrier building in the case studies that 
follow. 
 There has been a recent return to Schmitt’s work as a place for understanding 
enmity in the shifting sovereign-scapes of exception and the political construction of 
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enmity between the “us” and “them” (Legg 2011). Schmitt’s ideas took shape at a time 
when the shifting liberal high politics of war and peace existed inside a chronically 
precarious new world order of modernity, and the contours of his work help us to 
understand more precisely the troubles of our own times (Balakrishnan 2000). This 
chapter looks at the changing configurations of both the right of possession and the 
dispossession of humans in relationship to the creation of state borders. It summarizes 
how race was the central factor of the asymmetrical organization of modernity, and it 
traces the convergence of the material and the moral in creating and inventing new 
forms of state-based sovereignty to expand acquisition claims, challenging the 
underlying presumption in border studies that the limits of sovereignty, law, and 
territory are coterminous with the state’s border (Vaughan-Williams 2011: 288). These 
spatial shifts in global lines of possession also accompanied a spatial shift in war 
making, where zones of freedom were configured as conflict zones, dramatically 
altering the very ideas of war and peace and ultimately reconfiguring the figure, and 
rights, of the human inside these political orders. This chapter takes up Schmitt’s 
writings from the 1950s — as much a “nostalgic elegy” to the waning realm of 
European public law as a blueprint documenting its coercive operations — which look 
at the ways that walls have conceptually marked out spatial order power and dominion 
on earth (Hussain 2011: 244). I engage this archive as a sounding board for thinking 
about the rapid proliferation of border walls in our contemporary moment, using it to 
find inroads into blurred realms of commerce, immigration, security, and war at the 
border so that I can more carefully distinguish some of the moral, political, and 
ideological stakes in the questions that I want to raise in understanding the changing 
rights of the human. 
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Asymmetrical Organization of Modernity 
Nomos — the spatial orientation and ordering of political and social human life that is 
made visible — is simultaneously contained in appropriated space and flows from it 
(Schmitt 2003). Nomos can best be described as a wall “because, like a wall, it too, is 
based on sacred orientations,” and because all subsequent law derives its power from 
the “inner measure of an original, constitutive act of spatial ordering” (2003: 71, 78). 
Nomos is a trifold action that simultaneously seizes, divides, and tends (or cultivates). 
Schmitt retheorized empire in his writings: first as Reich, then as Grossraum (great 
space), and finally as nomos, conceptual turns that corresponded to the rise and fall of 
the German Third Reich (Hell 2009; Draghichi 1997). In the aftermath of World War II, 
Schmitt’s writing shifted from an analysis of decisionist theological politics to 
describing a “politics of empire that feeds on the remnants of eschatological history” 
(Hell 2009: 311, emphasis in original). He described international relations in a series of 
“spatial revolutions” — concepts of space made possible by unprecedented advances in 
technology (Draghichi 1997: x). Schmitt wrote, “The beginning of every great era 
coincides with an extensive territorial appropriation. Every important change in the 
image of Earth is inseparable from a political transformation, and so, from a new 
repartition of the planet, a new territorial appropriation” (Schmitt 1997: 38). The first 
“space revolution” on a planetary scale was the discovery of the Americas.  
 
Más Allá de la Línea (Beyond the Line) 
The amity lines were superficial, geographical lines dividing the surface area of the 
earth, delineating the limits of the spheres of conflict with contractual parties seeking to 
appropriate land (Schmitt 2003: 94). These agreements of just war centered on a 
common point of agreement, the freedom of the space beyond the line — the free seas, 
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and also the free lands for appropriation, which Locke would later refer to as vacuum 
domicilium, the improver’s doctrine of vacant land to be settled and cultivated (Gilroy 
2010a: 57). The amity lines specified a concrete location for the Hobbesian no-man’s-
land of the “State of Nature” — the specific space where Europe ended and the “New 
World” began. The space “beyond the line” signified a place outside the law where the 
lack of the legal limits of war meant that only the law of the stronger applied (Schmitt 
2003: 93–94). These boundaries, first formulated in the Treaty of Tordesillas as the 
rayas (lines), were authorized by Rome — res publica Christiana and the center of the 
medieval world — and later in the secret treaty agreement of the Anglo-French amity 
lines of 1559. This configuration would evolve into the larger European Christendom as 
the center, the “location of Modernity” (Dussel 2002) — where emergent planetary 
consciousness was adjudicated (Schmitt 2003: 87). 
 The inception of the new lines of the Atlantic circuit of commerce, which would 
be the foundation of Western economy and dominance, had at its foundation an 
imaginary that formalized purity of blood in relationship to the rights of the people. 
This constituted the first articulations of race-thinking, a system formalized in the 
Spanish limpieza de sangre, the “purity of blood” principle, a racial more than a 
religious means of identifying and excluding Jewish converts who did not meet the 
requirements for the changing conceptions of being Spanish (Fredrickson 2002: 41). In 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain, the expulsion of the Moors demarcated the 
exterior frontiers and the pogroms of the Jews, the inner borders of the emerging 
commercial system. The converso “opened up the borderland, the place in which 
neither the exterior nor the interior frontiers apply, although they were the necessary 
conditions for borderlands. The converso will never be at peace with himself or herself, 
nor will he or she be trustworthy from the point of view of the state. The converso was 
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not so much a hybrid as it was a place of fear and passing, of lying and terror” (Mignolo 
2000: 27–29). This historical place is important to mark because it is one of the first 
junctures where terrorism, racism, and borders converge inside the early formations of 
capitalism.  
 This creation of an emergent ethnic and racialized difference in the 
consolidating dynastic states of Spain, England, and France with more definite borders, 
predominant languages, increasing urbanization, and commercialization threatened 
local autonomy and brought people of diverse culture and appearance into conflict 
(Fredrickson 2002: 25). Certificates of pure blood were required for admittance of 
conversos into both secular and ecclesial organizations, precursors of the certificates of 
whiteness that were purchased by Spanish families with mixed indigenous ancestry who 
wanted to situate themselves in a higher color castas8 (Fredrickson 2002: 33–34). This 
racialization and internalization of borders is a formulation that underpinned the 
organization of imperial conquest and who could participate in such conquest. Only 
those of Christian ranks could be missionaries and conquistadores. Early Spanish 
accounts characterized the indigenous “Other” first as an object in the surrounding 
landscape and later, increasingly, as a subject, equal to the “I” but different from it 
(Todorov 1999). It was just war, not discovery, that formed the basis of the moral-legal 
right to conquest, and it was the organizing principle in Francisco de Vitoria’s defense 
of Spanish acts in relationship to the Treaty of Tordesillas to uphold Spanish rights to 
free trade, evangelization, and the protection of innocent natives from themselves.  
 The Spanish rulers recognized the papal missionary mandate that served as the 
legal foundation of the conquista, and the papal bulls relieved the Spanish monarchs 
from paying tithes on the gold and silver taken from the indigenous Americans (Schmitt 
                                                
8 castas: a hierarchical caste system in Spanish, and also Portuguese, colonial societies that ordered all 
political, economic, and social life based on the racial classification of people. 
 
 
83 
2003: 111). The emergent humanism out of the Salamanca School proscribed the enemy 
as indigenous people, premised in a categorical synthesis of treatment of slaves and 
exiles as both the dominated and proscribed inside the conquest of the “New” World 
(Chamayou 2012: 75–76). These shifting conceptions of humanity and infrahumanity 
segue between the religious intolerance of the Middle Ages and the secular naturalistic 
racism of the Enlightenment (Arendt 1968: 160). Might was changed into conquest, and 
conquest acted as a kind of unique judgment on the natural qualities and human 
privileges of men and nations (Arendt 1968). 
 
The Freedom of the Seas 
The global order of interregional power was geographically an Asiatic-Afro-
Mediterranean order, and the center of commercial connections was located in Persia 
and directed by the Muslim world from the seventh century AD (Dussel 2013). Until 
this point, Western Europe had existed at the extreme western perimeter of the 
planetary order of commercial and military power (Dussel 2013). After the failed 
Crusades and attempts at expanding into Russia, the only open door for Europe into the 
center of the existing power system was via the Atlantic Ocean (Dussel 2013: 29). 
Portugal, already unified in the eleventh century, was the first European nation to 
transform the Reconquista against Muslims into the early process of Atlantic mercantile 
expansion (29). In this emergent and rising Eurocentric horizon of Modernity, the seas 
remained juridically outside any state-based spatial order of the “New World,” and the 
oceans were opened up to European interests during the height of the age of the sail 
from 1500–1850 (Rediker 2014). The sea was neither state nor colonial territory 
precisely because it was a space that could not be physically occupied, so in this sense 
the seas were free, free from the fetters of European legal understandings of state spatial 
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sovereignty (Schmitt 2003: 172; Schmitt 1997: 46–47). Geographical borders and 
notions of proximity were irrelevant on the high seas, which were open to all states for 
trade, fishing, and free pursuit of maritime wars and prize law (Schmitt 2003: 172; 
Schmitt 1997: 46). The merchants moving commodities across long distances built up 
the world market, and the ships carrying settlers, traders, and empire builders to Africa, 
Asia, and the Americas would totally transform the global political and economic order 
in what Schmitt (1997) described as “the predatory capitalism of the golden age” 
(Rediker 2014: 1). Until this moment, law and peace were only oriented to land 
(Schmitt 2003: 175). Rediker wrote, “The armed European deep-sea sailing ship was 
the means by which a vast oceanic commons was made safe for private property. It 
projected European imperial sovereignty onto the seas around the world” (2014: 5). 
Schmitt depicted England as the center and the link between the different orders of land 
and sea, the “guardian of the other side of the jus publicum Europaeum, the sovereign 
balance of land and sea” (2003: 173). Schmitt understood these two spatial orders as 
competing for world domination until almost the end of the nineteenth century, where 
“tensions between Russia and England were given the popular image of a scuffle 
between a bear and a whale,” terrestrial fauna versus mythical fish (1997: 6). The 
“elemental drift” from land to the rising sea power of the English Leviathan was 
premised in an understanding of the free seas, which meant that all the world’s oceans 
were open to all as a gigantic, limitless theater of war (Schmitt 2003: 172). The British 
Empire built up its realm with the sailing ship, the machine of globalization, which 
combined the functional features of the factory and the prison (Linebaugh and Rediker 
2000: 328). The consolidation of Atlantic capitalism happened through the creation of a 
“maritime state, a financial and nautical system designed to acquire and operate Atlantic 
markets” (328). This was a mobile order of worldwide transportation that was built by 
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the landless, the expropriated, and the poor. Often, unwaged convicts, slaves, and 
people from the workhouse were forced to produce the unpaid labor of this capitalism, 
leaving the land and migrating from country to town, region to region, and across 
oceans (332). The origins of this mobile order were premised in the coercive seizure of 
women, children, and men through capture, enclosure, and imprisonment and 
maintained through operative regimes of terror (332). The ship was the instrument of 
capital accumulation on the seas, but also the setting for resistance, where the traditions 
of maritime radical solidarity became a vehicle for revolutionary ideas and politics, 
geographically expanding class struggles and challenging the emergent world order of 
capital (144–145). 
 As Linebaugh and Rediker crucially point out, this order of labor was extremely 
difficult to control and manage, because its true power lay in the fact that it was a 
multitudinous, mixed-race, and people-based power built through cooperative and 
collective labor, a planetary proletariat in its origins, motions, and consciousness (2000: 
332–333). The “motley crews” and pirates were pioneers of a different kind of freedom 
of the sea, a non-state-based freedom at a historical moment when consolidating 
conceptions of the nation-state were increasingly linked to ethnic and national 
definitions based on land-based understandings of place making. In this context, the 
open oceans were considered as a kind of non-place, or a utopia, a concept that is 
discursively double-sided. On one hand, the utopic opening can be extended to 
underscore the liberatory potential of autonomous seafaring communities, their political 
orders, imaginative networks, and futures that existed beyond the reach of the nation-
state. On the other hand, viewing the sea as a non-place can problematically substitute 
the real lived place of the sea for the imaginary one, vacating the historical, lived, 
material location of human work and life there and merely rendering the space and 
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people working there as “wild,” a view that was historically conducive to appropriation 
(Rediker 2014: 3). These two very different forms of “freedom” of the seas existed 
simultaneously. The first freedom was the liberty from legal constraints to seize and 
appropriate, and the later, a collective response to the aggressive actions cultivating the 
new nomic order. The nomos of the seas marked a change in warfare, both strategically 
and tactically. Land warfare had been a state-to-state affair where armies and bodies 
would directly confront each other in the open and civilians were not directly involved 
in the fighting, according to rules of war (Schmitt 1997: 47). In naval warfare the 
enemy was the trade and economy of an enemy state — rendering every inhabitant of 
the enemy nation, and even neutral countries with economic links to enemy states, as 
foes (47). Aqueous predatory capitalism had no borders, and the “newly” discovered 
lands provided new territory and human capital to size and claim, and new markets to 
cultivate. 
 
The Presupposing Violence of Coloniality 
The early configurations of nation-state sovereignty actually required an extra-
territorial formation of power based in the act of appropriation to create differential 
frameworks for certain spaces in order to create global free-trade systems, a political 
framework that Schmitt (2003) theorized early on from inside the inner machinations 
and intellectual capital of the Nazi totalitarian regime. Imperialism grew out of the 
national limitations of capital, as the ruling class in Europe turned to a politics of 
expansion by using racism as its major ideological weapon (Arendt 1968: 160). Race-
thinking marked the formations of the new body politic of the nation and brought into 
sharp relief the limits of European “humanism” (161). Provisional sovereignty was 
established through new latitudes of presupposing violence, which was legitimized 
 
 
87 
inside a one-sided rationality and spatiality where the nation-state created and enforced 
new forms of capital extraction through special-interest security zones around the 
world. Coloniality was the essential element, or glue, in integrating a global interstate 
system because it not only created a hierarchy and ordering, but also set rules for the 
interactions between states (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992; Mbembe 2001). Founding 
violence underpinned colonial rationality to the right of conquest and all the 
prerogatives flowing from that right (Mbembe 2001: 25). This presupposing violence 
was institutional in helping to create the very space over which it exercised its power, 
and what is unique about this spatially is that it had a one-sidedness, based in a supreme 
right that was simultaneously the supreme denial of right. The authorizing rationality of 
colonial sovereignty was maintained, spread, and performed through numerous banal 
acts that constituted the central cultural imaginary the state shared with society in a 
formation of sovereignty that collapsed authority and morality into one system of 
organization (Mbembe 2001: 25). To unmask this key moment in making “Modernity” 
— a Eurocentric view of Europe, and now the United States, as the center of Western 
civilization having internal characteristics that allow it to supersede, through its 
rationality, all other cultures — it is necessary to reveal the fallacy of the myth of 
“reason” by showing its other side (Dussel 2013). Violence was carried out, and at the 
same time it was denied, and it is the innocent victims of the civilizing project who are 
capable of revealing the false innocence of “Modernity” in its conquest of the “Other” 
(Dussel 2013).  
 In this originary context, borderlines were negotiable and fluid, and they were 
drawn by metropoles only in relationship to claims made by other metropolitan empires 
(Quijano and Wallerstein 1992). The race for colonies was concerned with the symbolic 
appropriation of and treaties with local indigenous peoples (Seed 1995). Europeans had 
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to deploy practices and mechanisms to assert imperial claims of control over the land 
and the people who lived there. Ceremonies of possession, especially fence building, 
were cultural practices of power that embodied sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Europeans’ belief in their right to rule and enact imperial authority (Seed 1995). These 
treaties and fences, especially in the English context, “had great practical value as a 
preparatory or contributory method for the recognized legal title of effective 
occupation” (Schmitt 2003: 215). In the nineteenth century, Schmitt wrote, “interstate 
international law, discoveries, explorations, and symbolic forms of appropriation had 
the practical significance as initial steps toward occupation, as inchoate title” as to give 
the explorer sufficient time to effectively occupy the appropriated land (2003: 215). 
Any challengers who arrived later would have to dispute this initial title and occupation 
(2003: 215). Provisional claims making was a way of creating territorial forms of 
recognition even when these were contested formations. In the context of the United 
States, the Protestant British distanced themselves from the Catholic Doctrine of 
Discovery by invoking the “Norman Yoke,” saying that land rights lay in the owners’ 
willingness and ability to “develop” their territory in accordance with the Genesisical 
doctrine of man subduing nature (Churchill 1992: 37). This invocation was politically 
strategic, not only because it bestowed on English colonial settlers the right to 
dispossess indigenous people of their lands not put to “proper” use, but also because it 
allowed the British Crown to contest discovery rights of other European powers who 
didn’t “cultivate” the wilderness they claimed (Churchill 1992: 37). The right of 
possession has continued to be “the most frequently asserted and doggedly fortified 
right in world history,” even though this entitlement has historically been disembodied 
from humanity itself (Moyn 2010: 17).  
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 Early race-thinking and racism cut across all national borders from the very 
beginning, even as it simultaneously constituted national borders (Arendt 1968: 161). 
The originality of the colonial context, which Fanon identified, is that of an economic 
reality of inequality — where the substructure is also a superstructure of the 
racialization of wealth and resources and creates a dividing line where frontiers take the 
form of military barracks and police stations (2001: 29). The nation-state’s new 
latitudes of violence outside national territory are what organized space. Fanon (2001) 
described the spatiality of the colonial world as divided into compartments, and he said 
that it is the examination of the system of compartments that can reveal the lines of 
force that the system implies. It was this ordering and its geographical layout that also 
marked the lines on which decolonized society would be reorganized (2001: 29). Inside 
the capitalist system the exploited party must be separated from those in power over 
him or her inside a moralized schema of violence and bureaucracy: “The first thing 
which the native learns is to stay in his place, not to go beyond certain limits” (2001: 
40). In these compartments it is the physicality of the freedom to move that becomes a 
source of power to people oppressed in these systems (2001: 40). Anzaldúa describes 
this formation in a similar way in explaining the “intimate terrorism of life in the 
borderlands” and how the internalization of oppressive formations is immobilizing: 
 
The ability to respond is what is meant by responsibility, yet our cultures take 
away our ability to act — shackle us in the name of protection. Blocked, 
immobilized we can’t move forward, can’t move backwards. That writhing 
serpent movement, the very movement of life, swifter than lightening, frozen. 
(2007: 42–43) 
 
This understanding of the convergence of the material and the moral, and the role that 
mobility plays in this schema — not a mobility limited to crossing boundaries, but 
rather a mobility in relationship to the “ability to respond” and to act in relationship to 
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these socio-cultural formations of economic systems — is crucial. It is the other side, 
the embodied side, of the monumentality in spatial formations of power and capital. 
This is why Fanon identified the political act of decolonization as the creation of a 
spatiality where the whole material and moral universe is broken up (2001: 34).  
 The inter-
European muddle of laws, agreements, and thousands of treaties made by private and 
colonial societies made legal and commercial recognitions inside colonial spaces 
problematic to realize the full extractive potential. To move beyond the inherent limits 
of an economic hierarchy based in a European Universalism that only acknowledged 
the sovereignty of other European nations and the United States as the political progeny 
of European hegemony, a series of legal and judicial changes had to take place in order 
to open up a global or planetary framework of appropriation, commerce, and trade. This 
was the context of the novel proclamation of a new form of U.S. sovereignty, the 
Monroe Doctrine, a spatial reconfiguration of the Americas that juridically constituted a 
special-interest commercial zone as a security zone (Schmitt 2003: 281). And one of the 
first consequences of the export of power was to disembody the state’s instruments of 
violence and to promote the police and the military as national representatives 
upholding ruling-class capitalist interests in colonial territories, effectively allowing 
violence and the laws of capitalism to create unprecedented social realities for the 
political organization of power (Arendt 1968: 16–17). Schmitt (2003) locates the legal 
architecture of this shift as happening at the 1884–1885 Congo Conference in Berlin — 
attended by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, 
Norway, and the Ottoman Empire — the culmination of a giant race for legal rights, 
titles, and occupation in central Africa, and also for the meting out of islands in the 
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Pacific (Schmitt 2003: 216; Young 2001: 31). The conference formulated the rules of a 
European land appropriation in a way that dissolved the old legal frameworks that 
spatially considered colonizer spaces distinctly from colonized spaces (Hochschild 
2006). This conference was dominated by a belief in a free-trade global economy, an 
idea that lay not only in overcoming the state’s political borders but also as a 
precondition for member states to have a minimum constitutional order that consisted of 
the freedom of the state public sphere from the private sphere, above all from the non-
state spheres of property, trade, and economy (Schmitt 2003: 235). Free-trade global 
commerce anchored the territorial divisions that divided sovereign states. State borders 
were not actually territorial lines, but rather the lines delimiting the spheres of human 
participation and labor (Schmitt 2003: 236). Fanon, writing in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, captured exactly how this dynamic worked by drawing on the same example as 
Schmitt: “A Berlin Conference was able to tear Africa into shreds and divide her up 
between three or four imperial flags. At the moment, the important thing is not whether 
such-and-such a region in Africa is under French or Belgian sovereignty, but rather that 
the economic zones are respected” (Fanon 2001: 51). Tending the borders of these 
economic zones is the culmination of nomos, the cultivating, pastoral power implied in 
its formation. Poet Aimé Césaire described the spatial representation of the wreckage 
and waste of the European colonial enterprise as a void surrounding Europe — a void 
that is the “prelude to Disaster and the forerunner of Catastrophe,” one that was created 
by overthrowing “the ramparts behind which European civilization could have 
developed freely” but can now only lead to ruin and perishment (2000: 74–75). Césaire 
(2000) draws on a reference to the walls around medieval free cities, which formed the 
basis of community-based protection and refuge.9 At the root of European foreclosure 
                                                
9 See pp. 50–51. 
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of itself is precisely its destruction of these early ideals. There is no proscription defined 
by the wall, but the proscription is everywhere. Ultimately, this act of tearing down the 
wall for colonial expansion not only perpetuated violence, but also condemned Europe 
to its own self-destruction. 
 
Decolonization, National Borders, and Planetary “Raceology”  
Eventually, by the mid-1800s, state-centered legal positivism was no longer sufficient 
to provide the conceptual tools and institutions capable of organizing the complex and 
confusing matrix of intra-state sovereignty and supra-state free economy (Schmitt 2003: 
236). The changing economic organization of the colonial project shifted. The old 
colonialism could not form the basis of contemporary global economic exchanges, and 
white people would have to do business with people of color globally to maintain U.S. 
economic imperialism (hooks 2000: 92). Decolonization rendered colonized spaces as 
legible inside the legal framework of inter-state commerce, which up until this point 
had still been confined to the ideo-political norm of a European Universalism, as 
opposed to a global free-trade system. Overt military violence was collapsed inside 
capitalism. It is the “detached complicity between capitalism and the violent forces 
which blaze up in colonial territory” (Fanon 2001: 51). It is worth quoting Fanon’s 
description of this process at length: 
 
In the early days of colonization, a single column could occupy immense 
stretches of country: the Congo, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and so on. Today, 
however, the colonized countries’ struggle crops up in a completely new 
international situation. Capitalism, in its early days, saw in the colonies a source 
of raw materials which, once turned into manufactured goods, could be 
distributed on the European market. After a phase of accumulation of capital, 
capitalism has today come to modify its conception of the profit-earning 
capacity of a commercial enterprise. The colonies have become a market. The 
colonial population is a customer who is ready to buy goods. Consequently, if 
the garrison has to be perpetually reinforced, if buying and selling slackens off, 
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that is to say if manufactured and finished goods can no longer be exported, 
there is clear proof that the solution of military force must be set aside. A blind 
domination founded on slavery is not economically speaking worth while for the 
bourgeoisie of the mother country. The monopolistic group within this 
bourgeoisie does not support a government whose policy is solely that of the 
sword. What the factory-owners and finance magnates of the mother country 
expect from their government is not that it should decimate the colonial peoples, 
but that it should safeguard with the help of economic conventions their own 
“legitimate interests.” (2001: 51) 
 
This safeguarding is paradoxically referred to as securing peace or democracy — 
maintaining law and order without constant physical force — but rather in a way that 
tied the people to the land, to international markets, and to new nationalities. National 
independence did not undo coloniality; it merely transformed its appearance in the 
world. Ethnicity became the new marker of the boundaries that served to locate human 
rank and identity within the state — categories that never existed before this point in 
history, and which served inside different local contexts as the social borders that 
corresponded to the division of labor and labor control (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992). 
After the abolishment of slavery in the Americas, and later the end of colonial rule, 
conscious and systematic racism took root as a way of culturally shoring up economic 
hierarchies inside early transnational economies. Increasingly, the informal constraints 
of ethnicity were insufficient to maintain workplace and social hierarchies, particularly 
in the case of the United States (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992).  
 Nationality and citizenship emerged as legal frameworks in the wake of a 
growing free-trade global economy, shifts that included early ideas of rights, including 
the human freedom of movement. However, the freedom of movement held up and 
enshrined in this new system was never intended for everyone. In the nineteenth 
century, the United States created some of the first modern legislation to enact formal 
segregation and to force Native Americans into reservations (Quijano and Wallerstein 
1992). The American West and Southwest were violently appropriated through 
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genocide and displacement of Native Americans, and the conquest of the wilderness 
was a means of consolidating formations of national identity, democracy, and an 
expanding economy, projects that all drew on the authorizing mythologies of the 
originary colonial “regeneration through violence” in the creation of the United States 
as a settler-state (Slotkin 1998: 10; Slotkin 1973). At this time there were also local 
movements for racial segregation in urban centers in Europe and the United States, 
interconnected and often enacted through smaller-scale governance (Nightingale 2012: 
5). Functional segregation was joined to hierarchy (Scott 1998: 111). 
 Prior to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945, the idea of rights 
situated a politics of citizenship in the West at the expense of a politics of suffering 
abroad inside competing spaces of citizenship (Arendt 1968; Moyn 2010: 12–13). 
Western “humanism” was too fragmentary and did not extend to millions living under 
colonial subjugation, and it was above all “sordidly racist” (Du Bois 1984; Césaire 
2000). Subaltern groups chose not to organize around the broken promises of liberal, 
individual rights located in frameworks guaranteed by nation-state sovereignty, but 
instead, anti-colonialist movements organized around collective liberation and self-
determination, visions that did not necessarily imply a need for sovereign autonomy, 
largely because this sovereignty was not true, but malleable in service of economic 
interests and the market (Senghor 1964). It was the global scope of racism that 
connected anti-racist and anti-colonial struggle across borderlines, even while Western 
priority maintained the nation-state as the forum for rights (Moyn 2010: 95). 
 The Universal Declaration dramatically recast rights, not as foundational to the 
nation-state, but instead as entitlements that might contradict the nation-state from 
above it and outside of it (Moyn 2010: 13). Rights talk emerged as a precarious kind of 
cosmopolitanism that collapsed moral ideals inside global economic realities as some of 
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the first ideas of a world without borders, and as an internationalist imagination that has 
historically abetted the proliferation and competition of different states and nations 
more than it has helped imagine a world without moral borders (14). Property 
protections remained the most prominent and significant rights claim in both theory and 
law from this period onwards, and often social movements searching for new terms of 
inclusion were forced to set themselves against these persisting sets of rights embedded 
with property instead of proposing new ones (35). In Discourse on Colonialism, Aimé 
Césaire (2000) invokes the terminology of provisional sovereignty-claiming procedures 
to depict the U.S. postwar outlook. U.S. leaders unfurled the banner of anti-colonialism 
by declaring that the future of the world belonged to them, as “economic forces 
unmistakably put the future leadership of the race in their hands. … Which means that 
American high finance considers that the time has come to raid every colony in the 
world” (Césaire 2000: 76). This early blurring of the site of civil society and the market 
as one and the same is a precursor of neoliberal citizenship where free markets are 
considered as the singular precondition for individual rights and social justice (Somers 
2008: 29–30).  
 After World War II, when U.S. hegemony reached new planetary heights, 
formal segregation was becoming more and more ideologically untenable, but it was the 
rise of U.S. economic supremacy that permitted and required widespread illegal 
migration from non-European countries to the United States, which gave way to the 
“Third World Within.” This immigration reality was rationalized inside a subtler form 
of labor organization in the United States that collapsed racism inside a meritocracy of 
individualized worth that privileges and values those who have historically been at the 
top of the hierarchical organization of the world all along (Quijano and Wallerstein 
1992). For example, desegregation in the United States was a way of weakening the 
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collective radicalization of black people by creating a privileged class of black people 
with access to the existing social structure to keep the ruling power class in the United 
States intact (hooks 2000: 92). 
  So when we talk about contemporary borders, we have to understand them as 
an important tool of labor control, which is part of a racist system of boundary making 
in the service of inter-state free-trade networks. The contemporary configurations of 
border walls, and more broadly the larger context of policing, securitization, and 
surveillance practices on borders, need to be understood not as new dramatic changes, 
but inside the historicized ligatures of sovereignty, security, and territorial boundaries as 
spatial and political co-constitutive formations that are operative of global economy and 
founded in violence and just war. As we think about the legal framework embodied by 
and generated from national border walls, we can understand them as acts of 
appropriation that are operative of larger processes of labor controls that have profound 
consequences for the freedom of movement, in the larger sense I have previously 
described. In the more contemporary context of the globalization of neoliberal capital, 
Hardt and Negri situate the “endless paths” of autonomous movement as the circulation 
that allows the multitude to designate new spaces; “Empire can only isolate, divide and 
segregate,” and as such, the general right for the multitude to control its own movement 
represents the “ultimate demand for global citizenship” (2000: 399–400). A political 
response requires an adequate consciousness of the “central repressive operations” of 
Empire and “recognizing and engaging the imperial initiatives and not allowing them to 
continually re-establish order; it is a matter of crossing and breaking down the limits 
and segmentations that are imposed on the new collective labor power” (399). 
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Aerial Nomos and Vertical Ordering of Power 
The first nomos of the earth was the Treaty of Tordesillas, where land and sea were 
partitioned in a way that eventually gave rise to an “elemental drift” from land to sea. 
This partition privileged the naval power of the British Empire, a leviathan whose 
powers were later altered by the mechanization of the Industrial Revolution (Schmitt 
1997). Finally, Schmitt referenced the rise of a third order of power in the “political 
bestiary,” the griffin, the great bird that represents the power of the skies (Mendieta 
2011: 265). In writing Nomos, Schmitt had also considered the figure of the phoenix or 
the dragon as the animal to represent this emergent elemental and geophysical order 
(Mendieta 2011: 265). He concluded his analysis by suggesting that the invention of the 
airplane and the opening of the skies represented the next nomos of the earth, a fiery 
order. He penned these conclusions as he and the populous of Berlin huddled in bomb 
shelters listening, as he wrote in a letter to Ernst Jünger, to “the furious roar of 
behemoth as it greets the great bird Ziz” (Schmitt 1997: 57; and Schmitt quoted in 
Mendieta 2011: 265). This apocalyptic vision of global supremacy being negotiated 
from the sky has some points of conceptual relevance for today, especially with the rise 
of U.S. unmanned warfare and air strikes. This is the juncture where my work begins to 
theoretically and empirically explore the aerial nomos and the ways in which we might 
consider how national border walls are functional tools inside a vertical spatial regime 
of digital presence, aerial surveillance, and airpower. The evolution of the aerial 
configuration of state power has occurred rapidly. It has been one hundred years since 
the first aerial bomb was dropped, and in the last decade, the use of drones, surveillance 
cameras, satellite imaging, and aerial missile defense systems have proliferated, not 
only as tools of warfare and national defense but also as tools to surveil citizens 
(Lindqvist 2001; Shock and Awe Conference 2011; Singer 2009). The newest frontiers 
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are in the sky, and the surveillance of these vertical and aerial sovereign spaces still 
references terrestrial and maritime boundaries, although these sovereign borders are still 
quite porous and up for grabs in many juridical and economic respects. Radio signals, 
one of the earliest aerial technologies, had to be regulated to stop artificially at borders. 
While the regulatory apparatus for satellites, cameras, drones, and sensors along the 
permeable borders of the skies is still in flux, the human mobility inside this sphere is 
the most highly regulated and economically exclusive.  
 The “coloniality of power” pioneered reconfigurations of planetary labor and 
mobility regimes via walls that were constitutive of a new form of sovereignty that did 
not have precedent, but was first formed through the symbolic and later, effective, 
occupation (Quijano 2007; Schmitt 2003). The reason this isn’t talked about in the 
“new” context of this latest round of border walls and globalization is because it is not 
situated inside the progressive linear history that we are conditioned to speak from. The 
walling formations that Carl Schmitt’s discussion of nomos outlines are present and 
recognizable in new case studies of border walls. First, inchoate sovereignty is 
necessary for laying a provisional claim to sovereignty over a specific territory and 
operative of land and labor. This sovereignty is enacted through symbolic forms of 
appropriation, but generates legal power extra-legally through the physical violence of 
occupation. These power formations are crucial in creating a differential spatial 
framework that is operative of extractive economies premised on racialized and 
differential spatialities of human participation. Often these configurations are 
constitutive of and accompany new forms of war making. All of these features are 
present in the contemporary cases studies presented in the following chapters. At a core 
level we have to understand border walls in relationship to the organization of labor and 
free-trade economies, which is manifested in the changing ideology of landscape that 
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requires a spatial revolution that renders borders as a differential space where extra-
legal formations can be enforced. Historically, the freedom of movement as a human 
right emerged in this context, which was always a differential framework where some 
people are considered within those rights and others are considered outside of those 
rights. The in-between space is productive of fear, terror, and passing — features that 
are normally talked about as newly produced or manifested in the context of the latest 
human migrations by both land and sea. This zone of indistinction is the hallmark of 
nomos that sits just outside the purview of Schmitt’s focus on the emergence of a 
centralized system of sovereign states bound together by a mutual recognition of 
equality. Agamben (1995) traces this space of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion 
back even further. He identifies the originary political act not as the social contract, but 
as banishment. To ban someone is to allow anyone to inflict harm upon the banished, or 
the proscribed person is to be considered as already dead (Agamben 1995: 105). The 
historic figure of the werewolf as a hybrid, part animal part human, who dwelt in both 
the forest and the city but belonged to neither, was ultimately condemned to a category 
of indistinction between the passage of animal and man, physis (nature) and nomos, 
excluded and included (105). “Sovereign violence is in truth founded not on a pact but 
on the exclusive inclusion of bare life in the state,” Agamben writes, and it is the ban 
that holds the poles of bare life and sovereign power together (107–109). There is an 
ambiguity between historical understandings of exile as punishment and exile as refuge, 
or a freedom from punishment, which is rooted in the sovereign ban. This tension was 
present in the changing social and political role of medieval walls, as mentioned earlier. 
It also manifests in the discursive flexibility of “freedom” that surfaces in different 
moments in Schmitt’s accounting of nomos, a term that is important to flag up because 
it resurfaces again and again in the contemporary geographies of walls that follow. The 
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ban can simultaneously be both the emblem of sovereignty and the representation of 
expulsion from society (110–111). However, the relationship of the person who is 
simultaneously included and excluded remains forever outside the possibility of 
equality. This is a foreclosure that renders figures like the undocumented migrant just 
human enough to be the architects laboring to build the new realms of economic 
freedom, but still subhuman and racialized so as to be excluded from political 
protection.  
 This broad historical survey of the changing spatial formations of state borders 
via Schmitt’s conceptual epochs of nomos reflects on how new economies, labor, and 
spheres of human participation were organized along axes of racial difference and 
crafted though shifting conceptualizations of war and peace. Often the legitimacy of 
these orders relied on organizing moral claims through new spatio-legal hierarchies of 
walls and divisions that organized human submission through provisional sovereignty 
claims and occupation. I have carefully detailed these larger historical shifts in such a 
way as to set the stage for my engagement with contemporary discussions of border 
walls, revisiting the subtle and emergent shifts in these concepts of banishment, just 
war, and security and looking at what it is that opens up in thinking about our 
understanding of the socio-moral location of the human.  
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Chapter 4: Inchoate Sovereignty and the Symbolism of the Wall 
 
The wall, which for the Costa Ricans is merely a small section of wall, one 
kilometer long and two meters high, has been nicknamed by the [border] 
business community in Peñas Blancas, as the “wall of infamy,” a symbolic way 
of saying that Nicaraguans shouldn’t enter neighboring territory because they 
only cross over to commit crimes.  
 
— “END en el muro de la ignominia,” in Nicaraguan newspaper El Nuevo 
Diario (Mairena Martínez 2001) 
 
The wall fell the 9th of November 1989. Little by little it was taken apart. … 
After 1990 many fragments were sent to different parts of the world as symbols 
so that no wall like this would never be repeated. 
 
— José Joaquín Chaverri, Costa Rican Ambassador to Germany, on the 
occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall (Mata 
Blanco 2014) 
 
When the Costa Rican government began construction of a one-kilometer cinder-block 
wall along the major, terrestrial border crossing with Nicaragua, it was billed as simply 
a minor upgrade to a badly decaying immigration post, which was described in news 
reports as an “indignity” and “a national embarrassment” (Guerén Catepillán 2001). 
The president of Costa Rica vehemently denied reports that qualified the structure as a 
national border wall, and instead he described it as merely a small and much-needed 
update. “This is simply a wall to protect the customs headquarter,” he said. “Be careful 
not to be misguided by wrong information. What difference does a wall that isn’t even 
one-kilometer long make along a 320-kilometer border? It doesn’t do anything” 
(Guerén Catepillán 2001). And indeed, his statements came true. Even in the year after 
it was built, the tiny wall did not stop some 1,000 Nicaraguans from daily crossing over 
the national border into Costa Rica without authorization (Hernández 2002). Today, the 
wall is overgrown with vines and weeds and is almost completely forgotten inside 
larger conversations about border security and migration, one decade after it was built. 
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Instead, the construction of the Costa Rican border wall marked out the beginnings of 
an escalating and ongoing border conflict, where the rural northern Costa Rican 
borderlands have been reconfigured not only by new levels of policing and surveillance 
but also by efforts to open up and expand new border markets. This chapter traces the 
history of the world’s smallest national border wall in Costa Rica, and also that of one 
of the most well-known border walls in the world, the Berlin Wall, comparing and 
examining the ways in which a border wall serves as a provisional marker and 
sovereignty claim, which are often brokered by presupposing violence in the form of 
policing and surveillance methods that are later formalized inside legal policies. These 
two different geographies are connected not only by the practices and material 
infrastructure of walling itself, but also ideologically inside the Cold War “culture talk.” 
 The descriptive inventory of contemporary walling projects, even in the case of 
the world’s smallest one, is bound up in relationship to the Berlin Wall in a way that 
simultaneously engages a multiplicity of temporal, spatial, and material matters inside a 
way of thinking about the social space (Lefebvre 1974) of border barriers, embedded in 
popular and academic accounts of this proliferating infrastructure (Jones 2012; Di 
Cintio 2012; Rice-Oxley 2013). The depictions of the global phenomenon place this 
varied architecture, which includes structures ranging from chain-link fences to four-
meter steel posts and cement walls, in direct relationship to the symbolic epitome of 
both the militarized, ideological division at the heart of liberal Western rationality, and 
also the most dramatic human and capitalist triumph over walls in history. The Berlin 
Wall haunts these new border projects and the way we understand them, know them, 
and talk about them. The circumstances surrounding its abrupt overnight construction, 
the ideologies at stake on the different sides of the structure, its long and violent 28-year 
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duration, and its dramatic popular destruction in 1989 are bound up as a singular 
referent that continues to echo each time a new boundary is built and protested.  
 The standard account of contemporary walling usually goes something like this: 
the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the “borderless” age of 
globalization; but we have discovered that instead of more barriers coming down, walls 
are going up faster than at any other time in recent history (Jones 2012: 5–6). Revisiting 
the Berlin Wall as a temporal and visible marker of the changes occurring in the late 
1980s and early 1990s opens up ways to explore how its terminology and symbolism 
persist as an important reference point inside the changing configurations of the 
ideologies of global capitalism and U.S. hegemony. This chapter invokes the political 
and cultural repertoire that the Berlin Wall opens up10 in the media coverage of the 
Costa Rican border wall — a small but representative cross section of the global 
archives of the kinds of commentaries that surface every time a new border wall is 
announced. The Berlin Wall is a dialogical cypher that connects the “culture talk” of the 
Cold War to contemporary discourses of terrorism. A careful analysis of the Berlin 
Wall helps to unveil the ways in which the physical practices and violence of walling 
have been transformed into a best practice of governance. This telling underscores the 
importance of aerial configurations of power and capital and its circuitry, and it gives 
insight into the changing spatial measurements of freedom, even along the only 
remaining 1.3-kilometer strip of the Berlin Wall itself. 
 
Think Tanks and Sky Bridges 
In the aftermath of World War II, there was a global reorganization and realignment of 
wealth and territory. The Marshall Plan allowed U.S. interests to organize and dictate 
                                                
10 Raymond Williams’s insightful treatment of the Country and the City (1973) helped me formulate the 
approach for thinking about the Berlin Wall undertaken in this chapter — to unpack highly visible 
markers of larger social and political changes inside the archives of literature.  
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the new global economy inside the experimental mixed occupation of Germany, and in 
particular Berlin. These temporary zones of governance that were developed under the 
banner of securing world peace were configured exclusively in the service of military 
garrisons, not the everyday necessities of civilian living. The Marshall Plan was 
instrumental in taking down trade barriers to U.S. industry expansion into Europe inside 
the rebuilding of European markets and industry. One of the principal architects of the 
Marshall Plan was the American think tank the Brookings Institution. The first 
president of the institute was a University of Chicago professor schooled in war debt, 
Harold Moulton, who at the request of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI), chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, devoted the entire staff at the institute to 
the task of preparing a comprehensive set of recommendations to the U.S. Congress 
(Brookings Institution 2015a). Leo Paslovsky, a Brookings Institute scholar and U.S. 
State Department bureaucrat who would later draft the charter of the United Nations, 
led the team in developing their recommendations, which “declared that the ‘magnitude 
and special character’ of Europe’s desperate need for help ‘require the creation of a new 
and separate American agency’ headed by a Cabinet-level official with direct access to 
President Truman,” organized with an elite, pro-business approach to international 
affairs (Brookings Institution 2015a; Eisenberg 1996: 16). The Marshall Plan was 
situated inside this larger “world peace” building project — the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the creation of the United Nations. It was an institutional 
predecessor of sorts to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security — an extra-judicial 
government agency created inside “exceptional” circumstances that reports directly to 
the U.S. president. The political, human rights project that was born of this historical 
conjecture “draws on the image of a place that is not yet called into being,” full of 
aspirational hopes. It “promises to penetrate the impregnability of state borders, slowly 
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replacing them with the authority of international law” (Moyn 2010: 1). In reality, the 
U.S. approach to partitioning Germany was driven by the conviction that a free-market, 
economic framework would promote integration and sustain U.S. prosperity. Instead, 
this move escalated a competing bloc rivalry, where military strength and the threat of 
nuclear weapons, not the United Nations, became the major mediators of Great Power 
relations (Eisenberg 1996: 13). When the Soviets began the blockade of Berlin to 
prevent the U.S.-led partition, U.S. president Truman characterized Soviet actions as a 
cold-blooded land grab, even though the United States had forsaken agreements in 
Yalta and Potsdam, pushing forward in creating a West German state against the 
reservations of many Europeans (Eisenberg 1996: 491). The imagery of the U.S. 
propaganda posters for the Marshall Plan captures the ideological inversion that 
reconfigured the U.S. military and economic efforts for partition as a pair of red, white, 
and blue wire cutters. The United States was cutting through the barbed wire to liberate 
Europe for a new global prosperity regime (George C. Marshall Foundation 2015a). 
This stance is similar to the patriotic and forward-marching “anti-terror” charter of 
today. The “liberations” of Iraq and Afghanistan take the form of planetary 
counterinsurgency, opening new markets with “disaster capitalism” where it is 
primarily civilians who bear the costs and wreckage of U.S.-built structures of 
economic order (Klein 2008). Since the 1940s the Brookings Institution has also gone 
on to play key roles in influencing U.S. deregulation policies, tax reform, and welfare 
reform (Brookings Institution 2015b). The institution also advises around issues of 
homeland security, and particularly border security in the aftermath of September 11, 
2001 (Daalder and Destler 2002). Ultimately, it was the idea of the airlift that allowed 
U.S. policy makers to solve intractable problems in the East-West confrontation around 
the partition of Germany by framing them inside the media-friendly, “humanitarian” 
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gesture of feeding the city of Berlin in an “unbeatable display of U.S. generosity,” even 
though the very act had been precipitated by unilateral U.S. actions, jeopardizing not 
only the economy of Berlin but of the entire eastern zone (Eisenberg 1996: 414–490).  
 Before there was ever a wall in Berlin, there was a thoroughfare in the sky. The 
same British and U.S. air forces that had just flattened the city of Berlin would be 
commissioned to lead a two-year airlift to sustain it in the face of the Soviet blockade. 
Berlin was an island in the center of this configuration — a quadrant of power lines 
drawn by the victors that lay 130 kilometers into the Soviet Sector, set up by the 
postwar Berlin Agreement. It was a city that served as both the capital of Germany, but 
also the “capital of the free world” — the micro-stage where the macro rearrangements 
of planetary power played out. It was a place where the future was being planned, built, 
and imagined, central to post–World War II discourses of urbanism, modernism, and 
postmodernism (Broadbent and Hake 2010: 2). When British foreign secretary Ernest 
Bevin raised the question of Atlantic security with U.S. secretary of state George 
Marshall on November 22, 1947, he advocated that the West needed a “positive plan for 
an association of the Western democracies” — a “spiritual federation of the West” that 
was “not a formal alliance but an understanding backed by power, money and resolute 
action” (quoted in Harrington 2012: 41). The United States demanded the end to the 
Soviet blockade on the basis of Western access rights, citing the hardships the blockade 
inflicted on Berlin citizens, and began the airlift as an interim solution. In a June 13, 
1948, cable to Washington, D.C., American general Lucius D. Clay said, “We can 
maintain our own people in Berlin indefinitely, but not the German people if rail 
transport is severed” (Collier 1978: 56). His British counterpart Sir Brian Robertson 
proposed an alternative plan to supply Berlin’s basic needs by air (55). The first small 
British contingent of eight planes flew out from Waterbeach, near Cambridge, on June 
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25, 1948. On June 26, “Operation Counterpunch” began to supply 17 days’ worth of 
supplies of grains and flour, 32 days’ worth of supplies of grains and cereal, 48 days’ 
worth of fats, 25 days’ worth of meat and fish, 42 days’ worth of potatoes, and 26 days’ 
worth of milk and skimmed milk (64). The airlift was initially envisioned as a 
temporary, provisional, and ad hoc effort to supply Berlin’s daily food need of 13,500 
tons. It was a test of the limits and possibilities of airpower logistics, led with insights 
from General “Willy the Whip” Tuner, garnered from his experiences in the first-ever 
airlift actions by the U.S. Air Force during World War II, moving cargo across the 
Himalayas from India to China in theater operations there (Harrington 2012; Collier 
1978). The operational knowledge that formed the strategic basis of the Berlin airlift 
operation came from the tried and true lessons of airpower that were previously tested 
out on colonial subjects inside European colonial holdings. Many of the U.S. and 
British commanders involved had earned their credentials on different colonial 
campaign fronts, from Aden to Morocco. The success of the Berlin Airlift rewrote the 
limits of airpower in the annals of history and also in logistics manuals.  
 Containment and quarantine framed the shift from détente. The language of 
enclosure that has prevailed as a way to describe the configurations of rights to 
occupation — and the U.S. supreme right to grant and defend these rights — was 
always depicted as unilateral and spiritualized configurations of Western might as right. 
In 1961, during a meeting in Vienna, U.S. president Kennedy told Soviet premier Nikita 
Khrushchev that any violation of rights of access and any encroachment on West Berlin 
would be considered a breach of U.S. rights and interests (Hilton 2001: 13). Upon 
President Kennedy’s return from Vienna, he made this public address: 
 
Our most serious discussions dealt with Germany and Berlin. I made it clear to 
Mr. Khrushchev that the security of Western Europe, and with it our own 
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security, is intimately interlinked with our presence in and our rights of access to 
Berlin, that these rights are based on a legal foundation and not on sufferance, 
and that we are determined to maintain these rights at all cost and thus to stand 
by our comments to the people of West Berlin and to guarantee their right to 
determine their own future. 
 
A month later, Khrushchev would propose to make the Berlin border into a state border. 
The Berlin Wall would be built in opposition to American economic hegemony, a 
power first secured with partitions on the ground, enforced and enacted from the skies, 
and carving out a powerful foothold inside the Soviet bloc. 
 
Building a Wall in Pajamas 
This section examines the construction of the Berlin Wall, reflecting on the 
instrumentalization of policing and the disciplinary operandi that transform and 
simplify inchoate claims into legible fields of political action. The first step in building 
the Berlin Wall was the discrete increase in East German police forces along the border. 
In secret, the Soviet leadership and the East Germans pored over city maps, planning 
how to shut down public transportation stops and utilities and how to barricade houses 
with windows and doors on the Berlin border. It took less than a month to coordinate 
and finalize the plans for Operation Rose. At the secret “X hour + 30 minutes” early 
Sunday morning on August 13, 1961, East German factory militia, people’s police, and 
border guards, some of whom were still in pajama shirts and slippers, began rolling out 
spools of barbed wire and setting up roadblocks. Some of the first images captured by 
the press showed rows of men standing behind tangled strands of barbed wire laid out 
on the sidewalk. There was an order not to fire, to prevent an authorized or “legitimate” 
U.S. and Allied response, and to maintain action on the border wall exclusively on the 
East German side, to avoid violating the Allied Powers’ pact division quadrants. There 
was no American contingency plan for this event. In the early moments of construction, 
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the wall’s existence was tenuous and provisional. One West Berliner separated from his 
fiancée in East Berlin recalled, “I was struck by an amazing stillness. Nowhere did I see 
signs of a city in crisis, with the exception of a knot of westerners at the sector border, 
shouting for the removal of the barbed wire. Governing Mayor Willy Brandt quickly 
dissuaded them of such folly” (Colitt 2011). The largest mass of protesters, some 3,000 
strong, gathered on the Western side of the wall between 11:20 a.m. and 11:40 a.m. 
only to be removed by Western police wielding truncheons against them (Hilton 2001: 
91). Had people mobilized collectively on a larger scale on either side of the early 
beginnings of the wall, it could have been easily torn down. Often when a barrier goes 
up, there is a pervasive sense of uncertainty, not only about the newly regulated space, 
often enforced by armed military or police, but also about its permanence. A wall can 
only be effective if it is accompanied by a pervasive sense of fear and insecurity. 
Provisional claiming is a cornerstone for the futurities of enclosure and a legal 
legitimacy for further actions and reconfigurations of the space that follow.  
 The next act that was implemented in the process of wall building was to begin 
recording the instances of people trying to cross the improvised border barrier. By 8:00 
a.m., several miles of wire had been laid down. By 8:15 a.m., the East German 
bureaucracy had begun to systematically record escapes. For example, one report 
recorded the following: At 7:00 p.m., a “hooligan driver” burst through the wire “in a 
Trabant, colour white-red, number plate could not be seen and the number of people in 
it could not be seen” (Hilton 2001: 87). At 10:45 p.m., it was recorded that a man had 
swum across the Teltow Canal (91). At the end of the day, 66 escapes and one capture 
had been noted officially on the East German log sheets (93). The number of refugees 
in West Berlin dropped to a mere 150 people registered, compared to the 2,662 
registered the day before the wall was implemented (93). This bureaucratic detail is 
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important, because it marks the moment when both the general public and the 
individual are policed inside the larger apparatus of the wall, making the provisional 
nature of the wire permanent with the creation of a written record. The act of cataloging 
is a function of the administrative ordering of the apparatus, in service of the state’s 
simplifications around the body politic (Scott 1998). Often the collection of 
documentary facts is used to create aggregates, in service of a standardized narrative — 
not simply describing and mapping, but shaping a people and landscape that will fit the 
state’s techniques of observation (Scott 1998: 80). These records also reveal the 
escalating degrees of violence along the wall. The first instance of the new shoot-to-kill 
policy along the border wall was recorded when a couple swimming in the Teltow 
Canal were captured at 5:50 p.m. on August 15, 1961, just two days after the barbed 
wire first started to go up (Hilton 2001: 109). 
 The Berlin Wall, like most border walls, was not singular, but rather was 
reinforced and rebuilt several times with increasingly restrictive and violent formations 
of policing. Houses along the demarcation line of the border wall were systematically 
vacated and then destroyed (Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie 2013). Permits to 
cross the border became a political commodity when they were first issued at 
Christmastime in 1963. The wall had several generations, each one more and more 
reinforced and difficult to cross. The inner sides of both walls were painted white to 
make it easier to recognize a fleeing person (Berlin Wall Memorial 2015). A few years 
after the wall was erected, billboards and moving-letter displays of political slogans 
went up on both sides targeting the neighboring sector of Berlin, and were displayed 
until 1972. Initially, giant stands with loudspeakers blaring slogans were also put up, 
but because they were so disruptive to daily life on both sides, they were taken down 
(Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie 2013). In the 1970s the metal fence was 
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expanded. East Germans laid out a mat of metal spikes, nicknamed by Americans as 
“Stalin’s lawn,” next to a building on the border, and even created an underwater fence 
so that people fleeing through canals and waterways would often be seriously injured. 
By 1965 all of the waterways in West Berlin were doubly or even triply reinforced 
every 10 meters. (Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie 2013). Nearly 1,000 German 
shepherds were deployed along 259 dog-run surveillance paths along the 70-kilometer 
ring around West Berlin (Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie 2013). In 1964, lines of 
lamps illuminated the death strip, and electrified fences that would trigger alarms were 
installed, so that at night soldiers could watch from more than 500 watchtowers for 
escapees. In 1967, a new watchtower was deployed on the border with “self-triggering” 
guns installed at three different levels. The guns would automatically go off, inflicting 
what people described as “crippling” and “gratuitous” suffering (Museum Haus am 
Checkpoint Charlie 2013). More than 60,000 of these devices existed along the border 
and were not removed until 1984 (Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie 2013). In the 
early 1960s, close to 12,000 political prisoners were held in East Germany, also known 
as the German Democratic Republic (GDR). After long negotiations, the GDR began to 
secretly to sell prisoners to West Germany, which turned into a standing practice 
(Hertle 2011: 99). The price for each prisoner was assessed on an individual basis in the 
beginning, but was later changed to an average price of 40,000 deutsche marks per 
prisoner, and then raised by the late 1980s to 95,847 deutsche marks (Hertle 2011: 99). 
In the end, this was not paid in cash, but in the form of goods and supplies. Ransomed 
prisoners were sworn to secrecy, and both sides maintained this system of political 
ransoming human traffic into the 1980s. 
 The focal points in the repertoire of memories and memorializing of the Berlin 
Wall primarily center on the violence of the wall. The harsh policing practices, the more 
 
 
112 
than 5,000 escape attempts, and the 136 deaths along the wall orient the narratives 
recorded in museums and books (Hertle 2011). The wall symbolized political 
repression, social conflicts, and personal suffering (Leuenberger 2006: 26). In the wall 
we see “modes of engagement that defined the East-West relationships during the Cold 
War, beginning with the forms of looking, watching, and framing the Other that 
provided ample opportunity for projections as well as strategies of imitation and 
demarcation” (Broadbent and Hake 2010: 1). “Viewed sociologically, however,” 
Leuenberger writes, “we can see that the wall as a material object was used evocatively 
and metaphorically to characterize a range of elusive and disparate experiences. It 
became a rhetorically powerful sense-making device that rendered these experiences 
comprehensible” (2006: 26). East German psychiatrist Dietfried Müller-Hegemann 
even discussed a novel psychological disease called “the wall disorder.” He took notes 
on the pathologies of his East German patients suffering from a variety of physical and 
psychiatric conditions from the detrimental social and psychological consequences of 
living encircled by a wall. In his book titled The Berlin Wall Disease (1973) Müller-
Hegemann pointed out the profound dissociative distance that East Germans 
experienced because they were not even allowed to call the border a “wall,” even 
though the wall’s physical presence was a major defining social horizon of life 
(Leuenberger 2006: 23). Even after the fall of the wall in 1989, German psychologists 
continued to speak about “the wall in the mind” (23). This terminology has been 
extended in the ongoing media coverage of Eastern European economies as a way to 
describe economic inequalities (Bradatan 2011; Dempsey 2011). The immediate 
congruencies of these apparatuses and tools of border enforcement in Berlin with new 
contemporary border security infrastructure, in particular along the U.S border fence, 
are unmistakable, and will be explored in more detail in the following chapters.  
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A Footstep to Freedom  
The entrapment and enclosure of West Berliners was understood in relationship to the 
space on the other side of the wall. The distance between the two sectors was ultimately 
measured by a footstep — that stepping onto West Berlin was to become “free,” not 
unlike the ongoing U.S. policy for Cubans.11 The large exodus of East Germans into 
West Berlin was often described as “voting with your feet.” This state-based 
measurement of a “footstep to freedom” serves as an entrée for thinking about the 
spatialities of movement in contemporary wallscapes. Often, people climbing new 
fences do not step into a free zone, but rather into a space that is more congruous with 
the dead zone, where 18-year-old Peter Fletcher agonized, bleeding to death for 50 
minutes after being gunned down by East German border guards as he tried to cross the 
Berlin Wall, and no one from either side intervened to help save him. Or they step into 
the “living dead” zone, where a person who steps without authorization onto a nation’s 
soil is one traffic stop away from incarceration in a detention center or from 
deportation. The necropolitical configuration of borderlands today can be catalogued in 
embodied ways: the razor-wire gashes, the broken femurs and hips, the rubber-bullet 
wounds, and the refrigerators full of dead bodies (Mbembe 2003; Cué 2013; Reynolds 
2012; McKinley 2010). As routes are securitized, crossers are increasingly pushed into 
shadow economies of human trafficking. On the Spanish border fence with Melilla, 
there are instances of men clinging to poles for hours, as police forces in Morocco and 
Spain try to bring them down with rocks, threats, and rubber bullets (Pleasance 2014). 
There is no longer freedom on the other side, but more often a legal patchwork of 
mechanisms that increasingly criminalize the act of “being undocumented” and enforce 
                                                
11 The U.S. government reestablished diplomatic ties with Cuba as the final revisions of this document 
were being prepared (BBC News 2015a). 
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and entrap people through racial profiling in policing and surveillance. Racial 
requirements have historically been at the center of this “footstep” measurement and 
employed in different forms of bureaucratic enforcement. Adolf Hitler observed this 
measurement first in U.S. policy and praised the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, writing: 
 
Compared to old Europe, which had lost an infinite amount of its best blood 
through war and emigration, the American nation appears as a young and 
racially select people. The American union itself, motivated by the theories of 
its own racial researchers, [has] established specific criteria for immigration … 
making an immigrant’s ability to set foot on American soil dependent on 
specific racial requirements on the one hand as well as a certain level of physical 
health of the individual himself. (Dorado Romo 2005: 240)  
 
The Nazi use of Zyklon-B in the death camps in Germany was actually inspired by the 
U.S. Public Health Service “delousing station” in El Paso, Texas, where Mexican 
visitors to the United States were stripped completely naked and fumigated with 
Zyklon-B or other noxious chemicals like sodium cyanide, sulfuric acid, or kerosene 
before they could set foot onto U.S. soil. These facilities were detailed in a German 
study, and the practice of fumigating Mexican bracero workers along other parts of the 
U.S.-Mexico border continued until the late 1950s (Dorado Romo 2005: 237–240). 
Looking at the spatial functions and continuities of the physical, managerial, and racial 
violence of border walls gives us a point of entry in thinking about walls after the 1989 
fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
The End of Walls 
The city wall that trapped and enclosed East Germans for decades also marked the 
limits in the Marshall Plan’s shifting nomos of global power. When the Berlin Wall 
finally came tumbling down, so did the last standing physical wall to U.S. hegemony. 
The images of people with pickaxes and hammers, chipping away at cinder blocks, have 
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a strong footing in the mediascapes of our memories. How did the rationality of 
violence that the Berlin Wall represented get transformed, after its collapse, into a best 
practice of securocratic governance? Perhaps we can begin to locate some of these 
changes inside shifting terrains of the market and civic participation, when the 
abolishment of the gold standard freed the representation of money from any material 
basis and increasingly integrated it inside the realms of private property, the state, and 
class relations. The resurgent terminology of “civil society” in the late 1980s and early 
1990s became a way of talking about citizenship. “Civil society” became not only the 
site of civic opposition to communism and the welfare state in the West, but also the 
singular requisite for individual rights and social justice, fully aligned with the market 
(Somers 2008). One of the early signposts of the changing planetary geography of 
market “freedom” couched in civilizational binaries was U.S. president Kennedy’s 1963 
speech in West Berlin when he said, “Today in the world of freedom the proudest boast 
is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ [‘I am a Berliner’]. All free men, wherever they may live, are 
citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words ‘Ich bin ein 
Berliner.’” This dialectical world of “free” and “unfree” would get a reboot in the “war 
on terror,” where reiterations of this geography would continue to redraw the lines of 
planetary nomos. Former U.S. president George W. Bush’s post–September 11, 2001, 
commentary was littered with these same allusions of a kind of totalizing “freedom.” 
“This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s 
freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who 
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom,” he said during an address to 
the U.S. Congress in the days immediately after the fall of the World Trade Center 
towers in New York. 
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 The fall of the Berlin Wall marked many things. It marked the end of the Cold 
War and socialism, and with it marked the triumph of Western power and capitalism, 
and opened a new chapter in American hegemony. The fall of the World Trade Center 
towers and September 11, 2001, became shorthand as a kind of bookend to that era — 
an American-centric terminology that collapsed the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombing 
and the July 7, 2005, bombings in London the day after it successfully won its Olympic 
bid into a singular reference — which has become the defining temporal maker for our 
present moment. During this period the term “culture” emerged as a politicized way of 
talking and understanding these changes that was usually divorced from the social and 
specific realities of particular countries, but instead couched inside larger references to 
global political events like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade 
Center towers in 2001 (Mamdani 2004: 17). This “culture talk” was built up in Samuel 
Huntington’s (1993) famous civilizationalist argument that the Cold War “iron curtain 
of ideology” would be replaced with the “velvet curtain of culture,” which was drawn 
across the “bloody borders of Islam” (Mamdani 2004: 21). Walls and curtains are the 
words that continue to be used to describe the contemporary geographies of terrorism 
and difference. The anti-walling discourse that has been bandied about in presidential 
speeches12 every November since the fall of the Berlin Wall features prominently in the 
                                                
12 “It is an honor to extend my congratulations to the people of Germany and the people of Europe on this 
twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall. … November 9, 1989, will always be remembered 
and cherished in the United States. Like so many Americans I will never forget the images of people 
tearing down the wall. There could be no clearer rebuke of tyranny. There could be no stronger 
affirmation of freedom. This anniversary is a reminder that human destiny will be what we make of it. 
For Germans the wall was a painful barrier between family and friends. And for so many across Eastern 
Europe it was one symbol of the system that denied people the freedoms that should be the right of every 
human being. And yet, even in the face of tyranny people insisted that the world could change. In those 
countries that got trapped on the other side of an Iron Curtain, they had the courage and resolve to hold 
fast to the belief in a better future. In America we stood for decades with our friends in Europe on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain, through the support to rebuild what had been destroyed by war, and our soldiers 
who kept watch to prevent another, through the enduring bonds forged across an ocean and above all 
though a commitment to common values. In our Declaration of Independence it reads that all men are 
created equal and that they have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In Germany’s 
constitution it reads that human dignity shall be inviolable. Even as we celebrate these values, even as we 
mark this day, we know the work of freedom is never finished. In a Berlin under siege, President 
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neoliberal narrative of globalization, even as dozens of new border barriers are cropping 
up around the globe. This isn’t a contradiction, but rather it reveals that the limits of 
modernity’s anti-walling discourse, which began in 1989, do not extend to include the 
newest wave of walling projects. In other words, contemporary border walls and fences 
are fully couched inside U.S. planetary interests, and as such, they are located beyond 
the reach of the platitudes of a borderless world for commerce.  
 Even the very monument meant to symbolize the end of all walls has been 
partially taken down by the power of global capital. On a snowy morning under the 
cover of darkness and the protection of 250 police officers, construction workers began 
to take down several segments of the last standing, 1.3-kilometer stretch of the Berlin 
Wall to make way for luxury high-rise apartments in early March 2013 (Guardian 
2013; Birnbaum 2013). This short strip of wall, popularly known as the East Side 
Gallery, is covered with murals by artists from all over the world that capture the 
significance, history, and meaning of the division of Berlin and project alternative 
visions of a more convivial world without walls. The stretch of cinder block and the 
preserved empty dead zone behind it became the most famous instance of de-bordering 
in the postmodern world, an antipode for future walling and divisions. Despite protests 
and conflict over the residential plan, a moneyed developer with police protection was 
able to remove parts of this European memorial to the freedom of human movement.13 
The remaining slabs and pieces of this memorial are displayed as artwork scattered 
                                                                                                                                         
Kennedy said, ‘Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved all are not free.’ … Today there are 
still those who live within walls of tyranny, human beings who are denied the very human rights that we 
celebrate today. And that is why today is for them as much as it is for us. It is for those who believe, even 
in the face of cynicism and doubt and oppression that walls can truly come down. Let us never forget 
November 9, 1989, nor the sacrifices that made it possible. Let us sustain the friendship across the 
Atlantic that must never be broken, and together let us keep the light of freedom burning bright for all 
who live in the darkness of tyranny and believe in hope of a brighter day.” — U.S. president Barack 
Obama’s online remarks on Nov. 9, 2009 (the U.S. border fence was still under construction when this 
statement was made). 
13 This short anecdote about the removal of sections of the East Side Gallery was previously published 
online in Antipode (Mena 2013). 
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throughout the world: inside a Las Vegas casino bathroom, at the village of Schengen, 
Luxemburg, the place where borderless Europe was signed into being, and even in the 
Vatican Gardens (You 2014). Only three pieces ended up in Latin America. One slab of 
this monument ended up in the gardens outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa 
Rica, a country that would go on to build the world’s smallest contemporary national 
border wall (Mata Blanco 2014). 
 
The Beginnings of the World’s Smallest National Border Wall 
The Costa Rican national border wall with Nicaragua is an interesting case to consider 
because it is situated in the heartlands of the U.S. sphere of influence and also on the 
boundaries of Cold War global alliances, which radically reconfigured Costa Rica’s 
northern borderlands with Nicaragua. This section is organized around three quotes 
from the media coverage of the construction of the Costa Rican border wall in 2001 that 
referenced the Berlin Wall in relationship to the Costa Rican border walling efforts. 
This kind of commentary is fairly standard inside global media coverage of different 
contemporary walls, and these quotes help to orient and locate the enduring politics of 
walling, not only in relationship to Berlin, but also in relationship to modernity — 
showing the provisional and changing sovereignty claims that a border wall stakes in 
relationship to aerial and terrestrial mobility corridors.  
 
“To Replicate the Extinct Berlin Wall” 
 
[The Costa Rican border wall] is a negation of the spirit of Central American 
integration, and anyone could scale the wall and jump to the other side, because 
they will not be able replicate the extinct Berlin Wall with barbed wire and 
guard posts because the border between the two countries is too long. 
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— Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, president of the Foreign Commission for the 
National Assembly (Barberena 2001) 
 
The news of Costa Rica’s wall-building project on its border with Nicaragua drew 
concerns at regional levels from the Central American Parliament, which was meeting 
for the 10th Conference of Political Parties during the early phases of the construction. 
“This problem must be resolved … with objectivity and from a ‘Central Americanist’ 
and unity-focused perspective,” said the former president of El Salvador and deputy in 
the Central American Parliament, Armando Calderón Sol, in a press conference (Muñoz 
2001). The president of the Foreign Commission for the National Assembly, Adolfo 
Calero Portocarrero, questioned the Costa Rican authorities’ intentions to erect a wall at 
the border with Nicaragua, “because it is not going to stop the migration of Nicaraguans 
toward that nation.” Portocarrero also announced that he would send a delegation from 
the Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies (Instituto Nicaragüense de Estudios 
Territoriales) on a technical mission with its Costa Rican counterpart agency (Instituto 
Geográfico Nacional de Costa Rica) to make sure that the wall’s construction fell within 
territorial limits of Costa Rica (Barberena 2001; Guerén 2001). Víctor Hugo Tinoco, 
another member of the commission, said that the wall reflected a limited perspective 
and vision of the future: “It is like saying the Costa Ricans, us over here, we are special 
and we don’t have anything to do with the rest of Central Americans and we don’t want 
to be contaminated by these others” (Barberena 2001). The president of the parliament, 
Hugo Guiraud, suggested an exploratory meeting to “promote a conversation so that 
barriers don’t thrive between brother countries that will have an eternally shared border. 
As Central Americans, we are geographically, politically, and historically one group” 
(Ruiz López 2001). This commentary situates the Costa Rican wall first in relationship 
to Central America — a reference that denotes different nomoi simultaneously: the 
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formation of the Federal Republic of Central America after its independence from Spain 
in 1821 and the unification of Central Americans in successfully fighting U.S. 
imperialists. It also refers to more recent moments like the Central American Integration 
System (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana), an economic and political 
organization formed in 1991 as an outgrowth of the Organization of Central American 
States backed by the United Nations, and later the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement. Next, it references the Costa Rican project in relationship to the Berlin Wall 
— a framing that situates Costa Rican actions in relationship with the West in a 
particular way and also inside the larger global post–Cold War narratives. 
 
Emblems of Modernity 
The decree for the emblem representing the newly formed Federal Republic of Central 
America — which included what is present-day Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica — after its independence from Spain in 1821 directed that 
the unified coat of arms for all of the states was to be signified by an equilateral triangle 
protecting the land base of five volcanoes. The landmass was bathed on both sides by 
the two oceans and covered by a rainbow. In the center, Liberty’s red hat radiated light, 
and the words “Federal Republic of Central America” (“Provincias Unidas del Centro 
de América”) were inscribed around the image. Granados (1985) indicates that the 
geopolitical significance of this image represents a dual vision of Central America, as 
both a bridge and an isthmus. In one vision, it is a continuous land bridge, creating a 
contact zone between North America and South America. However, the moment that 
European conquistadores arrived, the role of Central America was redefined in terms of 
how it would come to be used as a center for communication between economic and 
political centers linked no longer by land, but by sea (Granados 1985: 59). This emblem 
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marks a hybrid historical moment of both the pre-Columbian and the colonial, and it 
captures in visual form the transition from a terrestrial order of power to a maritime one 
(59).  
 Almost two hundred years later, various riffs of this pan–Central American 
emblem are still represented on most of the different Central American flags. However, 
the Nicaraguan flag bears an almost identical resemblance to the original flag of the 
Federal Republic of Central America. The blue horizontal stripes represent the two 
oceans and the white stripe represents peace. The original and intact emblem is located 
in the center of the white stripe with a modified description that says Republic of 
Nicaragua (República de Nicaragua) in an arc above, and Central America (América 
Central) in an arc below. Costa Rica’s flag, inspired by the French Tricolor, hints at a 
vertical ordering of power. Schoolchildren are taught that the blue represents clear skies 
— the growth and development opportunities in Costa Rica. White symbolizes the 
peace that Costa Ricans live in. Red represents the blood of the Costa Rican peoples’ 
sacrifices and the vibrancy of the land (López and Vásquez 2004). Indeed, the allusion 
of the sky in growth and development activities has played out in reality. Since the 
1990s, tourism has grown to become one of the country’s major industries, representing 
more than 5 percent of the GDP, or US$2.2 billion (World Travel and Tourism Council 
2014). In 1999, tourism surpassed coffee and bananas combined as a foreign-exchange 
earner. Total annual visitors have surged from a quarter of a million in the late 1990s to 
more than two million annually. Nearly 70 percent of all visitors arrive by air, and 90 
percent of North American and European tourists arrive by air (Instituto Costarricense 
de Turismo 2014). Costa Rica is the only country in Central America that has not 
become a signer of the Central America–4 agreement, which is often referred to as the 
Central American Schengen agreement because it allows for free movement of Central 
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Americans between the four signer countries: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. The passports of all of the four signer countries resemble each other, drawing 
from the historical reference to the Federal Republic of Central America. Even as the 
shifting importance of the skies is reshaping the Costa Rican landscape, its primary 
political point of reference to Nicaragua is still on the San Juan River. 
 Nationalistic visions in both Costa Rica and Nicaragua often interpret conflicts 
around territory in the context of a “zero sum game,” what the neighboring country 
gains, the other loses (Matul 2011: 148). This vision has played out historically in both 
the annexation of the state of Guanacaste from Nicaragua in 1824 and in many 
instances of conflict and controversy along the San Juan River. The presence of British, 
U.S., and even French interests in the possibility of constructing an inter-oceanic 
channel by using the San Juan River is indispensable to understanding the dynamics of 
dispute as the mode through which all major agreements along the border have been 
reached (Sandoval García 2012: 179). Foreign presidents and dictators made economic 
and political speculations by manipulating the myth of the inter-oceanic canal. Since the 
nineteenth century, the myth of the inter-oceanic canal became synonymous with 
“modernity,” “civilization,” and “progress” (Mojica-Mendieta 2010: 74). The canal 
project in the river contributed to a Nicaraguan national imaginary tied up in the idea of 
a collective history, naturally assigned and divinely destined to cumulate in the 
construction of the inter-oceanic canal (75). The idea that Nicaragua was called to 
become a “cosmopolitan nation” appeared constantly in newspapers and official 
documents in the nineteenth century: “The canal symbolized the route on which 
‘Progress’ would make its triumphant entrance, on the shoulders of European and North 
American immigrants who would bring their superior capital and culture” (75). The 
canal hasn’t materialized because there has always been an external factor impeding it, 
 
 
123 
be it North American interventionism or Costa Rican egoism (Cortés Ramos 2011: 
179). Costa Rica was always on the periphery of this potentiality on both its national 
borders. The construction of the Atlantic Railroad and the Panama Canal diminished 
Costa Rican strategic interest substantially in the possibility of a canal. To this day 
Nicaragua doesn’t have a major Atlantic port, although the new Chinese private 
construction of a canal that is slated to start soon could significantly change all this 
(Watts 2015). All major products destined for Atlantic markets must move through 
Puerto Limón in Costa Rica, or Honduras. In contrast, the San Juan River is a distant 
border issue in the actual social imaginary of most Costa Ricans. Its principal 
importance is rooted in the fact that it has been a source of conflict with Nicaragua. 
Whenever a disagreement comes up, the famous words of former Costa Rican president 
Ricardo Jiménez are repeated, “Costa Rica has three seasons: dry season, rainy season, 
and fight season with Nicaragua” (Rodríguez 1998). However, that was not historically 
the case in the borderlands. Until the 1970s, the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan 
borderlands communities were much more physically isolated from their respective 
national capitals and deeply integrated. Almost all of the inhabitants in the Costa Rican 
border region are part of families with mixed nationalities (Granados, Brenes, and 
Cubero 2005: 102). Until the 1960s, the Costa Rican border provinces had more social 
and economic connections with Nicaragua than with the rest of Costa Rica. It wasn’t 
until the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 that the Costa Rican government 
made an effort to socially and politically integrate the northern border provinces with 
the rest of the country by building new road systems, which contributed to the 
establishment of populations in the Northern Zone and demographic growth in the 
Costa Rican northern borderlands (Granados, Brenes, and Cubero 2005: 96). Generally, 
the relative physical isolation of Central American borderlands have allowed for the 
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conservation of abundant natural resources that have been disappearing in the rest of the 
national territory. There is a body of literature that has come out of Central America on 
the ecology of trans-border river basins, including the San Juan River basin.14 It 
references these ecologically rich border spaces as unique locations for cooperative 
conservation, a place where a kind of trans-border commitment to cooperation grows 
from arrangements that reach far beyond the limits of national sovereignty (Cortés 
Ramos 2011: 194). Up until fairly recently, this has largely been the case in the context 
of the Costa Rica–Nicaragua borderlands. Outside of a few major arteries, most main 
roads in the area are rocky dirt lanes that quickly turn to mud during the rains, and 
many of the smaller paths are maintained almost exclusively for the movement of giant 
harvest trucks. However, changing demographic pressures and patterns of land 
development through the intensive land use of corporate agriculture is reconfiguring the 
contact zones between states, putting the environment at risk (Mojica-Mendieta 2010: 
82).  
 Traditionally, individual Costa Rican farmers, small producers, and cooperatives 
in the northern Huetar zone15 along the Nicaraguan border produced coffee, sugar cane, 
bananas, grains, and tubers for local and national markets. In the early 1980s, there was 
a national push for growers to move away from traditional subsistence agriculture and 
traditional crops like corn, beans, and tubers. These crops were replaced with new ones 
destined for international markets. This tendency toward “productive reconversion” — 
a term that describes the shift from traditional crops and subsistence agriculture to 
                                                
14 Frequently, the U.S.-Mexico trans-border river basin of the Río Bravo, as it is called in Mexico, or the 
Río Grande, as it is called in the United States, is also included as an example in this body of literature, 
even though it is outside of the unit of regional analysis. This kind of ecological approach to thinking 
about trans-border river basins is an important point of convergence in discussions of the political 
ecologies of borderlands, especially now in relationship to border walls. 
15 The Northern Zone referred to here is the Zona Norte, which principally corresponds to the 
administrative planning region Huetar Norte: the province of Alajuela, the cantons of San Carlos, Los 
Chiles, and Guatusos, the Sarapiquí district in the canton of Alajuela, the Río Cuarto district in the Grecia 
canton, the San Isidrio de Peñas Blancas district in the San Ramón canton, the Upala canton, and, in the 
province of Heredia, the canton of Sarapiquí (Granados, Brenes, and Cubero 2005: 95). 
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large-scale agriculture of different crops for export markets — in Central American 
border markets, and especially in the case of Costa Rica, created huge economic growth 
but devastated traditional labor production. Productive reconversion also resulted in 
lasting economic, social, and political consequences for the local and regional 
borderlands community (Granados, Brenes, and Cubero 2005: 94–97).16 The agro-
industrial, mono-crop model shifted crop production. Now the region primarily 
produces oranges, pineapple, and yucca (Granados, Brenes, and Cubero 2005: 98). This 
production model necessitates intensive human labor for harvests. Most of these crops 
are picked by hand, with a limited window for picking. If crops are picked even a day or 
two late, they will not be acceptable as international export quality. As a result, new 
binational-border agro-processing networks have emerged (Granados, Brenes, and 
Cubero 2005). This economic model has generated new forms of transnational 
regionalism, which reorganizes social and cultural capital along different terms of 
inclusion and exclusion. Today, the Costa Rican agro-export industry alone seasonally 
absorbs around 60,000 Nicaraguan migrant workers for harvests (Rocha Gómez 2006: 
73). Some studies suggest that Nicaraguans perform as much as 75 percent of Costa 
Rica’s agricultural labor (73). However, Costa Rica is one of only three countries in 
Latin America that have not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Instituto de 
Investigaciones Sociales et al. 2012). 
 The changes in Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica have dynamically altered 
the Nicaraguan economy. Nicaragua receives more in familial remittances than in 
private capital flows or official development assistance. Familial remittances to 
                                                
16 According to Granados, Brenes, and Cubero (2005), this began with Structural Adjustment Programs 
(Programas de Ajuste Estructural, or PAE) and strategies like “Agricultura de Cambio” during Costa 
Rican president Luis Alberto Monge’s administration (1982–1986) and cumulated in the free-trade 
agreements that continue today. 
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Nicaragua have grown from US$320 million in 2000 to more than US$1 billion in 2012 
(Banco Central de Nicaragua 2013). One of the major reasons for the intense growth in 
remittances to Nicaragua is that more money is being sent back from Costa Rica. These 
migrations are precipitated by changes in big agriculture, economic restructuring, and 
also by natural disasters. A Nicaraguan government survey undertaken by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos in 2001, the same year that Costa Rica built its tiny 
border wall, showed that 75 percent of the total number of Nicaraguan emigrants had 
migrated during the 1990s, and of them, 53 percent had emigrated during the four years 
immediately prior to 2001 en route to two major destinations: Costa Rica and the 
United States (Rocha Gómez 2006). Three years earlier, Hurricane Mitch had touched 
down in Honduras, and the tropical storms wreaked havoc on Nicaragua. The official 
death toll in Nicaragua was 3,045 people, and more than one million people were 
affected by torrential rains, flooding, and mudslides that buried entire villages near the 
Casita Volcano. Hurricane damage was worse than the 1972 Managua earthquake and 
totaled some US$1.3 billion (Olson et al. 2001; National Climatic Data Center 2009). 
Mitch wiped out 70 percent of roadways and transportation infrastructure and left one-
fifth of the nation effectively homeless (Olson et al. 2001). José Luis Rocha Gómez, a 
leading Nicaraguan migration scholar and researcher, describes that in 
methodologically understanding Nicaraguan mobility, it is “difficult to isolate the 
hurricane as a variable from others present that year including increased unemployment, 
despair, etc.” (2006: 20). During a presidential summit held in El Salvador the month 
after the hurricane, the Costa Rican government announced that it would grant a general 
amnesty for all irregular Central American migrants already present in Costa Rica 
before November 9, 1998, which would allow Nicaraguans the possibility of obtaining 
a renewable one-year permanent residency status in an effort to confront the economic 
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and social consequences of the hurricane (La Gaceta 2003; Organización Internacional 
para las Migraciones 2001). There was a lapse of several months between the 
announcement of the amnesty and the initial processing of applicants the next year. This 
policy, called the “exceptional migration policy” resulted in 140,000 mostly adult 
Nicaraguans being regularized to live and work in Costa Rica. There were several 
historical precedents for amnesties in 1983, 1990, and 1994; however, this particular 
instance was the largest, and almost entirely Nicaraguan, amnesty with specific enough 
regulations for people to actually successfully be able to regularize their status.  
 Increasingly in the 1990s, the imaginary around the river border had less to do 
with canals, commerce, and the importance of the actual river, and more to do with 
foreign relations with Nicaragua, marked by immigration, mutual distrust, and 
xenophobia (Cortés Ramos 2011: 187; Sandoval García 2012). Costa Rican national 
identity is built on a characterization of the nation as a middle-class, white, peaceful, 
and stable electoral democracy. It relies on this historic characterization as the 
“Switzerland of Central America” and a national sense of uniqueness and 
exceptionalism by characterizing the nation-state as different from its Central American 
neighbors. This identity is articulated in opposition to racialized and class-based 
representations of Nicaraguans as poor, dark, violent, and communist (Sandoval García 
2004; Alvarenga 1997). Nicaragua is constructed as both an external threat and an 
internal one. Between 1984 and 2000, Nicaraguans represented in the Costa Rican 
census shifted from 1.9 percent to almost 6 percent of the total national population 
(Rocha Gómez 2006: 74). According to the most recent census data, Nicaraguans make 
up nearly eight percent of the total population, and 76.68 percent of all foreign-born 
residents in Costa Rica are Nicaraguan (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
2010). These figures are probably actually higher, because they don’t take into account 
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the estimated tens of thousands of undocumented migrant Nicaraguan workers who 
move in and out of the country to harvest crops, work in construction jobs, and work as 
domestics. Most of these workers cross into Costa Rica at the terrestrial border 
checkpoint in Peñas Blancas into the state of Guanacaste, one of the country’s 
wealthiest provinces, which Costa Rica annexed from Nicaragua in 1824, a fact that has 
never been forgotten in Nicaraguan popular social memory. This is the location where 
the world’s smallest border wall went up. 
 In the spring of 2001 an investigative reporter at La Nación, the national 
newspaper of record in Costa Rica, published a detailed report called “The 
Embarrassing Border” in which Costa Rican officials described the experience of 
border crossers at Peñas Blancas as “undignified and inhuman” (Guerén Catepillán 
2001). The checkpoint facilities, which hadn’t been updated since the 1960s, were 
falling apart and unsanitary. Lines of tractor-trailers stretched for kilometers, and 
processing times with Costa Rican migration officials took hours and often involved 
bribes or irregular payments to get through. Only three processing windows were open 
for the average daily crossing of some 4,000 people (Guerén Catepillán 2001). Later 
that summer, Costa Rica spent US$1.8 million to build a 970-meter-long and two-
meter-high cinder-block border wall directly on the state border with Nicaragua in the 
vicinity of the major border checkpoint (Guerén 2001). The wall is situated directly on 
the international boundary line and runs west from the Pan-American Interstate 
Highway. The wall divides Nicaraguan pastures with horses from swampy Costa Rican 
forest, which serves as an informal dirt parking lot just behind the official truck-
cleaning station. On the east side of the highway, a chain-link fence and a large river 
with caimans separates a sparsely inhabited space. 
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 The saga surrounding the border wall’s construction included a series of back-
and-forth political posturing and different statements from both countries’ presidents 
and other high-level officials in the national newspapers. These statements weren’t 
always consistent, and the Costa Rican government’s justification of the functional 
purposes and need for the wall changed at different moments during the wall’s 
evolution. There was also a semantic fight to call the wall a “wall” (muro) versus a 
piece of a wall to hide something (tapia). The Costa Rican press consistently called the 
border wall the latter (tapia) or a “wall” in quotes, whereas, the Nicaraguan press 
consistently referred to it as a wall (muro) in the coverage of its construction. 
Statements attributed to Costa Rican officials about the wall’s purpose varied widely. 
The Nicaraguan media quoted the customs director at Peñas Blancas as saying that for 
the Costa Ricans, the wall was a tapia and not a muro, and that the main reason behind 
its construction was primarily to have a psychological impact on “alien friends,” 
because these foreigners, who are mostly Nicaraguan, only come to steal trailer lights 
and license plates, and that by pure coincidence, these vandals cross mostly in the area 
where the Costa Rican authorities had started to build the border wall (Mairena 
Martínez 2001). At other moments the official Costa Rican version maintained that the 
wall was simply a renovation of the outdated customs facilities and nothing more. An 
opinion column published in early July 2001 in Costa Rica’s largest newspaper, La 
Nación, titled “The Wall of Lies,” sought to portray the escalating viewpoints about the 
wall’s purpose as a Nicaraguan political fiction. 
 
When there is tension, people should be on guard to avoid getting dragged down 
by fictions created on purpose to divert domestic attention. La Noticia, the 
newspaper of Managua that was created ad hoc by the Alemán Government, 
created a tempest in a teapot when it reported that Costa Rica was building a 
“wall” [muro] to stop the Nicaraguan immigration. It is easy to understand the 
intent of the story, the calculated use of the word “wall” [muro] (which 
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immediately refers to the ignominious Berlin) is used to speculate about its 
purpose. In addition, the article was full of inaccuracies. For anyone with eyes, it 
is obvious that a wall [tapia] (or whatever you want to call it) of 970 meters (not 
three kilometers, like the tabloid said) is a small thing on a 312 km border. Not 
even the Great Wall of China could prevent the incursions of rivals to its empire. 
Thankfully there are bi-national initiatives, driven by non-governmental groups 
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), aimed at promoting 
cooperation and cross-border development. Journalists and media should be on 
guard against those who raise walls of intolerance, hatred and lies, which are 
often born in newsrooms. (Murillo 2001) 
 
By the end of the month, Costa Rican president Miguel Ángel Rodríguez visited the 
national borderline and did photo ops with the Costa Rican national press, observing the 
pastures where the wall construction was beginning to take place. He defended the 
structure: “This is simply a wall to protect the customs headquarter,” he said. “Be 
careful not to be misguided by wrong information. What difference does a wall that 
isn’t even one kilometer long make along a 320-kilometer border? It doesn’t do 
anything” (Guerén 2001). The president’s visit to the space was the first part of his two-
day tour of the providence of Guanacaste to mark the celebration of the 177th 
anniversary of its annexation of the Partido of Nicoya from Nicaragua (Guerén 2001). 
A Costa Rican president would not formally visit this border post again until 12 years 
later, when the border immigration facilities at the border finally received a US$1.3 
million update to the border buildings to satisfy U.S. pressures to comply with 
requirements in the Central America Free Trade Agreement accords (González 
Sandoval 2008). On the eve of the celebration of the day that Nicaragua lost its territory 
to Costa Rica, Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla inaugurated the updated border 
installations, saying that finally “they are not an embarrassment anymore.” Not one 
Nicaraguan politician or border official attended the event (La Prensa 2012; Murillo 
2012). “Here is justice. This [renovation] commemorates the efforts to settle disputes 
through the diplomacy of law and to guard the border,” said the Costa Rican minister of 
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security on the occasion, without directly mentioning the ongoing border conflicts with 
Nicaragua about the San Juan River (Canal 15 2012). 
 
“No Wall Can Stand the Test of Time” 
 
We are not going to take reciprocal measures because no wall can endure and 
stand the test of time.  
 
— Arnoldo Alemán, Nicaraguan president (Ruiz López 2001) 
 
Political and racial tensions on Costa Rica’s northern border with Nicaragua have 
remained in constant tension in the social and political “discourse of limits” in both 
countries. Sandoval García (2004; 2011; 2012) describes this as both the discourse of 
limits in socio-political terms, and also of limits within a racialized framework of 
difference and identity maintained and produced through sensibilities of whiteness and 
the superiority of Costa Rican nationhood. Now, looking back at this statement in 
retrospect, it rings rather true in some ways. The Costa Rican border wall never became 
a symbolic site of power. It is overgrown with weeds, marking the zone where police 
won’t tread. It hasn’t stood the test of time, but rather it has functional extensions in 
other places where the new spatialities or nomos of the fence play out. 
 
“La Trocha”: The Highway that Leads to Nowhere  
A few months after Nicaragua dredged the San Juan River and stationed military 
personnel on Isla Portillos-Calero in October 2010, Costa Rica’s president Laura 
Chinchilla Miranda declared a state of emergency, invoking a state of exception in the 
borderlands. Citing the Ley Nacional de Emergencias y Prevención del Riesgo, a 
national law that largely corresponds to presidential responsibilities for protecting 
citizenry while mitigating natural disasters, the presidential decree stated that the 
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Nicaraguan “military invasion and occupation” of Costa Rican territory was a “violation 
of the terrestrial, aerial, and maritime spaces of Costa Rica” affecting not only its 
national sovereignty, but also generating serious environmental damage by destroying 
delicate zones of recognized national wetlands (La Gaceta 2011). The minister of 
foreign affairs described it as a “precautionary measure against the Nicaraguan politics 
toward Costa Rica” (Murillo 2013). This legal waiver was a key in authorizing the new 
defensive measures to tighten border security along the Nicaraguan border in the form 
of a border highway that had been under construction since December 2010. By mid-
2011 the government’s construction of a border highway in very close proximity and 
parallel to the San Juan River, the sovereign borderline with Nicaragua, was well 
underway. The contested, 160-kilometer highway, commonly referred to as “La 
Trocha” (the trail), was built by clearing large tracts of rainforest, wetlands, pastures, 
and rivers and shoring up more than half of the entire northern national border.  
 The Costa Rican presidential decree was declared in the interest of protecting 
the environment from the Nicaraguan military’s alleged damages by dredging of the 
San Juan River and of protecting Costa Rican national sovereignty by authorizing this 
new line of defensive road building. The decree declared a state of exception that freed 
the Costa Rican government from its environmental responsibilities in the name of 
security and expediency (La Gaceta 2011). The Costa Rican border highway 
construction was executed without any environmental impact studies, forest inventories, 
or assigning a responsible overseeing body for environmental concerns (Rivera and 
Oviedo 2012). A year and a half after the initial construction started, a study conducted 
by the Costa Rican Ministry of the Environment found already that wetlands and old-
growth forests over a third of the border were being adversely affected and that 
sediment was accumulating in an estuary of the Sarapiquí River and el Caño La Tigra 
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(Gobierno de Costa Rica 2012). While there were discussions of hiring outside 
consultants to advise on environmental impact and mitigation for the highway, the 
Ministry of the Environment opted not to incur additional costs, and instead made 
mitigation recommendations after the fact (Rivera and Oviedo 2012; Salas Murillo 
2012).  
 An environmental report generated by Nicaraguan environmental and advocacy 
organizations expressed deep concerns substantiated by scientific studies that the Costa 
Rican construction of the border highway could have significant impacts on what many 
consider one of the most diverse biological corridors in Central America and one of the 
principal nodes of connectivity of the Mesoamerican biological corridor. It found that 
the construction of the border trench already was implicated in environmental damages 
to soils, water quality, and forests. At least 100 linear kilometers of trenching were 
constructed through highly sensitive and fragile ecologies, including 10 different 
nationally and internationally protected areas in both Nicaragua and Costa Rica (El 
Grupo Ad Hoc de Observación Ambiental 2012). Finally, the study concluded that there 
are other long-term potential impacts to consider, including: the increasing population 
pressures on natural resources on the riverbanks and sensitive ecologies, the interests of 
petroleum and mining companies, and the increasing fragmentation of biological 
corridors that will only increase as the border highway and access roads provide 
increasing accessibility to an area that has been historically isolated (El Grupo Ad Hoc 
de Observación Ambiental 2012). 
 In February 2012, the president of Costa Rica traveled to Los Chiles to 
inaugurate La Trocha. “How does Costa Rica defend its national interests and 
sovereignty? With the same bravery and determination of our ancestors who were led 
by Juan Rafael Porras, who knew in that moment that only by taking up a rifle could 
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they defend our sovereignty, and they marched on called by history,” she stated (Ávalos 
2012). She announced the decision to officially name the new highway “Ruta 1856 Juan 
Rafael Mora Porras” after the Costa Rican hero who helped stop the North American 
filibusters led by Southern slaveholder William Walker. Mora Porras later became 
president of Costa Rica and signed the border treaty Jérez-Cañas with Nicaragua, 
settling the countries’ current borders in 1858. Chinchilla’s presidential discourse 
rewrote history by calling Nicaraguans the “new filibusters” in the context of the 
celebration of the National War of 1856, because this was the precise moment when 
Central Americans united to expel the American filibusters who were trying to enslave 
them. After the defeat of Walker and his men, Costa Rica attempted to take control of 
the San Juan River and part of Lake Nicaragua, a fact that is usually forgotten in the 
official Costa Rican historical narrative (Cortés Ramos 2011: 191). 
 Several months after the inauguration of Ruta 1856, it came to light that the 
government agency responsible for the project construction had no design or 
engineering plans. A private company hired to take over supervision of the project 
found 900 machines plowing and grading on the border, without any plans, and found 
that workers had received instructions to clear a path along the river margin (Oviedo 
2012). The project was initiated without any professional oversight or project manager 
responsible for planning. An independent investigation by the Laboratorio Nacional de 
Materiales y Modelos Estructurales, a laboratory at the national university, found no set 
standard for the type of road being built, no topographical studies completed to 
determine the best route, unplanned movement of cut and fill dirt along the route, and 
many instances of missing or badly executed side and transversal drains along the road 
(Laboratorio Nacional de Materiales y Modelos Estructurales 2012). Already, some 
communities living along the road have had their homes flooded as a result of the 
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construction. One town was left without any road access when one of the ill-constructed 
bridges built as part of the highway collapsed. Villagers had to walk miles to get food or 
public transport (Hernández 2013). 
 The construction of the highway has been plagued by corruption. By early 2013, 
the Costa Rican government had spent more than US$45 million on the project, but the 
dirt road remained largely impassable and almost entirely unusable. The government 
estimated that an additional US$81.5 million would be necessary to finish the border 
highway and the total per-kilometer cost would be US$510,000 (Loaiza 2013a). Many 
of the bridges needed by communities to make use of the road have still not been built 
after years of presidential promises to build them. Sections of cleared paths end 
abruptly at large chasms in the road and places where the rains have washed away the 
road and drainage. None of the road has been paved. It has become popularly known as 
“the road that leads to nowhere” (Mata 2013). Prosecutors have accused 42 people of 
criminal theft, embezzlement of public funds, and mismanagement related to the 
management and construction of the border highway (Solano 2015). Previously, the 
president had promised the road would be paved and completed by 2014. Now the 
completion of the road is still in limbo. The Costa Rican president penned a Sunday 
opinion column in the national newspaper defending the construction of the highway, 
calling it “a symbol of peaceful resistance to extreme threats, an act of affirmation of 
national sovereignty in its territory, and a strategic public work for the deployment of 
our police officers and emergency bodies in case that someday we have to respond 
again to defend the country” (Chinchilla 2013). The president also appealed to every 
citizen to help participate in protecting Costa Rican sovereignty: “This is not an effort 
that belongs solely to the government or to a president, but instead, requires the 
participation of all Costa Ricans. Therefore, we should value, with objectivity and a 
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sense of historicity, the true destiny that drives the building of Ruta 1856: protecting the 
sovereignty of Costa Rica” (Chinchilla 2013). In the borderlands, however, these kinds 
of national appeals continue to be problematic and not so black-and-white for the 
region’s binational, mixed community, because there are deeper and more recent 
histories of conviviality and partnership. 
 
“Depressing and Deplorable Sign”: New Lines of Legal Closure and Increased 
Policing Powers 
 
[It is a] “pretty depressing and deplorable” sign, saying that a wall, in this 
century, “even if it is built on the other side of the border, does not send a 
message of integration.” 
 
— Ruiz López (2001), quoting Nicaraguan defense minister José Adán Guerra 
 
This statement locates Costa Rican intentions and actions as being on the wrong side of 
“modernity” and in violation of the progressive narrative that started post–November 
1989. However, this Nicaraguan attempt to locate Costa Rican actions as backwards 
and pre-modern — a position that was more frequently applied by Costa Rica and the 
United States to Nicaragua after the Sandinista Revolution — is unsuccessful because it 
harbors an underlying recognition of the new wall’s sovereign legitimacy and 
signification. This tacit acknowledgement of the legality of the new wall, and its 
potentialities for violence and division, captures the gap described earlier between the 
anti-walling discourse and the reality of new border walls going up. Integration, parity, 
and equality of Nicaraguans are taken off the table with this new walling formation, and 
this statement hints at the future lines of legitimate legal closure of the border.	  
 Before the sun comes up, as the first buses pull into central San José, there is 
already a growing line of people snaking around the Nicaraguan embassy. By noon, a 
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large crowd of people will be standing under the beating sun waiting for consular 
services, often to procure the necessary documents to maintain their family’s residency. 
It is 4:00 a.m., and on the other side of town, there is another line where dozens of 
people sit or lay on the pavement with their backs against the wall around the central 
police offices in San José. The Costa Rican police will only fingerprint the first 75 
people in line that day. Those who arrived early enough to reserve their space will have 
to wait some six hours before they will be processed, one of the requisite steps to 
applying for legal residency in Costa Rica. These long lines of people in the capital city 
are the parallel embodiment to the border wall, the new lines that derive from the first 
act of spatial ordering. The border is closed, and updated migration policies make these 
new human lines only accessible to those who can afford to pay the new higher fees.  
 During the last decade, Costa Rica has enacted unprecedented, sweeping 
immigration reforms and legal closure making it increasingly hard for migrants living 
without proper documentation in Costa Rica to regularize their status. The Costa Rican 
national law on immigration has been revised three times since 2006, cumulating in the 
latest revision, which was passed in 2010 (Ley General de Migración y Extranjería No. 
8764). The law is emblematic of a reductive view of immigration as primarily a “public 
safety” or “national safety” issue. It has effectively defined a new regulatory framework 
and formed a new legislative and institutional basis for the criminalization of irregular 
migration and the networks that facilitate it (Cortés Ramos 2006; Kron 2010: 48). 
Cortés Ramos writes, “The logic of ‘national security’ is the guiding thread in this law, 
which strengthens the coercive mechanisms used against the migrant population and 
increases the migration authorities’ discretionary powers in its name” (2006). And in 
spite of the well-documented and intensive participation and efforts by religious, public, 
and not-for-profit organizations and labor unions in public forums to challenge and 
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remove prejudicial underpinnings of the proposed legislation, not a single one of the 
observations they offered in the hearings was incorporated into the final text of the law 
(Cortés Ramos 2006). The latest version of law, which went into effect in March 2010, 
dramatically increased the costs and fines associated with applying for regularization 
and for migrants who overstay their visas, placed more of the juridical processes 
regulating migration procedures into the hands of immigration police, and also 
effectively changed the definition of the border in service of amplified policing powers 
to remove unauthorized people.  
 The cost for one migrant to solicit residency for the first time under the new 
system costs more than US$373, a figure that does not include additional travel costs 
associated with going home to Nicaragua to get the required documentation, which 
includes police background checks in the country of origin, birth certificates, wedding 
certificates, and national passports, and can raise this figure closer to US$800 (Instituto 
de Investigaciones Sociales et al. 2012). These costs are prohibitive for many of the 
Nicaraguan migrants and families living and working in Costa Rica without the proper 
identification. The average undocumented Nicaraguan migrant fieldworker in Costa 
Rica makes about US$115 a month, and in Nicaragua that same worker would only earn 
about US$25 per month. The application process, described by La Nación as the 
“Nicaraguan Calvary,” is lengthy and requires at a minimum 14 different documents 
(Loaiza 2013b). This bureaucratic process is made even more difficult by the fact that 
many Nicaraguans are also severely under-documented in Nicaragua, and many do not 
even have a birth certificate, much less a Nicaraguan passport (pers. comm. with 
Gómez Guillén, 6 Nov. 2012). Migrant rights organizations have described the political 
apathy of the Nicaraguan government toward the needs of the migrant population living 
abroad as another challenge and obstacle, which means many Nicaraguan migrants live 
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in a legal limbo as disenfranchised from civic participation in both Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica (Rocha Gómez 2010). It is difficult for Nicaraguans to solicit copies of their birth 
certificate from outside of Nicaragua, which means that for a Nicaraguan citizen to get a 
passport, they usually have to travel to Managua. This step often takes several days of 
waiting in lines at different offices, including the understaffed and backlogged central 
registry that issues all national identity cards and doubles as the registry for all birth 
certificates. The costs for national identity documents like passports in Nicaragua are 
also high. Although the Costa Rican immigration law included a concession (leyes 
transitorias) to facilitate foreigners with expired visas or irregular entry status to be able 
to regularize their immigration status, the information with instructions on how to do 
this was not diffused very well. The timeframe to do this was also short and limited. 
Meanwhile, the backlog and lines at the Nicaraguan embassy were extremely long. The 
high costs involved made the option of seeking status regularization beyond the realm 
of possibility for many of the undocumented agricultural, domestic, and construction 
workers from Nicaragua, many of whom send remittances to Nicaragua to support their 
families. 
 Under the new law, if foreigners are caught with expired visas, a fine of US$100 
is levied for each overstayed month. Also, if foreign residents are caught with a 
residency card that has been expired for more than three months, they risk losing their 
immigration status completely. During the 2013 Easter Holy Week, the first major 
holiday after the penalty policies went into effect, the border traffic of Nicaraguans 
traveling home for the holiday plummeted. Costa Rican customs officials reported 
border crossings had dropped to less than half of the 30,000 crossings that had occurred 
during the same time the previous year (Quintero 2013). Also, in 2014, not long before 
Christmas, the new Costa Rican government’s regulations went into full effect, 
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requiring all people leaving Costa Rican soil to pay an additional US$5 exit fee — 
allowing banks, bus companies, and travel agencies to collect the exit tax on behalf of 
the tax authority of the government of Costa Rica. Under the new law, a person without 
the tribute receipt is not allowed to leave Costa Rica. It is customary at Christmas and 
Easter time for tens of thousands of Nicaraguans living and working in Costa Rica 
return home, often by bus, to celebrate holidays with their families in Nicaragua. On the 
first Christmas this exit tax was enacted, the government generated an estimated half a 
million U.S. dollars in revenue (Rodríguez 2013). These policies functionally make the 
border a container or cell and have a chilling effect on the rich tradition of maintaining 
transnational family ties. The future and longer-term consequences of these new 
policies, which will result in more deportations and “rejections” of Nicaraguan migrants 
living in Costa Rica, will also have lasting consequences that are yet to be fully realized 
for the new generations of Costa Rican citizen-children born to Nicaraguan parents 
living in Costa Rica, a binational and bicultural generation that Rocha Gómez (2010) 
calls Ticaragüenses. 
 Another key change in the law is how it expanded the definition of the border to 
be a 50-kilometer-wide zone along the actual national border, in which police can pick 
up and “reject” people entering, a migratory action of repatriation that is distinct from 
deportation in Costa Rica. This provision has the most impact on migrant seasonal 
agricultural workers, who frequently enter without the proper documentation and are 
often exploited by large agro-businesses. One Nicaraguan political scientist working in 
Costa Rica described the significance of the change in this way: 
 
This change means that people picked up by migration authorities in this strip 
who are undocumented or in an irregular situation will be turned away rather 
than deported, which will prevent them from demanding labor rights, such as 
payment for work done. It’s no coincidence that this strip covers a large part of 
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the region where sugar cane, oranges, pineapple, banana, cassava, and other 
agro-export products requiring a large amount of seasonal migrant labor are 
cultivated. Migrant workers, mostly from rural areas, typically enter Costa Rica 
without official documents, and the new law will create an employers’ paradise 
by legalizing the super-exploitation of migrants — which already occurs but is 
not legally sanctioned. (Cortés Ramos 2006) 
 
A common practice is for Costa Rican border police to deport Nicaraguans at a different 
border checkpoint than the one closest to where the person was originally picked up. 
For example, Nicaraguans that are picked up near Los Chiles are transferred to the 
Peñas Blancas checkpoint, from which they are deported to Rivas, Nicaragua. To travel 
from Rivas to San Carlos — the Nicaraguan sister city to Los Chiles, Costa Rica — 
requires more than 10 hours of travel by boat. The deportees often have no money or 
direct means of getting home, and they can be stranded for days in a region they have 
never been to before (pers. comm. with Gómez Guillén, 6 Nov. 2012). 
 In 2011, a coalition of immigrant rights advocates, religious organizations, labor 
unions, and agricultural and domestic workers filed a legal appeal saying that sections 
of the new law were unconstitutional and violated the human rights of migrants in Costa 
Rica. They particularly contested a provision that gave immigration police new powers 
to detain foreigners for indefinite periods. Previously, a judicial order was required to 
detain anyone for more than a 24-hour period. This new norm, the coalition stated, 
opened the door for racial profiling of people based on the color of their skin, their 
accent, and other cultural or physical characteristics. Also, under the new law, the 
administrative detention of foreigners, which should last no longer than 30 calendar 
days before the person must be deported, can be extended in “special circumstances” at 
the sole discretion of the director general of immigration without any explicit or 
detailed reasons for his or her decision. The law does not outline what kind of situations 
or criteria are used in the decision to extend administrative detention, making unlimited 
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the director general’s purview to detain foreigners held for indefinite periods, putting 
migrant rights to due process at risk (Cortés Ramos 2006). It also allows for 
immigration police to take a foreigner’s passport and documents away. The coalition’s 
appeal was ultimately denied by the Costa Rican constitutional court, which affirmed 
expansive scope and powers conferred on the National Office of Migration and 
Foreigners to execute these new provisions (Delgado 2013).  
 We can locate the world’s tiniest border wall and the small archive contesting its 
construction, insignificant as it may seem now, as marking out a particular moment 
inside the longer chain of provisional claims making that has occurred in the Costa 
Rican borderlands since then. In many ways, the one-kilometer wall served to 
demarcate the beginning of the larger social, economic, and political project of opening 
up the Costa Rican northern borderlands for future economic development through 
marshaling the Nicaraguan labor force that is central to building and maintaining this 
order. The whole new set of subsequent lines drawn by the sovereignty of the state: the 
lines of people outside of embassies and police stations, the lines on paper that spell out 
stricter migration laws and penalties, and the dirt line of “La Trocha” carved out of the 
forests and wetlands, are operationalized through more intensive forms of preventative 
policing and human management that still rely on older ideas of the racialzed 
“Nicaraguan” other. The “culture talk” that underpins the symbolism of the wall gives a 
moral-spatial location from where the state can launch political actions. 
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Chapter 5: Absurdity of the Wall  
 
You show me a 50-foot wall, and I’ll show you a 51-foot ladder at the border. 
That’s the way the border works. 
 
— U.S. Homeland Security director Janet Napolitano in remarks about the 
congressional discussions that eventually led to the passage of the U.S. Secure 
Fence Act in 2006 (Associated Press 2005) 
 
The first thing that we demand of a wall is that it shall stand up. If it stands up, it 
is a good wall, and the question of what purpose it serves is separable from that. 
And yet, even the best wall in the world deserves to be pulled down if it 
surrounds a concentration camp. 
 
— George Orwell (1944) 
 
A fence has divided Imperial Beach on the San Diego–Tijuana border since the early 
1990s; however, previous fencing has been unable to withstand the tidal battering of 
salty sea waves that corrode and break steel posts. In 2006, U.S. Marine divers tried 
again to erect a fence in the ocean, this time made of train rails pounded in by a pile 
driver, but these efforts eventually failed too (Robbins 2006). More recently, a private 
contractor was hired to rebuild the fence again; however, the fence was felled and was 
rebuilt. Now the US$14,000-a-foot fence stands in the Pacific Ocean, a 300-foot-long 
crooked testament to the absurdity of the wall built into the powerful ocean to stop 
border-crossing swimmers (Guidi 2011; Marosi 2011; Perasso 2011). One of the most 
expensive stretches of border fencing lies in the shallows of the San Diego beach, in the 
same city where the U.S. Coast Guard “sub hunters” division is based to interdict 
“narco-subs” that can carry between 100 and 200 tons of cocaine into the United States 
(Kushner 2009; Holguin 2010). The functional futility of this ocean stretch of walling is 
not lost on local residents. This extension of the U.S. border fence is part of Border 
Field State Park, also known as Friendship Park, which used to be one of the few places 
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along the international boundary line where people living on either side could meet 
face-to-face. It became a location where families separated by restrictive U.S. 
immigration policies could share an encounter with members on the other side to hug, 
hold hands, and spend time together. One couple that was separated by deportation even 
got married through the fence (EFE 2014). In the beginning there was no border 
marker; it was just a line (la linea). This line was enforced as the border (el bordo). 
Later it was marked by a wire (el alambre). In 1971 when First Lady Pat Nixon went to 
inaugurate the surrounding 800 acres as California’s Border Field State Park, she 
instructed her security detail to cut the barbed wire affixed to the monument so she 
could enter into Mexico to greet the crowd, saying, “I hope there won’t be a fence here 
too much longer” (Friendship Park 2015). In the 1990s, the park was closed off by a 
chain-link fence (el cerco). By the end of the century, for most residents of the region, 
the border had become a wall (el muro) (Friendship Park 2015). Today, the park 
occupies a 130-foot-wide space between border fences controlled by the federal 
government, but instead of holding hands through the chain-link fence, people can 
barely touch through the dense steel-wire mesh (Binkowski 2012). On the Mexican side 
there is open, 24-hour-a-day access every day, but on the U.S. side the border patrol 
only allows people to visit on weekends from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. under supervision 
from immigration agents (Friendship Park 2015). A group called the Friends of 
Friendship Park has continued to petition to keep the park open and hosts and promotes 
binational border events, including poetry, yoga, bilingual cross-border ecumenical 
services, and even Christmas posadas.17 Community members on the San Diego side 
planted a garden, and a gardener in Tijuana would water the plants (Binkowski 2012). 
                                                
17 posadas: Christmas caroling.  
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These symbolic gestures challenge the constantly changing and arbitrary sovereignty 
claims of the U.S. government. 
 A border wall always sits squarely on the builder-country’s side of the boundary 
line, never legally a violation of territorial sovereignty of the neighboring country. On 
average, the per capita GDP of a wall-building country is between two and four times 
that of the neighboring country that is being fenced out (Wittenberg 2009; Jones 2011). 
The characterization of this uneven building field often stops along a civilizational 
global-wealth axis to explain why countries build walls. This chapter asks how security 
spending on border walls might be understood spatially in relationship to the political 
economies of life. To do this I look at the one-sidedness of a wall, a spatial formation of 
power and rationality that is premised in both supreme right and simultaneously the 
supreme denial of right, a formation that is maintained and spread through the 
performance of numerous ordinary acts (Mbembe 2001: 25). This power formation 
frequently manifests as absurdity, the bizarre incarnations and practices that maintain 
this spatial order of sociality. It is the depth of the contradiction that is so volatile and so 
explosive. These absurdities appear seemingly as contradictions of the spectacular and 
powerful sovereign assertions made with the construction of a national border wall and 
play out in the trivial everyday interactions with it. This chapter examines some of the 
absurdities that played out in the initial construction and the ongoing existence of the 
U.S. border fence with Mexico. There is a deep political and cultural investiture in 
maintaining the appearance of the law to uphold the authority of this distorted power, 
especially in the midst of the fiscal and physical failure of the wall itself. Authority is 
collapsed with morality to transform a tenuous claim of violence into a righteous 
prerogative, one that supersedes all other concerns, and this is not merely a symbolic 
order, but rather it is generative of other asymmetrical realms. Charity is a derivative 
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field of one-sided action to manage and organize the human relationships and 
interactions, stripping away possibilities for real political responses. These 
asymmetrical realms lay bare the real dialectic between the living body and the social 
world.  
 
The Appearance of the Law 
The newly minted federal agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security had 
two years to build 670 congressionally mandated miles of border fencing after the 
passage of the Secure Fence Act in October 2006. Starting in September 2005, the 
secretary of homeland security, Michael Chertoff, made a series of five legal waivers to 
build the border fence. The first waived eight laws for a 14-mile stretch of border 
fencing in San Diego (Neeley 2011: 141). Next he issued a waiver of seven laws for the 
construction of 37 miles of fencing along the Barry Goldwater military range in 
southern Arizona in January 2007. After legal challenges by the Sierra Club, later that 
same year he waived 21 laws for almost five miles of fencing through the San Pedro 
Riparian National Conservation Area in southeastern Arizona. Then in April 2008, 
Chertoff issued a massive multi-state waiver for 36 federal and state laws across some 
470 miles in states all along the U.S. border. On the same day, he also registered an 
additional waiver for a 22-mile project in Hidalgo County in Texas. Each instance of 
the waivers was legally challenged — with the exception of the waiver for border 
fencing on the Goldwater military base; however, all of these efforts failed, and none 
have been successfully appealed, because the nature of the waiver removes any 
jurisdiction of federal appellate courts (Neeley 2011: 141–142). The Department of 
Homeland Security identified “contingency miles” in places where land acquisition was 
difficult or federal environmental protections were deemed problematic (Pers. comm. 
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with S. Nicol, 24 Aug. 2015; CREW 2010a; CREW 2010b). Even in the wake of 
massive popular opposition from border residents, tribal nations, border landowners, 
and a Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club lawsuit, the Department of Homeland 
Security maintained an official position that prioritized completion of fencing over land 
acquisition conflicts, federally mandated environmental studies, and long-standing 
Mexican condemnation of the project. The waivers have essentially stripped activists of 
virtually any legal avenue to fight these unconstitutional incursions, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not chosen to hear any of the constitutional cases. These waivers 
were the first crucial step for creating an extra-legal and in-between space where martial 
law trumped civil law.  
 Before the construction was to begin, the Department of Homeland Security 
working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had to acquire access to the properties 
on which they wanted to build the fence in order to conduct land surveys (Gilman 2011: 
262). Some landowners voluntarily gave land access, although often without full 
knowledge of their rights to be compensated for access and the ultimate effects on their 
properties; those who refused the agency access faced condemnation lawsuits by the 
government (Gilman 2011: 262–263). After surveying the land, the government seized 
permanent ownership of the lands of many Latino/a small landowners. The government 
offered purchasing prices largely ranging between US$4,000 and US$10,000, buying up 
only the specific strips of land that fell along the planned fence construction line, but 
not entire properties, which often resulted in landowners losing access to and use of 
their unpurchased property (Gilman 2011: 263). In some places, the wall’s trajectory 
left U.S. homes and properties fenced out on the southern side of the wall, making them 
almost entirely unusable and inaccessible. The small town of Granjeno in the Río 
Grande Valley of Texas organized and mobilized against U.S. government plans to 
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build a portion of the national border barrier through their properties. The projected 
path of the wall would have cut through the yards and even homes of the families living 
there — many of whom are relatives and can trace their landholdings back to Spanish 
land grants. Although they were unable to entirely prevent the construction of the U.S. 
border fence in their town, they were able to get the federal government to move the 
barrier back far enough to save their homes, and to have the barrier take the form of a 
concrete levy instead of a steel fence.18  
 Approximately 400 landowners — mostly in Texas, where there is more 
privately owned land along the international boundary than in other border states where 
large tracts of land are already federally owned — were affected when the government 
eventually took eminent domain of residents’ private and commercial landholdings to 
build the U.S. border wall (Weber 2012). Property owners who didn’t agree to give up 
the rights to their land would not have their day in court to receive a ruling for 
compensation until years after the wall was built (Gilman 2011: 265). Many smaller 
property holders lost their land in the wall’s path, while more lucrative commercial 
developments and resorts along the border did not (Gilman 2011; Weber 2012). 
Landowners received initial offers from the government that were far below market 
price value, and often did not find out about the disparities in proposed compensation 
until hearing about what neighbors were awarded (Weber 2012). For example, in 
Brownsville, Texas, cotton farmer Teofilo Flores described being first offered 
US$1,650 for a portion of his backyard; however, he learned that his neighbor had 
                                                
18 This anecdote about Granjeno was previously published online in Antipode (Mena 2013). During my 
fieldwork I visited Granjeno, Texas, and I spoke with one of the leading community organizers, Gloria, 
who saved her home from being literally cut apart by the projected path of the border fence. She 
recounted the emotional and physical stress of this protracted fight against the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and elaborated the unquantifiable costs this stress took on her time and especially her 
health. Several of the neighbors still have their “No Border Wall” posters up on their fences. It is not 
uncommon for local residents to be stopped and hassled by authorities who patrol the area telling them 
that they cannot drive on back levy roads. However, the wall has not slowed border crossers, who still 
climb the fence and cut across Gloria’s now smaller backyard (Pers. comm. with G. Garza, 19 July 2012). 
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received 40 times that for a similar land tract (Weber 2012). A 2012 analysis of nearly 
300 Texas cases found that most of the US$15 million settlement money that had been 
paid out went to a small group of landowners, one third of all the total property holders, 
all of whom had lawyers (Weber 2012). There was little qualitative analysis before the 
construction looking at the populations that would be most affected by the proposed 
fencing route, and instead, drug enforcement, security, and immigration concerns 
dominated the public dialogue about building the wall (Wilson et al. 2010). The 
property owners most impacted by the wall were poorer, more often Latino/a, and less 
educated than those not impacted.19  
 But the appearance of the legality of the U.S. border wall’s construction was 
critical for the state to maintain. One of the private fence-building firms in Southern 
California that was hired to build a portion of the 15-foot-high fence near the Otay 
Mesa border crossing in San Diego was discovered to have hired undocumented 
workers. In court the company agreed to pay US$5 million in fines for a misdemeanor 
count of hiring unauthorized workers to build the U.S. border fence, representing one of 
the stiffest penalties ever imposed on a U.S. employer for immigration violations 
(Washington Times 2007; Horsley 2006). During the trial, the government went as far 
as recommending jail times for the company’s executives, even though it is very rare 
for employers hiring undocumented workers to ever face criminal prosecution in these 
types of cases (Horsley 2006). The fencing company’s president and one of its 
managers were ordered to pay US$300,000 in fines and were sentenced to six months’ 
home confinement and probation (Washington Times 2007; Horsley 2006). Even in 
some of the largest U.S. immigration raids in recent history at meatpacking plants in 
Iowa in 2006, where more than 1,000 undocumented workers were rounded up and 
                                                
19 For a detailed case study of this disparity in Cameron County, Texas, read Wilson et al. 2010. 
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detained, no charges were directed against the company that ran the plants (Horsley 
2006). The California fencing company’s attorney admitted that the company had 
broken the law but said that the case demonstrated the real need for guest worker 
programs (Horsley 2006). Even though the appearance of the law secured a legitimacy 
based on this moral authority, it was not enough to overcome the real, lived dialectics of 
the land itself, which first toppled the one-sided power of the U.S. border fence, and 
even continues to bring down sections of this untenable formation.  
 
When the Walls Came Tumbling Down 
About 80 miles southwest of the center of the universe at Baboquivari Peak — the most 
sacred place of the Creation to the Tohono O’odham people — lies 516 square miles of 
federally protected wilderness area, a pristine desert habit populated with more than 26 
kinds of cacti and countless animals that survive the extreme temperatures of the 
Sonoran Desert, including endangered species like the Sonoran pronghorn and 
Quitobaquito pupfish (National Park Service 2015). Researchers are still uncovering the 
ways in which this ecosystem works (pers. comm. with L. Baiza, 10 June 2012). The 
few weeks when the giant saguaro cactus blooms coincide almost exactly with the 
migratory lesser long-nosed bat’s birthing season, when mothers and babies can feast on 
the sticky white cactus flowers. Historically, this land served as a crucial trading 
corridor. In the early 1990s, the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument was a bustling 
and active site receiving more than 800,000 visitors annually. During peak seasons the 
camping areas were completely full. The 51-mile loop that took visitors through the 
park was open, and only a barbed-wire fence and an occasional white international-
boundary marker demarcated the international border with Mexican farmland just on 
the other side of the national monument (pers. comm. with L. Baiza, 10 June 2012). 
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 Originally, there were plans to fence the entire 30-mile border of the national 
monument; however, after negotiations, the fencing portions were restricted to a 5.2-
mile-long perimeter concentrated along the urban border of the sister urban areas of 
Lukeville, Arizona, and Sonoyta, Mexico. Only a 15-foot pedestrian fence was required 
because the U.S. Department of the Interior built a vehicle fence that runs parallel to the 
pedestrian mesh fence across the southern border of the park. Before the construction of 
the U.S. border fence began, Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument issued reports and 
warnings that the fencing was not permeable and would cause flooding in the monsoon 
season when heat lightning zigzags across the desert skies and rain often, depending on 
the amount and intensity of rainfall, causes flash floods in the drainage crossings that 
flow southward along the fencing. After hearing the concerns, the Border Patrol issued 
a Final Environmental Assessment finding of no significant impact, determining that 
the fencing would “not impede the natural flow of water,” and the agency said it would 
remove debris immediately after rainfall. The US$21.3-million fencing section built by 
private company Kiewit Western was not even completed when a massive flood event 
occurred on July 12, 2008. The border fence acted like a dam, and the small gaps in the 
fencing to allow for drainage were quickly clogged up with brush and debris that piled 
up to 12 feet high in places, which combined with the 6-foot-deep foundation to stop 
subsurface water flow, causing lateral pooling two to seven feet deep along the wall 
(McCombs 2008; and pers. comm. with L. Baiza, 10 June 2012). The nearby sister 
urban areas of Lukeville, Arizona, and Sonoyta, Mexico, and the international port of 
entry were flooded at levels that had never been experienced in this area before 
(McCombs 2008). The owner of the general store Gringo Pass on the U.S. side sued the 
U.S. federal government and the contractor for US$6 million in damages (McCombs 
2008). That same day, another major flooding event also occurred in Nogales, Mexico, 
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adjacent to another section of U.S. walling in Nogales, Arizona (McCombs 2008). In 
2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers went back and installed liftable gates along the 
fence to prevent future flooding; however, a year later, another 40-foot section of the 
completed fencing was torn down in Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument during a 
flash flood on August 7, 2011, and the felled section had to be rebuilt (McCombs 2011). 
Again, the neighboring buildings at the port of entry on the U.S. side experienced 
flooding damages (McCombs 2011). When I completed observational fieldwork in 
2013, the giant gates that had been installed to mitigate the flood damages were closed 
and filled with debris from recent rains and more flooding. The protocol for flash floods 
is to open the floodgates 24 hours before the anticipated rainfall, a process that requires 
heavy machinery and, according to park employees, was rarely executed, causing 
visible and significant erosion on the U.S. side of the fence (pers. comm. with L. Baiza, 
10 June 2012). In July 2014, another 60-foot section of walling originally built in 2011 
along the Nogales-Mariposa port of entry was felled by flooding. The drainage gates 
were not opened and the neighboring houses were flooded with up to three feet of water 
(Associated Press 2014b). It cost the government over US$700,000 to complete the 
repair of this 60-foot section of fencing (Galvan 2015). Since 2008, there has been an 
ongoing push to build four new sections of fencing that were not completed as planned 
in the original mileage count. In 2011, U.S. Customs and Border Protection initiated 
four new projects in areas in Texas where concerns about environmental impact had 
prevented the agency’s completion of originally planned fencing. In its renewed 
building efforts, the government claimed that these projects were covered by the scope 
of a 2008 waiver (Nicol 2012). When Mexican officials for the International Boundary 
and Water Commission rejected proposals to build fencing sections in sections near Rio 
Grande City and Roma, Texas, citing the potential for flooding, the U.S. representatives 
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of the commission overrode international treaties and approved the efforts anyway 
(Nicol 2012). The U.S. counterparts created a new model, even though similar fencing 
in Arizona had flooded the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. Since the U.S. 
border fence construction began, Mexican and U.S. scientists have been researching and 
documenting examples of impacts caused by the construction of the border fence, 
including: “changes to soil characteristics from machinery, soil erosion, and 
fragmentation of populations causing concerns with genetic exchange and depopulation, 
particularly in the face of climate change and the expected adaptations and migrations” 
(Good Neighbor Environmental Board 2010: 53). The construction of the fence has also 
had a chilling effect on collaboration and coordination efforts between U.S. agencies, 
tribal nations, and Mexican partners on regional environmental concerns (53).  
 
Political Ecologies of the Fence  
In the popular imagination of the greater American public, the U.S. border fence is a 
monolithic structure that stretches for thousands of miles, sealing the border from 
“terrorist” threats in the wasteland of the desert where the occasional tumbleweed blows 
by. This imaginary functions as part of a narrative that renders the people living in this 
space and the unique habitat as nonexistent. In reality, the wall is functionally 
fragmentary, breaking up urban crossing corridors in several-mile chunks, which in 
many places also creates parallel “no-man’s land” between the actual international 
boundary line and the fence, a space where people aren’t allowed to move freely, and 
which, in places, can be as far as five miles from the actual international boundary line. 
Ironically, many segments of fencing are quite short. One can walk along for a mile or 
two or even several hundred feet in places and then suddenly find oneself at the wall’s 
end. And instead of the picturesque tumbleweed blowing by, there are places where 
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hundreds of tumbleweeds pile up 10 feet high along fence segments so thickly that they 
have to be burned off. 
 The temporal scale of the changing governmental policies implemented along 
the U.S. Southwest border is very different from enduring environmental changes, most 
of which take much longer to register than the isolated and publicized incidents like a 
monsoon flood or a section of wall falling down. Along the U.S.-Mexico border, there 
are 1.1 million acres of federal wildlife refuges, which provide important habitat for 
more than 30 endangered species that live within 25 miles of the international border, as 
well as migratory birds and other wildlife (Viramontes and Brown 2008: 9). Structural 
and functional habitat connectivity is one of the most important conservation needs to 
keep healthy and genetically diverse animal populations from becoming fragmented and 
at higher risk for extinction (Culver et al. 2009). Open, permeable crossing corridors 
allow for animals to migrate and find new territories, mates, and feeding areas. These 
corridors are particularly important for carnivores that travel longer distances, including 
wild cats like the jaguar and the ocelot, especially in the context of urbanization, new 
roadways, and border fencing. According to government reports, “The Sonoran 
pronghorn, masked bobwhite quail, ocelot and many other species have their last hopes 
vested in these lands” (Viramontes and Brown 2008: 9). Securitization and closure in 
the United States have pushed human crossing corridors deeper into protected nature 
reserves, disrupting major crossing corridors for animals including black bears, bobcats, 
pumas, jaguars, and ocelots (Culver et al. 2009: 85). This partitioning has lasting 
consequences that become more pronounced with the passage of time, and some of the 
early scientific studies of the habitats and species in the region stress the adverse impact 
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of added border security and the border fence.20 The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security’s needs and authority regularly trump other federal agencies’ purview and 
regulations, and undermine decades of efforts to save habitat, wildlife, and water 
sources.  
 It is not just the physical obstacle of fencing that creates habitat fragmentation in 
wildlife habitats that span national borders, but also infrastructure like lights, which 
disturb nocturnal habitats of bats, birds, and insects, and the increased human and 
vehicle presence that impacts the movement of animals. Above and beyond the border 
fence is the larger tactical infrastructure and operational footprint of the ongoing 
activities of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), including new roads and 
forward operating units — remote building units used by the U.S. military in Iraq and 
then brought to the Arizona desert, from which CBP agents deploy during regular, daily 
incursions off-road into natural habitats in the effort to maintain increased surveillance. 
For example, in the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, a memorandum of 
understanding in 2006 gave CBP full access to the entire park. Since then, the density of 
vehicle trails has gone up exponentially, according to the national monument’s aerial 
surveys. In 2011, park personnel found there were more than 2,320 miles of 
unauthorized roads on 700 routes. More than 95 percent of these miles were made by 
all-terrain vehicles, and many routes transect the park in an east-west direction (Organ 
Pipe Cactus National Monument 2011: 19). The incursion of vehicles and more 
intensive human movement damages the natural habitat and soil, making it difficult if 
not impossible to restore because the desert soil gets compacted to the point where 
plants can no longer grow. The rapidity of the destruction of habitat does not 
correspond to the temporal scape of the land itself. It takes a saguaro cactus, the iconic 
                                                
20 For an anthology examining some of the early effects of the U.S. border fence and security efforts in 
the historical context of U.S.-Mexico cross-border conservation efforts see López-Hoffman, McGovern, 
Varady, and Flessa 2009. 
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columnar cactus of the Sonoran Desert, 50 years to grow a single arm. Federal 
conservation experts are required to come up with figures for mitigation monies, but 
ultimately, mitigation monies do not rebuild wilderness; at best, they manage 
destruction. It is very difficult to contemplate the entirety of the U.S. border fence and 
its impacts on the living communities around it on a full scale. Most of the findings 
about the U.S. border fence are segmented and localized, because for years after the 
construction there were no accurate government maps of the fencing segments at all. 
 
The Map of the Fencing Mile-Count with No Miles 
Even though the magnitude of the U.S. border-fencing project was large and significant, 
no accurate map of completed fencing was made publically available for years. The 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security only released general draft plans for mapping 
locations during construction, but these were entirely provisional, and it wasn’t until 
late 2009 that the first map of border wall construction was made available on the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security website (Gilman 2011: 270). The first rendition of 
the map was almost impossible to translate into a clear understanding as to which lands 
and areas were affected, as it did not include any geographical references besides the 
actual borderline, nor did it have a scale to measure the length of the segments. Instead, 
the walling segments appeared as generic red lines right on the international boundary 
line, even though in many places the wall is located a significant distance from the 
actual boundary line itself (Gilman 2011: 270). Scholars and journalists had to sue the 
federal government to finally uncover the map of the border fence segments. For 
several years, the journalists from the Center for Investigative Reporting filed Freedom 
of Information Act requests with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to obtain 
accurate, detailed mapping data showing the location of the border fence system (Corey 
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2014). After several appeals, the journalists received limited data from the government 
showing where individual fence segments started and ended, but were informed 
repeatedly that lines showing details of the fencing constituted sensitive law 
enforcement information (Corey 2014). But as the reporters asked, how can giant 
segments of 10-foot walling be a secret from unauthorized border crossers or 
“terrorists”? By using information about segments and looking through satellite data, 
the reporters put together one of the most comprehensive representations of the entirety 
of the wall (National Public Radio 2014). In October 2013, the U.S. government finally 
released more detailed maps of fencing.21 
  “Might as right” is the basic formulation that transposes “founding violence” 
into “authorizing authority,” which happens in an imaginary capacity. Nowhere is this 
clearer than when nature itself upends this false rationality. Instead of considering the 
slew of failures surrounding the U.S. border fence as a reflection of the inherent 
contradictions of waning sovereign state power, perhaps these absurdities help us to 
identify more clearly the underlying fiction that is generative of other realms of 
asymmetrical arrangements that extend from the border. Asymmetrical power is a kind 
of authority that has to be constantly maintained and spread in order for it to have an 
increasing permanency in society, and which can include ordinary everyday acts, rules, 
and rituals, or a state of low-intensity warfare (Mbembe 2001: 25). One-sided power 
authenticates and reiterates a particular imaginary (25). This act in a colonial context 
combined morality and authority in a particular way so that “right was on one side” and 
so “[a]nything that did not recognize this violence as authority, that contested its 
protocols, was savage and outlaw” (26). When right, and its derivative righteousness, 
manifests as a fixed location, it creates a moral-spatial orientation. The human who is 
                                                
21 A copy of the maps is available from the University of Texas School of Law project on the border wall. 
See University of Texas 2015. 
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fenced out becomes an object of action, and the field of relational possibilities is 
stripped of social and political equality. Instead, fields of action are converted into 
realms of charity — another asymmetrical form of relationships. 
 
Migrant Humanism in the Realms of Charity  
The early prototypes of the border fencing in the 1990s as part of Operation Gatekeeper 
successfully closed the high-traffic crossing corridors near San Diego, California; this 
effectively moved unauthorized pedestrian crossing routes into the most dangerous and 
ecologically sensitive parts of the desert in the neighboring state of Arizona. Officials 
described this enforcement protocol as a deterrence mechanism that functioned by 
increasing the psychological cost of crossing through dangerous terrain where migrants 
would risk death and exposure to the elements. Consequently, the death toll in the 
desert rose precipitously (Nevins 2010). Community members in nearby U.S. cities like 
Tucson, Arizona, mobilized to provide water, hospitality, and care to migrants crossing 
through this gauntlet. In the United States, and globally, transnational religious and 
private civic organizations are increasingly called upon to assume larger roles in 
advocacy and care for migrants, at times even in collaboration with official government 
offices and agencies. This account raises important questions about the limits of 
humanitarian rationale and aid-based interventions that often orient this realm of uneven 
relationships.  
 When the interpersonal realms of interaction between those who live on the 
“right” side of the fence and those who do not is refigured by asymmetrical power, the 
political possibilities for interactions based equality, or even justice, are subsumed in 
this abyssal formation. Instead, the one-sided power is generative of other realms of 
one-sided power, and one of these that I want to explore here is the realm of charity, the 
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liberal, humanitarian idea of helping or “saving” the migrant who is suffering or in 
distress. The Protestant doctrine of suffering in which the act of suffering improves the 
sufferer does not apply to the undocumented person because the moral authority of the 
law does not extend to their presence, which is outside the spatial authority of “right” or 
rights. This means that actions to help a migrant or to extend them “basic human rights” 
become acts of charity, a relationship of power that objectifies the recipient. Charity is 
not solidarity because it does not exclude anyone (Todorov 1996: 85). It cannot be 
turned into an advantage for a particular group, so it is a moral act directed outwardly 
toward everyone and not toward any particular individuals, but rather toward the 
nameless individual (85–86). The act of charity, or pity, can humiliate its recipient 
because there is no way to repay in kind or to help the giver (Todorov 1996). Caring is 
not universal, rather it elicits a similar concern in return, and it implies a personal 
sympathy with the object of one’s concern. This objectification of the migrant in the 
liberal sphere of humanitarian aid is frequently couched in the language of a resurgent 
Christian humanism and transformed into a mantle for the re-investiture of the violent, 
uneven power formation that created it. 
 The language of emergency and humanitarian crisis first mobilized by activists 
in the Arizona desert drawing attention to the more than 5,000 bodies discovered in the 
desert during the first decade of border deterrence policy resurfaced, recycled into 
policy talk discussing thousands of undocumented Central American children crossing 
the U.S.-Mexico border during the summer of 2014. The White House, politicians, and 
the media were quick to label the occurrence a “humanitarian crisis,” a terminology that 
extended to violence and events transpiring in El Salvador and Honduras but not to the 
violence of mass incarcerations and deportations that apprehended women and children 
experienced after crossing into the United States. When media images of jail cells in 
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Texas crowded with children filled the news, President Obama requested US$3.7 billion 
in emergency funding from the U.S. Congress to hold a “sustained border security 
surge,” to improve conditions where the migrants were detained and to speed up 
deportation proceedings (White House 2014; Johnson 2014). By the fall of that same 
year, the largest immigrant family detention center was under construction in Dilly, 
Texas, to hold up to 2,400 people, mostly women and children, facilitated by a contract 
that bypassed normal bidding procedures with the largest private prison company in the 
United States, Corrections Corporation of America (Hylton 2015). The U.S. 
government also revamped another facility in Karnes, Texas, to expand the bed count to 
500 beds, making the family detention centers part of an “aggressive deterrence 
strategy” where “no-release” policies are part of a larger “national security” effort 
(Johnson 2014). In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Department of Homeland Security director Jeh Johnson laid out the moral-spatial 
structure of authority in these words: “Those who cross our border illegally must know 
there is no safe passage, and no free pass; within the confines of our laws, our values, 
and our resources, they will be sent back to their home countries” (Johnson 2014). 
These lines of confinement couched inside the moral-legal frame of authority use the 
threat of incarceration as a form of deterring refugees, contrary to existing international 
law. 
 As existing systems of reference are broken, new lines of force are enacted 
through legal surveillance practices, checkpoint stops, detentions, government-seized 
lands, and objective murders. The foreclosure of cultural systems of reference that 
Fanon (1956) pointed out in his paper to the First International Conference of Negro 
Writers and Artists in Paris happens when the culture, living and open to the future, 
becomes closed and fixed, caught in the yoke of oppression, both present and 
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mummified. We can identify these foreclosed futurities in the stalled and stagnant 
borderscapes of walls and in the boom of costly temporary rights schemes that follow in 
a wall’s wake. They are located inside new hierarchies of vulnerability where human 
rights are organized along axes of nationality, age, gender, and sexual orientation inside 
differential regimes of relief and distinctive temporalities of legality. Only those with 
monied means can access these systems, and those who cannot dwell alongside the 
expendable and excluded. Tellingly, children are at the center of the contemporary 
debates about “humanity” and the limits of temporary rights regimes, in what perhaps 
could be described as a kind of migrant humanism, where challenges to these 
hierarchical valuations of humanity are increasingly relegated to the spheres of 
charitable action instead of political action. In these systems, racism is not the entirety 
of the system but one of the most visible, everyday, crudest elements of it (Fanon 
1956).  
 The object of racism is not the individual person but a form of existence in the 
world (Fanon 1965). The real, lived dialectic between “my body and the world” that 
Fanon describes helps us to understand and locate how these legal frameworks are 
corporialized in relationship to the border fence. This manifests as vulgar contempt 
toward forms of undocumented existence, poor existence, and brown existence. During 
the summer of 2014, citizen protesters in Murieta, California, wielding U.S. flags 
blocked and turned back U.S. Border Patrol buses full of undocumented children in 
transit to overflow detention facilities in their community, chanting, “Go Back Home! 
USA!”(Martinez and Yan 2014). Several days later, in Oracle, Arizona, citizen 
protestors, and a even a member of the U.S. Congress, mistakenly identified and 
temporarily stopped a school bus filled with young YMCA campers as one of the buses 
transferring undocumented Central American youths to local facilities to be detained 
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(Abdullah 2014; Associated Press 2014). This example reveals how the border wall 
becomes the moral baseline for social truths. Once established, this baseline becomes a 
snare for ethical and political options, not just for migrants but also for everyone who 
tries to engage or challenge the line, because it has become a lacuna of one-sided 
rationality. This reflection highlights the complexities in naming the injustices 
surrounding the border wall and in identifying uneven power formations, because the 
same language of humanitarian rights undergirds both the discourses of protest and 
dissent and also the surge in the securitization of special-interest zones. Now we can 
start to see the part of the wall that has become totalizing, encircling us all. 
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Chapter 6: Special-Interest Security Zones 
 
No more dikes, no more bulwarks. The hour of the barbarian is at hand. The 
modern barbarian. The American hour. Violence, excess, waste, mercantilism, 
bluff, conformism, stupidity, vulgarity, disorder. 
 
— Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (1955)  
 
The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In 
its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined 
to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth 
the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High — the Sacred 
and the True. Its floor shall be a hemisphere — its roof the firmament of the 
star-studded heavens, and its congregation an Union of many Republics, 
comprising hundreds of happy millions, calling, owning no man master, but 
governed by God’s natural and moral law of equality, the law of brotherhood — 
of ‘peace and good will amongst men.’ 
 
— John L. O’Sullivan, “The Great Nation of Futurity” (1839) 
 
Frontiers occupy a comfortable and familiar place in the American psyche. Shoring up 
boundaries of the southern U.S. border isn’t just a metaphor, but a practical way that 
U.S. national political powers are initiating a social closure of the U.S.-Mexico border 
while trying to open up further economic borders. This closure doesn’t just happen on 
the border, but it is a politics that is oriented in relationship to the border, stretching 
from sea to shining sea and beyond. This kind of project is the latest chapter in a long 
legacy of racialized policing of the southern United States that feeds on ethnocentric 
and nationalist fears and makes immigration from Mexico one of the ongoing central 
policy issues in the country. Building a border fence is a costly project, one that has 
maintained a saliency in times of economic downturn in spite of the overwhelming 
evidence of its technical failures and the ecological, economic, and social damages it 
has left and continues to leave in its shadows. It has been accompanied by a nation-wide 
push of unconstitutional, yet widely popular state laws and policies directed at 
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undocumented Latino/a immigrants, where nationality serves as a legal proxy for racial 
profiling in federal law enforcement guidelines. These proposed laws and policies, 
originating in walled-border states like Arizona, have a toxic social afterlife, authorizing 
a broader anti-Latino/a sentiment that crosses citizens and noncitizens alike. This has 
not been the case on the U.S.-Canadian border, which remains almost entirely 
unsecured according to government estimates. On the northern border, rhetoric of 
friendship and inclusion is not only the norm, but also the national policy. In contrast, 
what has emerged alongside the U.S. fencing project with Mexico is a carceral 
complex, a mindset that locates a personal sense of security behind a fence, fostering an 
environment where unauthorized immigrants are made to feel so uncomfortable that 
they “self-deport” and supporting a burgeoning immigration corporate sector that 
profits off this system. This racialized reining-in of the frontier draws on a long 
mythology rooted in a systemic violence against humans, animals, and the environment 
in the Southwest. It is part of a “persistent colonial present” that hasn’t left the United 
States (Gregory 2004). 
 The Monroe Doctrine was a U.S. spatial reconfiguration of the Americas that 
first juridically constituted a special-interest commercial zone as a security zone. U.S. 
secretary of state John Adams drafted the wide authority over entire spheres of the 
planet outlined in this initial declaration, which set an important precedent for U.S. 
unilateral action, undergirding emergent U.S. global imperialism as the spatial location 
for peace and freedom. One of the early testing grounds for the Monroe Doctrine was 
the contested U.S. borderlands with Mexico, and ever since then, this space continues to 
be the living laboratory of partition in the era of a neoliberal free-trade order. This 
spatial organization is prevalent in borderlands, where border walls are often decreed as 
part of a “state of emergency,” which open up new roads and infrastructure for new 
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industry and economic extraction, as noted in previous examples. This chapter 
contemplates the ways in which the U.S. border wall with Mexico serves as a signpost 
of a special-interest security zone, a configuration where global capital and global 
security converge in underwriting the inviolability of new and future forms of 
possession, and it situates this emblematic landmark inside the global milieu of closure. 
 
Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine 
In the early 1800s, there were only two independent nations in the Western Hemisphere, 
Haiti and the United States. At the start of the 1820s, many Latin Americans would 
begin their fight for independence from Spain. In his annual address to the U.S. 
Congress in December 1823, U.S. president James Monroe laid out what would become 
the expansionist bedrock of U.S. foreign policy — outlining unilateral U.S. protection 
over the entire Western Hemisphere, a policy that at the time was completely 
unsustainable vis-á-vis actual U.S. military capabilities but which set the limits for 
future European colonial interests. His declaration mapped out a zone of national “self 
defense,” a set of economic intentions couched in the terminology of just war. “We owe 
it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States 
and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend 
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety,” 
said President Monroe. The declaration defined the Western Hemisphere not as an 
actual space with cartographic or geographic specificities, but instead as a realm of 
special U.S. interests, and also as a realm of freedom (Schmitt 2003: 281). The peace 
structure born out of this ideological blurring not only marked out a new defensive line 
in relationship to Old Europe, but also rendered the newly declared spatial realm as 
lands reopened for new U.S. acquisition and occupation (286). This mounted an early 
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dialectical understanding of the United States as a “sphere of freedom and peace” 
unspoiled by Europe, and the rest of the world as a field of war, a distinctive chapter in 
the Western rationalism of modernity born inside a U.S. planetary frontierism that 
remains en force today (287). The new trenches of “global linear thinking” dug out by 
this doctrine set the backdrop for shifting understandings of humanity, trading in 
European paradigms of colonial humanism and all its atrocities and “rebirthing 
humanity” as an American-made set of rights, a bastion of freedom and justice (288). 
Marking out this American moment in the wider context of legal and political changes 
foregrounds a set of ideological considerations that will resound along the built-up lines 
of our contemporary moment.  
 President Monroe’s statement would not become known as the Monroe Doctrine 
until some 30 years later, when U.S. president James Polk invoked it inside a more 
expansive version of Manifest Destiny to keep Spain, Britain, and Russia from 
establishing stronger footholds along the Pacific Coast, and also when he sent troops to 
the Río Grande at the conclusion of the Civil War to demand that France withdraw the 
Maximilian reign from Mexico. Manifest Destiny was based in the idea of white 
American supremacy. As the United States grew as a world power, the Monroe 
Doctrine was used to invoke and recognize spheres of U.S. influence. The Frederick 
Jackson Turner address named the exceptional character of U.S. history and politics as 
the central feature of American historiography (Slotkin 1998: 29). U.S. president 
Theodore Roosevelt and Frederick Jackson Turner shared the belief that the frontier 
shaped U.S. institutions and the national character, and that the passing of the agrarian 
frontier marked the beginning of a crisis (Slotkin 1998: 30). The concrete orientation 
that the “New World” existed “beyond the line,” free for appropriation, was subsumed 
in a new formation that separated the state from the economy. However, creating 
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economic presence with political absence required that the old ideology and 
raciography of “freedom” be maintained (Schmitt 2003: 293–294). The farmer and the 
hunter at the root of the myth of the frontier are linked inside the spiritual and secular 
regeneration of taking up “virgin land,” which symbolically addressed the economic 
aspects of ideological concern, and also through the defeat of the “savages” in a “war of 
the races,” which addressed the political aspects of conquest and use of force (Slotkin 
1998: 33). Theodore Roosevelt’s belief had to be grounded in a “historiography that 
would allow him to see the industrial/urban order of the present in the direct, logical, 
and hence desirable outcome of the frontier past” (Slotkin 1998: 33). To the Monroe 
Doctrine, U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt added the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, 
which expanded U.S. global policing powers to intervene in the affairs of Latin 
American countries. Schmitt cites the example of the Panama Declaration in 1939, 
when the United States forbade warring states from undertaking hostile acts within a 
specific security zone, as a line that extended the idea of territorial waters from three 
miles off the coast to 300 miles (2003: 282). This action stretched the land-based limits 
of the Western Hemisphere into the free seas, an unprecedented form of appropriating 
the ocean inside a security zone, and it bears a remarkable resemblance to the current 
internally oriented 100-mile expanded security zone of the U.S. international border, in 
which the U.S. Customs and Border Protection have certain extra-Constitutional powers 
along the U.S. “border,” where about two-thirds of the entire U.S. population lives 
(Schmitt 2003: 283; American Civil Liberties Union 2015). In 1953 the U.S. 
Department of Justice adopted this extended juridical understanding of the 100-mile 
border without any public comments or debate. At that time there were fewer than 
1,100 Border Patrol agents nationwide, whereas today, there are over 21,000 agents, 
and this old ruling has taken on expanded powers in interior checkpoints, forming a 
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dragnet where “suspicion-less stops” and “routine searches” of vehicles and luggage 
can be legally conducted without a warrant (American Civil Liberties Union 2015). The 
increased capacity and intensity of these practices coincide with the rising use of 
private-sector technologies and partnerships that multiply surveillance capacities of 
enforcement, including databases and watch lists, advanced identification and tracking 
systems, the “virtual” border fence of cameras and sensors, and also unmanned aerial 
vehicles. Carving out provisional claims and making them permanent takes years, and 
this latest set of claims to “free” space and trade that the U.S. border wall marks out is 
no different.  
 
NAFTA’s Realm of “Freedom” Secured by Fencing 
In the early 1990s, borderlands were described as the world’s so-called “natural 
economic zones,” these “wealth-generating region states that lie within or across” 
borders (Ohmae 1993). The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement between the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada created the largest free-trade area in the world. The 
beginning of this arrangement was accompanied by the first prototypes of the U.S. 
border fence. Special economic zones require special protections. One of the unique 
characteristics of special economic zones in the borderlands is the convergence of free 
trade and state-of-emergency security measures — supra-national economic right and 
supra-exceptional legal powers to police. Historically, total policing has usually 
accompanied the new infrastructure of economic interests along the U.S.-Mexico 
border, and since the very beginning it has been organized around an aerial aspiration of 
surveilling the entirety of the borderline. In the latest chapter of U.S. border 
management, this has taken the form of ontological policing increasingly managed 
though public-private partnerships.  
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 The last two decades of this borderland region’s history are simultaneously 
situated at the interstices of opening capitalist projects dependent on disposable 
Mexican labor and the closing of the U.S. national border. In the absence of 
comprehensive U.S. immigration policy reforms, most immigration issues have been 
dealt with at a policy level in a haphazard, inconsistent manner. Shortly after the first 
and only U.S. immigration amnesty in 1986, immigration control along the U.S. 
southern border was “elevated from one of the most neglected areas of federal law 
enforcement to one of the most politically popular” (Andreas 2000: 85; Perea 1997). In 
the 1990s, the United States began a conservative-led “War on ‘Illegals,” following the 
“War on Drugs,” which outlined key “threats” as drugs and “illegal” immigrants 
(Nevins 2010). Meanwhile, U.S. immigration quotas were reframed with liberal 
language of “fairness” and “equality” inside dramatically reduced national quotas for 
countries in the Western Hemisphere, a way of organizing immigration that profoundly 
limited legal migration options for Mexicans while simultaneously constructing 
Mexicans as the face of undocumented immigration in the United States (De Genova 
2013; Chavez 2008). 
 There is an ongoing dialectical mobilization of “extra-national violence” 
associated with Mexican and Latin American drug lords and kingpins that renders U.S. 
citizens as innocent, threatened, and potential victims that are outside and independent 
of the political, economic, and social forces related to international drug trade and drug 
consumption and immigration policy in the United States. This framework also 
construes the United States as a sovereign and rational actor to resolve the outside 
“threat,” be it drugs or undocumented people, both brought largely under the same wing 
of law enforcement in the U.S. Border Patrol since the early 1990s. Fencing played a 
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key role in drug interdiction efforts, tactics that were quickly operationalized to use on 
people crossing the border to look for gainful employment.  
 The San Diego sector’s chief patrol agent began an initiative to erect stronger 
physical barriers, primarily to deter drug smuggling, in 1990. Sector officials installed 
about 14 miles of 10-foot welded-steel fencing along the border where they believed 
most unauthorized crossings of drugs and people occurred. A joint task force that 
coordinated military support for drug enforcement efforts in El Paso helped install  
high-intensity lights and a second and third fence at strategic locations along the same 
14-mile stretch in San Diego. In 1991 the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) tasked Sandia National Laboratories, through Immigration and Naturalization 
Services, to do a “systematic analysis of the security along the United States/Mexico 
Border between the ports of entry and to recommend measures by which control of the 
border could be improved” (United States General Accounting Office 1994). ONDCP 
chose Sandia, a national weapons lab, because of its “expertise in designing physical 
security systems” (United States General Accounting Office 1994). Sandia personnel 
visited all nine Border Patrol Southwest border sectors, toured various Border Patrol 
facilities, and interviewed both chief patrol agents and Border Patrol agents. They 
viewed much of the Southwest border from either the ground or the air and reviewed a 
number of previous studies related to border control (United States General Accounting 
Office 1994). In 1993 Sandia issued a report with its findings recommending that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Border Patrol focus on preventing illegal 
alien entry instead of on apprehending aliens once they have entered the country 
(United States General Accounting Office 1994). The growing ideological significance 
of the line’s orientational emphasis at the border, again not a specific location but rather 
an expansive conceptual one, was manifest in the naming of enforcement operations 
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that began en force in 1993, including “Operation Hold the Line,” a deployment of 
agents and technology in a “show of force” in the El Paso area, and later in “Operation 
Gatekeeper” in 1994 (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2015a). To implement this 
strategy of preventive policing, the Sandia study recommended using (1) multiple 
physical barriers in certain areas to prevent entry and (2) additional highway 
checkpoints and other measures to prevent drugs and illegal aliens that succeeded in 
entering the United States from leaving border areas. Previous studies have made 
similar recommendations (United States General Accounting Office 1994). Sandia, the 
company that first invented the national fencing strategy, would a little more than a 
decade later be a contractor again with the federal government to conduct crash testing 
of fencing and support the construction of the U.S. border fence (U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection 2010b). 
 
Million-Dollar Miles and Crisis Metrics 
The early prototypes of grate-style fencing in the 1990s along parts of the U.S.-Mexico 
border were frequently cut out by Mexicans living nearby, because they made excellent 
grating for homemade barbeque grills in northern ranching regions famous for grilled 
meats. Now the theft of the border fence is a more lucrative endeavor, an indicator of 
the growing political economies of fencing. In 2010 a former U.S. Air National 
Guardsman was found guilty of stealing and selling 90 tons of metal from a border 
fence project near Sonoita, Arizona, in 2007 and 2008 and was sentenced to a 15-month 
federal prison sentence, ordered to pay US$43,000 in restitution, and required to serve 
three years of supervised release (Pedersen 2010). In the decade after September 11, 
2001, the U.S. government has spent some US$90 billion to secure the U.S.-Mexico 
border (Mendoza 2011). The exact costs and figures for the completed U.S. border 
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fencing and its ongoing maintenance are extremely hard to pin down with any accuracy, 
largely because the wall’s planning and construction budgets were carried out in a 
segmented way. Not only were the estimates of costs for land acquisition, repair, and 
maintenance not always clearly broken down in government reports on cost-per-mile, 
but delays and hiring private contractors to build the wall resulted in higher costs. 
During my fieldwork I observed corporate logos welded into sections of the border wall 
by the private companies that built them. Some initial government reports on the price 
tags for early phases of construction in 2007 and 2008 indicated that fencing miles 
completed cost an average of US$3.9 million per mile for pedestrian fencing, a figure 
that during the final stages of the project increased to US$6.5 million per mile and was 
completed almost entirely by private contractors (United States Government 
Accountability Office 2009; SBI testimony quoted in Gilman 2011: 270). The price of 
vehicle fencing in these reports ran anywhere from US$200,000 to US$1.8 million per 
mile, averaging US$1 million a mile (United States Government Accountability Office 
2009: 4). In one instance, U.S. Customs and Border Protection allotted US$58 million 
to build a 3.5-mile stretch of fencing in the San Diego sector (United States 
Government Accountability Office 2009: 4). The total cost of fence construction so far 
is approximately US$2.4 billion, and the estimates that include the construction and 
ongoing repairs to the wall over the next 20-year period put that figure closer to US$6.5 
billion (SBI testimony quoted in Gilman 2011: 270). The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers predicted that the 25-year life cycle cost of the original Sandia prototype 
fencing in San Diego would range from US$16.4 million to US$70 million per mile, 
depending on the amount of damage sustained by the fencing (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 
2009: 27). These estimates do not include mismanagement of funds and costs sunk into 
virtual border fencing. In 2010 the Obama administration scrapped the Secure Border 
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Inititiative network, a US$1 billion virtual fence project contract with Boeing that was 
plagued with technical difficulties (Preston 2011; Powell 2010). A 2011 audit found 
that Customs and Border Protection purchasing procedures for a fencing section were 
not followed and a high-priced subcontractor was selected to do the construction, 
resulting in the purchase of excess steel and storage of steel incurring US$69 million in 
unnecessary costs (Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General 
2011). In spite of these great expenditures, the fence cannot be measured for its 
effectiveness in preventing or stopping unauthorized border crossings. For example, a 
2009 United States General Accountability Office report found that U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection “reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained 
agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a 
US$2.4 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical 
infrastructure” (2009). In response to these findings, Mark Borkowski, the executive 
director of Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative, compared 
analyzing the effectiveness of the fence and the accompanying sensors and technology 
to “calculating the costs and benefits of planes in combat while they’re still on the 
drawing board,” and yet in the same interview he asserted that “it is very clear to the 
Border Patrol that this has been very effective in cutting down illegal migrant traffic 
into the U.S.” (Wood 2009).  
 The metrics to support this expensive endeavor are couched inside a very 
problematic calculus that measures success of border enforcement by the number of 
human apprehensions, primarily along the U.S.-Mexico border. The data until fairly 
recently has focused on enforcement outcomes — that is, crossing or attempted crossing 
events — not the individual crossers, and it does not measure or give an accurate sense 
of actual inflows of undocumented people to the United States. Instead, these measures 
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depend on the subjective judgments of the agents who quantify the number of border 
crossers who “got away” or whom the measures were able to “turn back” (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2014: 28). The “effectiveness rate” of the Border 
Patrol, which is often used as a generic measure for “border security” at large, divides 
apprehensions and estimated “turn backs” by estimated known illegal entries (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2014: 28). However, Border Patrol’s enforcement 
outcomes are a function of both the flow of people crossing and the agency’s ability to 
detect such flows, and the enforcement data conflates the two, which tends to 
overestimate flows of undocumented people where resources are strong and to 
underestimate flows where resources are scarce (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office 2014: 28). 
 The latest levels of apprehensions of undocumented people in the United States 
— 468,651 in the 2014 fiscal year — are close to an all-time low since the 1970s 
(Passel and Cohn 2015). Declining apprehension rates of undocumented crossers along 
now heavily securitized corridors can serve as both the measure of U.S. Border Patrol’s 
“success” and yet simultaneously serve as a justification for the need to maintain 
burgeoning funding levels of security. It is a metric that is as golden as the mile-count, 
with shifting measurements and evaluation schemes, but ultimately the claims of a more 
“secure” border rest on the laurels of expenditure and deployment of tactical 
infrastructure and an increased number of border agents. The Border Patrol will never 
be able achieve prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, as required by 
the 2006 Secure Fence Act’s definition of “operational control of the border,” and yet 
the objective of “persistent surveillance” along the entire expanse of the southwestern 
U.S. border remains the aerial and scopic dream that has continued to orient U.S. spatial 
understanding of the border since the beginning of the U.S.-Mexico border.  
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Pancho Villa and the First U.S. Border Patrol 
The very first U.S. military experiments with aircraft support and intervention happened 
in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands when the First Aero Squadron of the U.S. Army crossed 
into Mexico in 1916 to provide aerial reconnaissance for General Pershing’s cavalry in 
pursuit of revolutionary Pancho Villa. This mission authorized U.S. Army troops to 
launch a punitive counterinsurgency expedition to capture Pancho Villa in Chihuahua, 
Mexico, after his troops raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico. The experimental, 
and largely failed, aerial surveillance during this cross-border manhunt required special 
handling because of the inherent contradictions that it posed to Mexico’s national 
sovereignty, so much so that the U.S. president’s chief of staff Hugh Scott had to clarify 
with the newly appointed U.S. secretary of war regarding President Wilson’s narrow 
objective of capturing a single person: “Mr. Secretary, do you want the United States to 
make war on one man? Suppose he should get into a train and go to Guatemala, 
Yucatán, or South America; are you going to go after him?” (Katz 1998: 568). The final 
instructions given to the troops emphasized that the group would respect the 
sovereignty of the Mexican government and its troops unless they were attacked. The 
goal was not necessarily to capture Villa, but the stated aim of the expedition was that: 
“the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa’s band or bands 
are known to be broken up” (568). In practice this required an intensive 
counterinsurgency march deep into the Chihuahuan Desert where many villages and 
families were loyal to Villa. The president tasked General John J. Pershing, and his 
superior commander Frederick Funston, who had experience in one of the U.S. Army’s 
early campaigns against revolutionaries and indigenous Muslims during the U.S. 
occupation of the Philippines (567). Their man-hunting expedition for Pancho Villa was 
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unsuccessful, but what ultimately emerged from this military experiment several years 
later was the first U.S. Army Border Air Patrol, a military surveillance squadron that 
preceded the actual ground-based incarnation of the U.S. Border Patrol, which was not 
incorporated until 1924. 
 After the U.S.-Mexico War from 1846–1848, Mexico ceded 50 percent of its 
territory to the United States, and an estimated 150,000 Mexicans and 180,000 free 
indigenous tribes were living in the newly declared U.S. territory when the current 
international boundary line was initially drawn up (Lytle Hernández 2010: 21–22). 
Consolidating this new claim over the land and transferring land ownership into the 
hands of Anglo-Americans settlers was a project that from early on required practices of 
aerial surveillance and violent policing of certain bodies on the border. Practically 
speaking, this was difficult to do because of the shortage of soldiers to patrol the border 
(Matthews 2007). In the early 1880s, the United States and Mexico signed a treaty that 
gave the U.S. government border-crossing privileges to pursue Native Americans, 
bandits, and smugglers without incurring a violation of national sovereignty. In June 
1919 Pancho Villa attacked Juárez, Mexico, for a third time, and a few days later, U.S. 
troops were ordered to cross the border from El Paso into the neighboring Mexican city 
of Júarez to assist the garrison of federales; the chief of the Army Air Service formed 
the first Border Air Patrol to support the mission. The immediate purpose of this second 
cross-border aerial intervention was to prevent Villa’s soldiers from shooting across the 
Río Grande into the United States, or to address what we would call in a more 
contemporary nomenclature “a threat to national security” (Hinkle 1967: 3). The 
formation of the Border Air Patrol was part of a larger effort of finding a means to 
secure the vast, newly acquired lands and the populations who had historically lived 
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there by preventing cross-border incursions of displaced and disconnected communities 
into the newly extended U.S. territory.  
 The activities of the newly formed Border Air Patrol included aerial 
reconnaissance, photographic surveillance, and even the use of a stationary balloon 
called the “lighter-than-air patrol,” an early and unsuccessful precursor to the tethered 
blimps used for radar surveillance that are currently operational in Arizona and Texas 
(Hinkle 1970; Hinkle 1967; Rozemberg 2012). One of the original pilots in the “River 
Flyers” squadron described the daily duties along the border like this: 
 
Our flight instructions were to search for bands of men along the border, flying 
low to observe what they were doing, how many were in the band, the number 
of horses and cattle, and the location and direction of movement. A report and 
sketch of the location were to be made and dropped at the nearest of our cavalry 
outposts. There were ten outposts of the 8th Cavalry in the Big Bend and Upper 
Big Bend country which could be reached by wagon trains; the others were 
accessible only by pack trains and mounted troops. (Hinkle 1970: 11)  
 
Communication was still limited to one-way from air to ground, and usually consisted 
of a small parachute with a message bag with a red cotton streamer dropped from low 
altitudes providing information to ground troops (Hinkle 1967: 7). The pilots would 
randomize their fly times to keep the presumed or potential “bandits” on the ground 
always on alert (Hinkle 1970: 11). Although the pilots were officially prohibited from 
crossing the international border into Mexican airspace, they regularly did. However, 
reports of these incursions were not made unless it served in the interests of 
preventative U.S. military action (Hinkle 1970: 11). The official U.S. government 
records and memoirs of one of the pilots on these daily patrols paint a rosy picture of 
the effectiveness of preventative policing in eliminating all the “costly raids by bandits 
from across the river” (Hinkle 1967; Hinkle 1970: 13). 
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 Many of the practices and even the physical locations of border patrol outposts 
formed during this early border regime are still present in the contours of contemporary 
geographies of U.S. border enforcement. Since the inception of the U.S. Army Border 
Air Patrol until today, what has remained constant has been the United States’ 
overarching vision for achieving operational control by securing an all-encompassing 
scopic horizon of the entire U.S. borderline with Mexico. Regarding an inspection of 
the earliest aerial surveillance measures, Hinkle writes, 
 
After his inspection of the patrol, General Mitchell, testifying before the House 
Rules Committee on August 20, stated, “Every foot of the United States-
Mexican border from San Diego, California to Brownsville, Texas is being 
patrolled from the air daily; and there has not been a single invasion by armed 
forces (revolutionaries) since the Border Air Patrol was started.” (1970: 19)  
 
The persisting fantasy of the omniscient eye of surveillance in knowing, predicting, and 
controlling the movements of those below is the concrete orientation of the U.S. 
borderline, which is now formalized by the U.S. border fence. The scopic regime of the 
border is organized vertically and corporeally around the state’s physical pursuit and 
capture of the unauthorized person, which relies on old ideological racial categories for 
intelligibility. It is both a morality and authority that rules from above, making the body 
itself the object of capture. This form of violence and domination engenders a form of 
ontological policing where the chased are forced to internalize the infrahuman concepts 
that the dominant have imposed on them (Chamayou 2012: 25). The next section traces 
more of the historical contours of the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol to better situate 
and understand the contemporary practices of ontological policing on the border. 
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Ontological Policing and Hunting “Illegals” 
Kissing her crying children and husband good-bye, Leticia Ramirez sat alongside four 
other undocumented people wearing shirts that read “No Papers! No Fear! Dignity is 
Fighting Here!” on the street in front of the location of “America’s Toughest Sheriff” 
Joe Arpaio’s criminal trial for racial profiling in Arizona. The group challenged 
Arpaio’s deputies to arrest them, calling out the ways in which an estimated 11.2 
million undocumented Americans are forced to live in the shadows of fear and 
insecurity created by the wave of federal and state policies that have criminalized the 
act of being under- or undocumented and have resulted in a record number of 
deportations. 
 
My name is Leticia Ramirez. I have been undocumented for 18 years. I am a 
mother of three kids and I am here to tell Arpaio that he’s been chasing our 
community. He’s been chasing our people. And I’m here to tell that I’m making 
his job easy, that I’m here and that I’m not going to stand up for what’s he’s 
been doing to my community and come and get me! (Democracy Now 2012) 
 
Before, legal exclusion through banishment was a punishment for a crime, but now it is 
a status where the person himself or herself is the infraction (Chamayou 2012: 273). For 
many people living in the United States without legal authorization, a deportation is 
only a routine traffic stop or a broken taillight away. Chamayou (2012) locates this 
contemporary chapter of hunting down of undocumented people inside a longer 
historical genealogy of manhunting as technology of capture and a means of 
governance, where domination presupposes the master’s power, which is formulated in 
the violent act of capture. This cynegetic modality of power is a condition for the 
master’s economic domination, which in the beginning was an extra-political concept, 
but which since has been mobilized inside conceptions of political sovereignty 
(Chamayou 2012). It is what allows the undocumented person to be legally exploited in 
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their work and to have their existence proscribed from any legal protection, while it 
simultaneously serves as the basis for the ongoing inflation of police powers to monitor 
and hunt them (Chamayou 2012: 277–282). The stateless person’s insecurity is exile, a 
withdrawal from law that engenders vulnerability. When the U.S.-Mexico borderlands 
were first opened up for U.S. appropriation, it was organized by this kind of policing, 
which brokered a working “peace structure” between the leaders of both the victors and 
the defeated to facilitate the commercial goals of Manifest Destiny (Montejano 1987: 
8). This happened as Anglo powers seized the land markets, and then, increasingly, with 
the emergence of corporate agriculture and exploited labor markets, culminating in the 
new urban-industrial order during the Second World War (Montejano 1987). The 
United States’ orientation to the border has historically relied on this old raceography 
organized through violence.  
 When the U.S. Border Patrol was first created in May of 1924, its broad federal 
policing powers were developed regionally, and the new agency quickly directed the 
punitive force of U.S. immigration law toward Mexicans and Mexican Americans. The 
first members of its ranks were drawn from the Texas Rangers, the first paramilitary 
organization in the United States, which shaped and protected Anglo-American 
settlement through a strategy of “raw physical violence” to secure favorable outcomes 
for Anglo-American settlers in labor and land disputes with Texas Mexicans (Tejanos) 
(Lytle Hernández 2010: 20). The Rangers also regularly battled with indigenous 
communities and chased runaway slaves (20). The officers of the early force were 
predominantly Anglo-Americans who had grown up in the borderlands, but they often 
did not fall within the landed elite class, and so they used their new role in managing 
Mexican labor as a source to broker power and shore up their tentative claims to 
whiteness inside the region’s growing political economies (40–41).  
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 Often, the Border Patrol policed Mexican and Mexican Americans as a proxy 
for policing immigration, and their activities centered on creating a broad net of 
surveillance that surpassed the enforcement outcomes of their police work (Lytle 
Hernández 2010: 45, 53). Early on, the U.S. Border Patrol did not work along the 
borderline, but farther inland along highways and roads, trying to apprehend 
unauthorized migrants before they reached their final inland destinations in the United 
States. This meant that the agents broadly policed Mexican mobility instead of 
enforcing the actual political boundary (46). Enforcement was premised exclusively on 
race. The category of “Mexican” could be used regardless of the citizenship status of 
the person in question, whereas “white” and “American” were interchangeable terms 
(48).  
 Anglo-American settler colonialism did not take off in the more arid parts of 
Texas until the advent of new irrigation technology in the mid-nineteenth century, and 
the Texas Rangers were key in removing well-established Tejano ranchers from the 
land to open up new opportunities for Anglo-American farmers. The agricultural 
revolution, especially in South Texas, still required a lot of labor, and instead of being 
entirely displaced from the land, the working-class Mexicans and Mexican Americans 
were increasingly tied and bound to their land and indentured through their labor 
(Montejano 1987: 9). Frequently, agribusiness had direct influence over developing 
Border Patrol practices in Texas and California (Lytle Hernández 2010: 56). The Border 
Patrol’s narrow focus on policing unauthorized Mexican immigration throughout its 
early history and up to now “drew a particular color line around the political condition 
of illegality” (Lytle Hernández 2010: 222). Race was subject to very localized 
interpretations in the beginning, but by the late 1960s it had taken root in much larger 
national initiatives for drug interdiction and crime control (222). The U.S. Supreme 
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Court has consistently legitimated U.S. Border Patrol practices as a site of sanctioned 
state violence, where targeting Mexican and Mexican American bodies simply based on 
their racial appearance is legal (Lytle Hernández 2010). Today the U.S. Border Patrol 
— now the largest federal policing entity, reconfigured inside the massive overhaul and 
creation of the post–September 11, 2001, U.S. Department of Homeland Security — 
continues to play an instrumental role in setting up new regimes of differential rights 
and rules inside the United States. This massive infusion of enforcement is still directed 
almost entirely toward the U.S. southern border. The extensive and intensive policing 
has been regularly described by border residents as a broader “culture of impunity” 
where the policing agenda organizes and rules over the borderlands.  
 The Tohono O’odham nation is a sovereign indigenous nation whose cross-
border community is simultaneously fenced in and out by the U.S. border fence. About 
1,500 Tohono O’odham citizens live on the nation’s lands, which share a 75-mile 
border with Mexico. Until 1993, there was no Border Patrol presence in the Tohono 
O’odham nation, but the increasing security measures on the border funneled migrant 
and drug trafficking routes into the nation (Amnesty International 2012). Now the 
nation’s roads are full of Border Patrol vehicles, which constantly stop traffic moving in 
the area. Predator drones, Blackhawks, and other “air assets” fly overhead, and there are 
surveillance towers, scope trucks, and even a Forward Operating Base, a remote mobile 
operating base developed by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan (Miller 2012). In 
a 2008 written testimony to a joint hearing on the border wall and the legal waivers to 
build it, the chairman of the Tohono O’odham nation described the impact of this 
militarization inside a much longer and larger historical context of U.S. imperialism: 
 
In the words of the United States Supreme Court, Indian tribes predate the 
United States. We are older than the international boundary with Mexico and 
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had no role in creating the border. But our land is now cut in half, with O’odham 
communities, sacred sites, salt pilgrimage routes, and families divided. We did 
not cross the 75 miles of border within our reservation lands. The border crossed 
us. (Norris 2008)  
 
At all the tribal crossings from Mexico into the United States, tribal nation members 
must show their ID cards to a Border Patrol agent on duty before they can open the gate 
to cross to their vehicle. All three exits from the reservation into Arizona have 
checkpoints. An Amnesty International (2012) report documented extensive accounts of 
abuses by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents, including physical and verbal abuses 
against tribal citizens. O’odham citizens frequently have the validity of their tribal 
identification cards questioned and are routinely stopped; however, their complaints of 
abuse, like most complaints along the border, are rarely followed up on by the agency. 
 In 2014, a Washington, D.C.–based organization analyzed 806 reports of abuse 
by the U.S. Border Patrol along the southwestern border between January 2009 and 
January 2012 and found that 97 percent of complaints registered against the U.S. Border 
Patrol were never investigated (Hsieh 2014a). In the findings only 13 complaints led to 
action, most of which consisted of counseling, oral reprimands, or written reports; only 
one agent was suspended for an excessive use of force complaint (Hsieh 2014a). Since 
2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents have killed at least 46 people, 
including 13 U.S. citizens and 9 teenagers (Arizona Republic 2014). One third of these 
cases involved minors. The youngest killed was 12-year-old Lourdes Cruz Morales 
Cases, run over with her father by a Border Patrol agent who was driving a vehicle in 
pursuit of a group of migrants near Dateland, Arizona, and who said that he did not see 
them (Associated Press 2006a). The child’s father, whose back was broken when he 
was run over by the agent, was arrested on charges of child endangerment and detained 
for a week before he was finally deported back to Mexico (Associated Press 2006a). 
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Only two agents have been disciplined by verbal reprimand, and the others have been 
absolved from any misconduct (Bennett 2015).22 At least three teenagers were killed 
after being shot in the back by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officers. In one of the 
cases, Border Patrol agents shot through the U.S. border fence onto Mexican soil, 
shooting 16-year-old José Antonio Elena Rodriguez ten times in the back and head. 
According to multiple eye witnesses, Rodriguez was simply walking by while two 
people climbed the U.S. border wall back into Mexico and were allegedly throwing 
rocks at border agents (Ortega and O’Dell 2013). It was only after public outcry upon 
the airing of a national public television program documenting the death of Anastacio 
Hernández Rojas that a congressional mandate to investigate practices of U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection’s use of force was issued. Anastacio Hernandez Rojas, a 
Mexican national, was Tasered and beaten into a coma while he was handcuffed on the 
ground screaming for help and begging for mercy, surrounded by more than a dozen 
U.S. Border Patrol agents on May 28, 2010. He died in custody shortly after the 
incident, leaving his U.S. citizen wife a widow and his five U.S. citizen children 
fatherless. Amateur videos of the event corroborated the circumstances of his death, 
which was ruled a homicide by the San Diego coroner; however, the police 
investigation did not result in an indictment against any of the officers involved (Ponsot 
2012). A 2013 independent review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency’s 
use-of-force incidents along the U.S. Mexico border found that: 
 
                                                
22 A more recent investigation by the L.A. Times found there have been 67 Border Patrol shootings since 
2012, which resulted in 19 deaths. There are three pending cases still under investigation by the U.S. 
Department of Justice as of June 15, 2015 (Bennett 2015). On Sept. 24, 2015 as this document was sent 
to the printer the Border Patrol Agent Lonnie Swartz was indicted for second-degree murder of José 
Antonio Elena Rodriguez in what is perhaps the first-ever indictment of a border patrol agent killing 
someone in Mexico (O’Dell and González 2015). The Arizona Republic newspaper has kept a database of 
Border Patrol killings since 2005 and reports that only two agents have ever been indicted on any kind of 
homicide charges. “The last agents indicted for lethal force were in 2005 and 2007, the cases were 
dismissed or ended in hung juries” (O’Dell and González 2015). 
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Border Patrol agents have intentionally and unnecessarily stepped in front of 
moving cars to justify using deadly force against vehicle occupants. Agents have 
shot in frustration across the US-Mexico border at rock throwers when simply 
moving away was an option. Border Patrol demonstrates a “lack of diligence” in 
investigating incidents in which US agents fire their weapons. It’s questionable 
whether Border Patrol “consistently and thoroughly reviews” incidents in which 
agents use deadly force. (Hsieh 2014b) 
 
The scathing media reports and investigations finally resulted in a public relations 
overhaul, under which Border Patrol released its use of force policy guidelines to the 
public and announced a system to register and process complaints, slow bureaucratic 
gestures that are largely a positive gloss on the lethal side of lawfulness. 
 The escalated levels of sanctioned violence, the right to expel and even to kill 
the proscribed, are vigorously held up as legitimate acts of “self-defense.” Individual 
border agents can claim they acted in “self-defense” inside their larger task of being the 
frontline of “homeland” and “national” defense. These actions are also situated inside 
political realms that construe the capture and detention of migrants as defensive acts to 
protect citizens. In 1994 California voters passed the “Save Our State” Proposition 187, 
a measure which claimed that the people of California “have suffered and are suffering 
economic hardship, … personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of 
illegal aliens in this state” and assert “the right to the protection of their government 
from any person or persons entering this country unlawfully. ” The controversial bill 
prohibited the provision of social services and benefits to noncitizens, but was 
eventually ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. courts. It was the first time a state had 
tried to enforce U.S. federal immigration policies on its own. A decade later, Arizona 
became the next state to pass a similar law to California’s Proposition 187. This time, 
however, legal challenges to the law did not hold up, and the toned-down version of the 
California law was successfully implemented. In November 2004, Arizona voters 
passed Proposition 200, the “Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,” by a 56 
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percent vote, requiring people to provide proof of citizenship before applying for public 
benefits or registering to vote (Marosi 2004). The discursive flexibility of “self-
defense” and “right to protection” at all these different levels blurs the realms of civic 
and political participation with the realms of war, ultimately positioning larger claims 
about the border as a security zone inside a set of relations based on territorial 
protections grounded in war making. This political and cultural framework mixes these 
discourses to make the unauthorized immigrant internalize these as moral systems. The 
register for defense becomes one of “consequence” and “punishment,” tailoring 
enforcement to exact an individualized response, even to the point of making the hunted 
police themselves. 
 
“Self-Deportation” and “Consequence Delivery Systems” 
In the 2012 U.S. election campaigns, during the worst economic recession since the 
Great Depression, immigration was one of the hot topics buzzing on the lips of the 
Republican contenders vying for the party nomination. In fact, all of the contenders 
early on began to frame their arguments about immigration in reference to the border 
fence. It was almost as if the fence had become a rhetorical figure in the debate. Early 
on, all of the candidates had to outline their stance inside a binary framework either in 
support of increased fortification or not. Herman Cain “jokingly” suggested that the 
fence be electrified (Wyatt 2011). Senator John McCain (2010) walked in front of the 
border fence for one of his campaign advertisements with Arizona Pinal County sheriff 
Paul Babeu talking about his plan to “Complete the Danged Fence” — to bring troops 
and state, county, and local law enforcement to the border. Another word on the lips of 
contenders was “self-deportation,” an expression first coined by Daniel D. Portado, a 
satirical character, whose name is a play on the Spanish word deportation, that was 
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created in a sketch by Chicano cartoonist and satirist Lalo Alcaráz in 1994 in the wake 
of the California Proposition 187. D. Portado went on Spanish-language television 
shows pretending to advocate a “reverse immigration” (This American Life 2012). The 
preposterous irony was transformed and naturalized as a functional and legitimate 
concept when presidential contender Mitt Romney suggested this as a viable option, 
that instead of “rounding up” undocumented people, the goal should be to make 
undocumented immigrants so uncomfortable that they willingly “self-deport.” “The 
answer is self-deportation, which is people decide they can do better by going home 
because they can’t find work here because they don’t have legal documentation to allow 
them to work here,” Romney said in a 2012 debate. “And so we’re not going to round 
people up” (Madison 2012).  
 Romney’s idea is a central pillar of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol’s current 
strategic policy to implement penalty schemes tailored to the individual called a 
“Consequence Delivery System.” U.S. Border Patrol agents evaluate each apprehended 
person and “identify the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further 
illegal activity,” a strategy based on the effectiveness and efficiency of preventing 
recidivate crossing (Seghetti 2014: 9). This is all neatly packed as a matrix onto a 
wallet-sized, color-coded flashcard carried by agents in the field that describes “the 
range of enforcement actions available for a particular alien as a function of the 
person’s immigration and criminal histories, among other factors, and of the 
enforcement resources available in each Border Patrol sector” (9). The “high 
consequence enforcement outcomes” are intended to deter undocumented people from 
crossing the border by raising the immediate costs to migrants who are apprehended. 
For example, deporting people far away from where they were initially picked up 
makes it harder for them to reconnect with smugglers or forces them to take a long 
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journey from the interior of Mexico back to the northern border, and it also levies the 
longer-term physical and emotional costs of extended detentions and separations from 
their families. The goal of this system is that virtually every person who is apprehended 
faces “some type of consequence” other than voluntary return, where the apprehended 
person voluntarily “self-deports,” the least effective and efficient “consequence” 
according the matrix (9). This is a kind of predictive and preventive policing that 
operates in a future tense, based on possibilities and not realities. It spatially relies on 
the line that the border wall codifies to reorganize economic futurities, and it is 
generative of new dividing lines to organize economies of closure in the defense of 
“freedom.” 
 Faced with budgetary shortfalls in 2014, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security set up a pilot public-private partnership program that allows U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) to accept private and corporate monetary and property 
donations and non-personal services from the private sector. Most of the initial 
partnerships are with airports, which pay overtime fees to CBP to have quicker 
processing of international travelers at peak times; however, the city of El Paso, Texas, 
also signed a deal to foot the bill for increasing the number of CBP agents at the 
international bridges on the border during holidays and weekends. Privatizing policing 
inside a consumer matrix creates new border markets where they did not previously 
exist and opens up cross-border trade stagnated by delays costing the U.S. economy 
billions every year (Border Trade Alliance 2013). The mayor of El Paso described the 
partnership as “not just an economic development driver for our community, but it will 
revive economies in communities across the nation” (Border Trade Alliance 2013). 
Another sector where public-private partnerships along the border are growing 
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exponentially is the prison-industrial complex, an economic market that profits from 
economies of fears secured by government quotas.  
 
Carceral Complex Growth Sector  
The escalating criminalization of “living undocumented” in the United States in the last 
decade coincides with new growth sectors in the prison industrial complex and 
sweeping anti-immigrant policy actions coming out of the “New South” and 
Washington, D.C (Gordon 2012). This phenomenon is not specific to the United States, 
but it is part of a global trend where destination countries in the overdeveloped world 
are criminalizing undocumented presence and the act of undocumented work in a way 
that is disproportionately punitive to the individual.23 Lines of appropriation are 
generative on new realms of acquisition, generative of new lines that organize capital 
extraction. We can functionally understand immigrant detention centers as the 
complementary structure to the border wall. Two years after the North American Free 
Trade Agreement was enacted, the U.S. Congress passed a law requiring undocumented 
immigrants to be locked up. It wouldn’t be until a decade later, when private prison and 
correction companies’ lobbying efforts peaked, that Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), an arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, would 
receive an additional billion dollars in funding and an increased budget for custody 
detentions, just as the Secure Fence Act was being signed into law (Associated Press 
2012a). This marked the beginning of a growing multibillion-dollar industry: federal 
prosecutors charged immigrants with felonies for entering multiple times without 
authorization, and thousands of people convicted were sent to new private prisons built 
                                                
23 For example, in 2014 Israel passed “infiltrator” laws, which criminalized the act of being 
undocumented and allowed the government to incarcerate undocumented migrants for three years, and 
the government built a massive 2,000-bed detention center in the Negev Desert to hold African migrants. 
The Israeli courts ruled these provisions as a violation of human rights for asylum seekers, and a judge 
ordered the Holt detention center closed (Fisher-Ilan 2014). 
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just for them. In 2009 the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), essentially formalized this practice into a 
congressionally mandated quota by adding a clause to the ICE detention budget in the 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010 which said that “funding 
made available under this heading shall maintain a level of not less than 33,400 
detention beds” (Carson and Diaz 2015). ICE interpreted this directive to mean that the 
agency had to contract and fill 33,400 detention beds daily, a figure that was increased 
again in 2013 to 34,000 beds (Carson and Diaz 2015). This detention quota is 
unprecedented, and no other law enforcement agency in the United States operates 
under a congressionally mandated quota (Carson and Diaz 2015). Practically the entire 
immigrant detention process had been privatized (Schriro 2009). In the early 2000s, 
only 10 percent of the beds for civil detention centers in the United States were run by 
private facilities (Associated Press 2012a). Today, 62 percent of all ICE immigration 
detention beds in the United States are operated by for-profit prison corporations, 
largely concentrated in the hands of two of the largest publicly traded private prison 
corporations, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group (Carson 
and Diaz 2015). Private facilities are run with very little oversight from the federal 
government (Schriro 2009). And although government detention standards for 
“unauthorized aliens” specify that criminal detention is different from civil detention, in 
practice, they are functionally identical. A 2009 government report on the subject 
described the facilities in this way: 
 
Each group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities with hardened perimeters in 
remote locations at considerable distances from counsel and/or their 
communities. With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain 
aliens were originally built, and currently operate, as jails and prisons to confine 
pre-trial and sentenced felons. Their design, construction, staffing plans, and 
population management strategies are based largely upon the principles of 
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command and control. Likewise, ICE adopted standards that are based upon 
corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations to guide the 
operation of jails and prisons. (Schriro 2009) 
 
There are also three family detention facilities where accompanied and unaccompanied 
children are held, and media reports in 2013 during the Obama administration’s four-
year crackdown on immigration documented more than 1,000 minors being held in 
adult immigration detention facilities for more three days, a violation of federal protocol 
(Bennett 2013a). Immigrant populations that are not detained in facilities contracted or 
managed by ICE are kept in county jails through intergovernmental agency service 
arrangements (Schriro 2009).  
 Private detention companies profit not only from providing beds, but also 
generate additional revenues from subsidiaries that provide health care and 
transportation for detainees. Another way that these companies increase profits is from 
the very bodies they are paid to restrain. Legal precedents that outlawed chain gangs 
and forced labor have been reincarnated inside immigrant detention centers, where most 
immigrants are not legally allowed to work but are commonly forced to do manual 
labor, getting paid as little as US$1to US$3 a day as part of federally authorized 
“voluntary work programs” (Urbina 2014; Moreno 2015). In 2013, some 60,000 
immigrants worked in detention centers around the United States for 13 cents an hour 
and sometimes even for free, saving the government and the private companies who 
contract with them US$40 million or more a year on contracting paid labor at federal 
minimum wage (Urbina 2014). A group of current and former detainees who were 
being held at a private facility in Denver are suing the GEO Group, saying they were 
paid US$1 a day to do janitorial work, at times under the threat of solitary confinement 
(Moreno 2015). Another group of jailed migrants sued, accusing immigration 
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authorities in Tacoma, Washington, of putting detainees who staged a work stoppage 
and hunger strike into solitary confinement (Urbina 2014).  
 This survey of the prototypes and pilot programs along the U.S. border helps us 
to identify the emergent realms of acquisition that the border fence marks out in 
building a special-interest security zone — an economic sphere that is carved out by a 
rhetoric of defense, the rules of war, and expansive ideas of sovereignty. It locates the 
historical moorings of these doctrines of economic imperialism and expansion 
originating in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, and it links these inside a larger account of 
the ideological emergence of U.S. planetary frontierism. As we identify the historicities 
and futurities of special-interest security zones inside the changing spatial conceptions 
of the U.S. border, it offers us entry points to understanding and thinking about the 
centrality of race, violence, and preventative policing in organizing and operationalizing 
these realms of claimed state power. In studying the details of the nascent nomos that 
the U.S. border fence marks out, we can begin to uncover and name with greater 
precision the practices securing new claims.  
 In its latest strategic plans, the U.S. Border Patrol has dramatically altered its 
operational vision from its long-standing efforts to “seal” or “close” the southern border 
to more recent efforts aimed at becoming a rapid response agency, responding to the 
changing border anywhere and everywhere. It has shifted its organizational attention 
from resource acquisition to one of “risk”- and “threat”-based responses, a flexible 
apparatus that works in tandem with other government agencies. This includes using 
specially trained tactical teams and a shift toward using more technologies of 
surveillance to assess threats before they come close, in many ways returning to and 
expanding upon the original goal of securing a scopic vision of the entire border. For 
example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses a network of long-range radars to 
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provide “persistent air, maritime and land surveillance capability” to detect and monitor 
low-altitude aircraft and vessels 200 miles out from the actual border to increase 
“domain awareness” and allow more time to plan and make enforcement decisions. 
These radar feeds are also linked into Customs and Border Protection’s “domain 
awareness architecture” system (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2014). This aerial 
organization of domestic space borrows heavily from the tactics of U.S. 
counterinsurgency warfare and has important implications that connect global 
discussions around the shifting lines of war, peace, and humanity.  
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Conclusion: Our Backs Against the Wall  
 
The United States Government has not recognized any top or upper limit to its 
sovereignty. 
 
— Loftus Becker, U.S. State Department legal advisor, speaking in 1958 
(Banner 2009: 272) 
 
The Falcon and CAV [combat aerial vehicle] programs will allow the United 
States “to crush someone anywhere in world on 30 minutes” notice with no need 
for a nearby air base. 
 
— John E. Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, quoted in the Washington Post 
(Pincus 2005) 
 
Nomos of the Skies 
The advent of airpower in the early twentieth century reconfigured the way war was 
conducted. In the beginning, airpower was organized by sacred property rights over the 
land, and over the seas it was organized by the principle of the freedom of the seas for 
trade and plundering. Land-based warfare required a direct presence and force applied 
to the population (Schmitt 2003: 319). Sea war was a form of trade war governed by 
prize law that could be directed against hostile or even neutral property in the free space 
of the sea (310). Both of these earlier spatial orders required varying levels of 
reciprocity, but airpower was different. Air war was considered a “purer” and “nobler” 
form of warfare that could preserve peace by leveling the fields of engagement, and it 
was even heralded that flight would end the very cause of national conflicts by bringing 
people closer together (Lindqvist 2001: 67). At first, airpower was more like an 
addendum to land- and sea-based laws of war, but increasingly, the airplane ushered in 
the end of the free seas, and whole zones of free sea could become battle zones (Schmitt 
2003: 315). “All such institutions of international law based on legal and moral equality 
had a spatial counterpart based on the equal surface of the theater of war [land and 
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sea]” (311, italics in the original). Airpower changed all this in that it rendered 
everything as a destructible target; in other words, there is no longer any theater of war, 
and instead the principles of occupation and free trade morph into a singular 
organization of war. Airpower does not play out on a horizontal plane where both 
parties face one another; instead, it is devoid of this relational component (319). It 
provides a means of “control without occupation” (Lindqvist 2001: 102). Airpower is 
an asymmetrical orientation of power without reciprocity, and it reconfigures the spatial 
order in relationship to the human in a particular way. 
 When this dramatic unevenness in war making occurs, “the opponent becomes 
nothing more than an object of violent measures” (Schmitt 2003: 320). Some of the 
early international conventions around airpower limited its destructive functions to be 
equal to but not greater than the destruction of military maneuvers on land and on the 
seas (Lindqvist 2001: 75). However, in practice, airpower was deployed and developed 
inside European colonial holdings, and the brutality of bombing noncombatants from 
the sky approximated the older military services’ bloodbaths on the ground (76–79). A 
racial order of supremacy oriented all the early air interventions, which justified the 
technology of aerial warfare and the genocide it produced as part of a larger civilizing 
mission. Italians dropped the very first aerial bombs onto Arab civilian populations in 
an effort to take the last remaining Turkish-controlled strip of North Africa in Tripoli in 
1911 (76–78). British prime minister Winston Churchill first discovered the cost 
effectiveness of airpower when he ordered a punitive expedition in Somaliland. The 
British offensive against Mullah Mohammed Abdille Hassan was accomplished when 
pilots dropped the first bomb onto the leader and his amirs, who had never before seen a 
bomb. The military operation took one week instead of a year and cost a fraction of the 
army’s proposed budget, cementing a permanent and ongoing operational budget for the 
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newly formed British Royal Air Force (100–101). Britain continued to use aerial 
bombing campaigns throughout its holdings in India, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, 
and South Africa (102–111). Because air attacks made it possible to attack the enemy 
far beyond fortified lines, the distinction between soldiers and civilians was subsumed 
inside the collapse of distance. Air attacks also relied on a racial hierarchy that viewed 
civilian native lives as less than human, drawing from Christian medieval doctrines that 
only allowed the use of long-range weapons to be used against an “unjust” or 
unchristian enemy (Schmitt 2003: 321). The early use of aerial bombing relied on an 
economic-moral calculus that combined the cost-effectiveness of air strikes with a 
moral authority to use weapons of catastrophic destruction preemptively, a logic of self-
defense where the advantage belongs to the one who strikes first (Lindqvist 2001: 104).  
 In this formula, the distinction between power and law ceases, and the 
vanquished are displaced into a bellum intestinum (internal war) (Schmitt 2003: 320–
321). Schmitt writes, “The victors consider their superiority in weaponry to be an 
indication of their justa causa, and declare the enemy to be a criminal, because it is no 
longer possible to realize the concept of justus hostis [a legally recognized enemy]” 
(2003: 321). The “[i]ntensification of the technological means of destruction opens the 
abyss of an equally destructive legal and moral discrimination” (321). This vertical 
transformation has made war, according to Schmitt, into “a police action against 
trouble-makers, criminals, and pests” and requires that “the justification of the methods 
of this ‘police bombing’ … be intensified’ (321). The brutality of this legal-moral 
regime was framed as “bloodless” means of victory and a more humane method of war 
making. It was bloodless because it did not spill the blood of the aggressors, but also 
because in “killing the economy” by targeting infrastructure like roads, bridges, and 
transport, it made the actual killing of the combatants and noncombatants on the ground 
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redundant (Lindqvist 2001: 111). In staking out some of the shifting contours of early 
war making from the sky, where combat becomes the object of a policing action and the 
figure of the enemy becomes the criminal, we can start to see some of the early 
intersections and crossover between spheres of war making and civic realms of 
domestic policing and free trade.  
 
Walls in the Age of the Drone 
Border walls are grid lines of an aerial nomos. The latest terrains of just war are being 
crafted in the sky as part of the evolving “techno-legal armature” of drone warfare 
(Gregory 2013). The most recent rayas (lines) in the skies are still justified inside 
doctrines of just war. The U.S. military is leading the way in creating new political and 
cultural understandings of airspace — where deeds are suspended from action inside 
radically instrumentalized understandings of legality (Chamayou 2015). We must now 
consider what Chamayou (2015) describes as the “necro-ethics” — the reconfiguration 
of the principles of international humanitarian law in service of a self-preservationist 
nationalism — not only inside the realms of warfare, but also inside the protected 
territories of the domestic sphere that enjoy “democratic” order and peace. Radically 
instrumentalized understandings of legality have not yet reached their full potential in 
the national airspace of newly expanded border enforcement zones, the 50-kilometer or 
100-mile radius where exceptional border laws reach. National borders are pregnant 
with possibilities to reconfigure the airspace emanating upward from territorial 
borderlines because they are increasingly spaces where the laws of the land have 
already been waived. Unlike previous colonial and imperial eras where walls and 
treaties claimed “new” lands, today all terrestrial property is already under ownership, 
which requires that new realms of acquisition be organized and managed on a vertical 
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axis, an aerial one that has been historically constituted almost exclusively in times of 
war or in the name of national security. The liberal imperative of the freedom of 
movement, a right usually only upheld for military and market forces is undergirded by 
a whole set of corresponding carceral systems — the operative tools of this aerial 
nomos that compartmentalize and fracture. The outgrowth of these systems of 
containment and confinement from “no-fly zones” to detention centers are couched 
firmly inside a liberal discourse as “more humane” methods of war, governance, and 
global human management. Practices of just war and global governance share this 
mutual investment in the authorizing language of liberal humanitarian ideologies, which 
tenuously prop up hierarchies of human vulnerabilities through vast arrays of rules, 
prohibitions, and punishments that ensure human submission.  
 The rapid changes with the deployment of drones that have happened during the 
course of my research have required me to think about how we might understand 
national border walls inside the nomos of the skies. What do walls mean in this 
arrangement, and what purpose do they serve? Even as I write this, the U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration is still developing its first set of guidelines for drone use in 
domestic airspace. So in lieu of a conclusion, what I outline here are some initial and 
critical reflections on what national border fences mean in relationship to the blurring 
lines of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and aerial surveillance in both U.S. domestic 
airspace and the larger American global battlespace, and how these are interconnected 
and ultimately rely on a corporal schema where the racialized body serves as the basis 
for intelligibility. Drones and walls are technologies that help us identify the contours of 
the asymmetrical forms of power that manage surveilled living and “better” killing in 
these connected systems of containment. The first time the United States ever used 
aircraft was in a punitive expedition along the U.S.-Mexico border, and early 
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counterinsurgency doctrine critically shaped the United States’ use of airpower and how 
particular bodies along the border were monitored in service of securing new and 
provisional land claims, which have since the very beginning posed problems to 
territorial sovereignty. Dronization is a preventative enforcement practice both in 
conflict and in policing that provokes a slow civic death anchored in legalized federal 
racial discrimination at home and abroad, generating a whole set of fragmentary 
temporal and spatial modes of being and belonging. The vertical and scopic 
understanding of the U.S. spatial order of the skies domestically and abroad is animated 
by an understanding of surveillance as a fence and evolving practices of confining from 
the sky. 
 
The New Heights of Asymmetrical Power 
Weizman identifies the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as the last symmetrical battle to be 
fought between state armies of relatively equal force. After the fall of the Iron Curtain 
and the end of balanced, symmetrical military warfare, the frontier has emerged as a 
political space where military and quasi-military engagements are increasingly taking 
the form of low-intensity, asymmetrical violence in densely populated areas (Weizman 
2004). Walls, like drones, are an asymmetrical and preventative technology of the 
frontier. Both walls and drones collapse large horizons with a distancing function that 
separates space into hostile and safe areas. This way of thinking and organizing space is 
premised in removing the state agent’s body from the hostile environment (Chamayou 
2015: 22). In this context, remote-controlled warfare or intervention becomes a 
“philanthropic device” that keeps agents of violence and policing safe from 
occupational hazards (23). In using armed unmanned drones, injury occurs in only one 
direction, and warfare shifts from being asymmetrical to unilateral (13). In using 
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unmanned drones for surveillance, the state’s gaze occurs in only one direction too, 
from an altitude beyond the visual reach of the human on the ground. These actions are 
often classified and covert, drawing a curtain of secrecy in the wide-open space that is 
rent when the Hellfire missiles or machinery fall down from the sky. This is a 
radicalization of warfare and policing (24). Unlike walls, drones are a kind of 
“‘unidentified violent object’: as soon as one tries to think about it in terms of 
established categories, intense confusion arises around notions as elementary as zones 
or places (geographical and ontological categories), virtue or bravery (ethical 
categories), warfare or conflict (categories at once strategic and legal-political)” (14). In 
many ways, this relatively new form of airpower has been understood as a confining 
power, described as sets of lines or even as “virtual” walls, a spatial understanding that 
is more familiar. Walls and lines are a stationary form of violence, a kind of material 
warning of punitive dangers awaiting one on the other side. It is frequently understood 
as a “humane” tool because it signals people to turn back before they encounter the 
“consequence.” A wall’s true power exists in the threat of force or of violence that lies 
just behind it. 
 
Systems of Containment and Lines in the Sky  
One early example of containment from the sky was the experimental, harsh, and 
“highly effective” containment regime imposed on Iraq after the First Gulf War. It was 
made up of three elements: embargo, inspections organized through the United Nations, 
and a “no-fly zone” in northern and southern Iraq, with the expressed purpose that it 
would prevent Iraqi airpower from being used against its own people (Walzer 2006: 
xiii-xiv; Gertler et al. 2013). Walzer (2006) describes the “system of containment” as 
“measures short of war,” which all involve the use or threat of force. Embargos and 
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enforcement of “no-fly zones,” which includes bombing radar or antiaircraft 
installations are considered under international law to be acts of war. The murky legal 
basis for the “no-fly zones” in Iraq was in direct violation of Iraq’s territorial 
sovereignty. Walzer situates these test containment measures as different from actual 
warfare and explains how these are much easier to justify than a full-scale attack 
because “the arguments against preventative war … don’t apply to the preventative use 
of force-short-of-war — since short-of-war means without war’s unpredictable and 
often catastrophic consequences” (2006: xiii-xiv). The implementation of “no-fly 
zones” in Iraq was moved outside of the ethical-legal parameters that define war 
making and into a realm that is used to define democracy making.  
 Domestic use of “no-fly zones” in the United States, the global leader in aerial 
protocols and practices, has also dramatically increased. On September 11, 2001, the 
United States implemented an unprecedented nationwide temporary flight restriction, a 
domestic “no-fly zone” over the entire country that lasted until September 13, 2001. 
Since then, places like Disneyland, the Greater Washington, D.C. area, and stadiums 
with capacity of more than 30,000 people have become permanent domestic “no-fly 
zones.” The deployment of temporary flight restrictions in high profile crime scenes and 
standoffs with police is also on the rise. In Fergusson, Missouri, Michael Brown, a 
black, unarmed teenager was gunned down by white police officer Darren Wilson in the 
summer of 2014, and the St. Louis County Police Department requested a week-long 
“no-fly zone” over the neighborhood where vigils and protests over Michael Brown’s 
death were being met with SWAT teams, rubber bullets, and tear gas canisters (Gillum 
and Lowy 2014). The Federal Aviation Administration issued the order to “provide a 
safe environment for law enforcement activities” after officers alleged that shots were 
fired at police helicopters, although it was later revealed that the order was really 
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intended to keep media from accessing the area during the protests against police 
(Federal Aviation Administration 2014; Gillum and Lowy 2014).  
 “No-fly zones” are part of the next generation of operations, which are described 
by security think-tank reports and military experts as methods other than war that will 
be increasingly used inside urban settings. It is a kind of warfare, and also paramilitary 
policing, that uses infrastructure like walls and other technologies as a means of 
“selective dominance” — ways of controlling specific areas and activities and 
“precluding presence” of certain bodies in combat spaces to facilitate “overall mission 
accomplishment” (Glenn, Steeb, and Matsumura 2001). These terminologies are 
euphemisms for describing the desired results of nonlethal or “soft-kill” weapons. Many 
of these new “technologies of pain compliance” called “non-lethal obstacles” are 
designed for human containment and enclosure, ranging from traditional barbed wire, 
pop-up vehicle barriers, rapidly hardening foam, superlubricants, ship entanglement 
devices, synchronization of obstacle networks, projectile nets, and distance snares that 
are fired to entrap individuals or groups (Arike 2010; Glenn, Steeb, and Matsumura 
2001:18; Voetberg 2007: 3). Chemical and acoustic sensors are also part of new-wave 
technologies, which also allow “seeing” through walls with micro insect-like drones 
(Glenn, Steeb, and Matsumura 2001). The “political utility of force” through the use of 
these “non-lethal obstacles” marks the lines along which society is organized (Arike 
2010; Fanon 2001).  
 
From Boots on the Ground to Boots in the Air 
The first contemporary remote surveillance technologies deployed along the U.S. 
southern border in the late 1990s were always envisioned as a kind of “virtual fence” — 
a line of daylight and thermal cameras hung up on poles and remote video surveillance 
 
 
203 
systems and sensors in the ground described as a “shield” initiative (Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General 2005: 1). These remote sensing 
systems, which could gather data without a human being physically present, were 
envisioned as a “force-multiplier” allowing fewer agents to expand the scope of human 
apprehensions within a managerial matrix of measuring enforcement capabilities to 
maximize effectiveness (Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector 
General 2005: 12). However, these early efforts were plagued by technical difficulties, 
and government audits continue to highlight that U.S. Customs and Border Patrol has 
not been able to measure the impact or effectiveness of its technology assets or its larger 
organizational outcomes (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2014). The more 
recent updated version of the “virtual fence” was envisioned as a single, integrated 
border security technology solution for securing the entire U.S.-Mexico border called 
the Secure Border Initiative network — a system of cameras, radars, and sensors on 
towers and linked to command centers. Boeing only completed 53 miles of the project 
in Arizona at a cost of about US$1 billion before the failed program was terminated in 
2010 (Powell 2010). This idea of “total closure” of the U.S. Southern border through a 
singular integrated system has been replaced increasingly by the idea of flexible 
enforcement actions that are organized inside the broader borders of the six U.S. global 
command zones rather than within the bounds of any particular nation-state boundary. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is using more conventional surveillance 
and tactical equipment along the U.S.-Mexico border deployed in situational events or 
local settings, much more in the vein of counterinsurgency warfare tactics that respond 
to “threats,” “risks,” and “surges.” Some of the infrastructure deployed in the 
borderlands includes: drones, military-grade radars, mobile surveillance units, thermal 
imaging systems, and large- and small-scale nonintrusive inspection equipment. These 
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strategic changes in managing the U.S. border with Mexico more from the sky have 
been part of the larger militarization of the border bolstered by immigration legislation 
lobbying efforts and built up by leading private military contractors, including General 
Atomics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and General 
Dynamics (Lipton 2013).  
 In 2004 the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol tested its first Israeli-made Hermes 
drone over the borderlands in Arizona (Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General 2005: 13). During testing, the Hermes and Hunter UAVs were 
primarily used to “support apprehension” of humans presumed to be undocumented and 
who had already been spotted by other means (14). In 2005 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection first used an unarmed version of the unmanned Predator B drone to support 
law enforcement operations on the Southwest Border. Since 2011, Predator B drones 
are being launched from bases in Arizona, North Dakota, Florida, and along the Texas 
border. Specially equipped Guardian drones outfitted for both sea and land surveillance 
operate out of Florida and the Texas Gulf Coast. The unmanned Predator B drone is 
described in reports as a form of “active, layered defense in-depth” covering terrains “to 
conduct missions in areas that are remote, too rugged for ground access, or otherwise 
considered too high-risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground,” the same 
remote places where U.S. policies funnel the undocumented into crossing corridors 
(U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2010a: 5; Holland Michel 2015). Along U.S. 
national borders, more than 270 aircraft and 10 unmanned UAVs provide critical aerial 
surveillance assistance to personnel on the ground (Vitiello and Vaughan 2012). U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol plans to add 14 more unmanned aircraft to its fleet to be 
able to respond to a major event anywhere in the United States within three hours and to 
provide first responders with real-time information and imagery (Department of 
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Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General 2014: 2). Some of the first aerial 
surveillance technologies deployed along the U.S. border were leftover equipment from 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan repurposed to the domestic desert. Even reserve troops 
were deployed to help manually expand the linear surveillance capacity along the 
Southwest national border. 
 The U.S. Army National Guard — a domestic military reserve force that 
protects the homeland but is limited in the military actions they can take on U.S. soil —
were first deployed along the border by George W. Bush to support the initial 
construction of the border fence and roads from 2006 to 2008 (Booth 2011). In 2010 
Barack Obama deployed 1,200 reserve troops again, this time to support U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection apprehensions, working as “additional eyes and ears” on the 
border, essentially serving as low-tech stationary observers of the border. One news 
report described the work of these soldiers as “a kind of neighborhood watch with M-
16s, often perched 30 feet in the air in skyboxes, portable watchtowers the size of phone 
booths” (Booth 2011). Because the soldiers were limited by law in their actions on 
domestic soil, the most the army reserves could do was to radio a U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) agent to alert them to what they observed, essentially having 
three people do the job of one Border Patrol agent, costing an additional US$6,271 for 
each person caught with the help of the extra reservist surveillance (Booth 2011). By 
2012, the ground support role of the Army National Guard was transitioned from these 
static positions to conducting aerial detection and monitoring, in the words of a CBP 
deputy chief, “moving from boots on the ground to boots in the air” (Vitiello and 
Vaughan 2012). This aero-shift was part of a larger recapitalization program of the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection to increase the flexibility of CBP aircraft and air 
operations in a billion dollar overhaul of the air fleet (Vitiello and Vaughan 2012). 
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Crucial to this was the flexibility in authorizing CBP to use its drones for air support 
missions far beyond “supporting apprehension of suspected illegal aliens” near the 
border. From 2010–2012 CBP drones flew 500 flights for other agencies, including the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and also local sheriff 
departments (Lynch 2014). In these kinds of missions CBP drones can surveil a 
building and inform other agency ground units about the building’s layout and human 
and vehicle movements in and around the area (Holland Michel 2015). CBP can also 
provide other agencies direct video feed and access control to play video captured while 
flying unmanned aerial systems in support of other agency operations (Holland Michel 
2015). In this context CBP drone experience in humanitarian missions or natural 
disasters serves to enhance its capability for security responses (Kostelnik 2012). This 
inter-agency resource sharing and collaboration merges homeland security actions and 
domestic policing enforcement, a convergence that is characterized as an asset where 
enforcement can jump from a national to international jurisdiction. The standardized 
use of General Atomics drones on both the domestic front and the war front allows for 
seamless interoperability to be able to switch commands from the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security to the U.S. Department of Defense (Barry 2013). This blurs the 
lines restraining military forces within society, the lines that demarcate the limits and 
bounds of the law. International law governs rules of war and primarily focuses on 
armies and the military, but human rights against state oppression are rooted in relation 
to the nation-state’s sovereign power. The conceptual distinction between combatant 
and civilian in humanitarian law rests on the distinction between whom the state 
authorizes to be killed or surveilled, and whom it does not (Osiel 2009: 6). The 
seamless interoperability between both spheres blurs these distinctions.  
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 In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense, CBP migrates technology 
and equipment from wartime missions to homeland security applications. Another 
major system that is being tested and used along the U.S.-Mexico border is the Star 
Wars–sounding Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER). The airborne 
radar system detects and tracks pedestrian human movement and vehicle movement 
from a Predator drone five miles overhead (Bennett 2013b). These forms of active and 
passive surveillance or “domain awareness” are a way that the state can see without 
being seen to “deter, intercept threats at a safe distance” (U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 2010a: 5). The VADER system allows agents to watch movements in 
Mexico before they even reach the border. However, most of the details about the 
scope, cost, and reach of these operations are shrouded in secrecy and not discussed, in 
the name of security and law enforcement objectives. The Pentagon flew a number of 
covert flights into Mexico in 2011 using the Global Hawk drones — unmanned spy 
planes that can fly above 60,000 feet and that are not visible to people standing on the 
ground — with permission from the Mexican government. These operations, secured by 
presidential agreements, were not made publicly known because the Mexican 
Constitution bars foreign military and law enforcement agents from operating in 
Mexico except under limited circumstances (Thompson and Mazetti 2011; Rodriguez 
2011). The United States’ use of unmanned drones for surveillance operations in 
foreign airspace solves the sovereign problems of immunity for expanding extra-
territorial interventionism. Previously, manned covert U.S. anti-drug operations flown 
by U.S. planes in Mexico posed juridical problems because the Mexican government 
would not give the American pilots and agents immunity protections while operating in 
Mexican airspace and territory (Rodriguez 2011). Unmanned drone and radar systems 
have changed all this. Ongoing U.S. Customs and Border Protection surveillance in 
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northern Mexico, in collaboration with the Mexican government, was officially 
formalized with a binational agreement in 2012 that called for the creation and 
installation of a CBP cross-border surveillance system that is capable of fusing radar 
data from Mexican sites and select sites along the U.S. Southwest border to create 
greater “domain awareness” of the airspace over Mexico and to “monitor threat areas” 
to “permit more effective bi-national coordination of law enforcement responses” (U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection 2012). Jurisdiction needs a line of reference, and the 
U.S. southern border fence demarcates expanding borderlines, ones crafted in the 
abyssal dialectic of war making/peace building.  
 The United States divides the entire world into theaters of war. Increasingly, 
U.S. border drone operations are organized inside these larger “Unified Combatant 
Commands.” U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine 
participated in a SOUTHCOM inter-agency drug interdiction operation and other 
unspecified operations stretching as far south as Panama in the summer of 2012, which 
served as a prototype for ongoing SOUTHCOM operations (Kostelnik 2012). The 
Dominican Republic acted as a regional host for Customs and Border Protection 
Guardian drone flights deployed over the Caribbean Sea and over nations in the 
geographic purview of the command, which includes the Caribbean, Central America, 
and South America (Kostelnik 2012). The Dominican Republic is also one of the latest 
countries to have proposed building a border wall; the wall would go up along its shared 
border with Haiti and was proposed in the months after a controversial constitutional 
ruling in 2013 that retroactively denied citizenship to more than 200,000 Dominican-
born children of Haitian immigrants24 (Gaestel 2014). At the beginning of 2015, the 
Dominican government launched “Operation Shield” — a roving border operation of 
                                                
24 This denial of citizenship was met with international outcry. In the summer of 2015, only 300 of the 
250,000 Dominican Haitians who applied for permits had received them, and some 500,000 
undocumented people living in the Dominican Republic are facing deportation (Jones 2015). 
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soldiers working in collaboration with the immigration authorities to arrest and 
repatriate Haitians to Haiti (Haiti Libre 2015). In the first 14 days of the operation, 
15,000 Haitians were deported (Haiti Libre 2015). The push to build the border wall has 
been renewed in the latest national congressional session, and the Dominican military 
has also started to consider deploying drones on the border to augment “Operation 
Shield” (Haiti Libre 2015; Dominican Today 2015). Dominican nationalist politician 
Vinicio Castillo Semán has been pushing for the wall’s construction to curb a “silent 
invasion of Haitians” and “to protect Dominican sovereignty,” and he has asked the 
United States to collaborate and help with the design of the wall-building efforts 
(Bonilla 2015; Quezada 2015).  
 Another one of the most recent national walls going up lies in the heart of 
AFRICOM’s drone district on the Horn of Africa along the Kenyan border with 
Somalia. In the days before the Garissa University College attack, in which 147 
university students were murdered by a group of attackers, National Youth Service 
trucks equipped with building material were seen headed to Mandera to begin work on 
a separation barrier at the Kenyan border with Somalia (Kimari 2015). Like many other 
contemporary border walls, the Kenyan separation barrier was announced in the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks and inside a climate of national emergency, but 
without parliamentary debate or impact surveys in local border communities (Kimari 
2015). An American private security consultant in Kenya had been hawking the border 
fence for over a year before it was finally implemented, advocating for Kenya to call on 
its foreign allies for support in building up its security infrastructure and intense 
policing (NTV Kenya 2015). Documenting the U.S. hand in national border walling 
projects around the world helps us to be able to think about and qualify the emergent 
conditions of an aerial nomos, ranging from small-time ex-Marine security experts in 
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the case of Kenya, to binational cross-border covert military operations in the case of 
Mexico. It was also reported that U.S. Army engineers helped to design the Egyptian 
border wall to block the tunnels with Gaza (Fraser 2009). 
 
Contours of Contemporary Airspace 
A consideration of the socio-legal organization of airspace opens up the ways in which 
the aerial nomos of the earth seamlessly combines principles of war and property rights 
to shape airspace in a way that simultaneously reifies national borders while rendering 
the entire globe into mobile “kill-boxes.” This latest stratospheric formation bears all 
the hallmarks of imperial conquest, where the conqueror moves freely, rendering 
violence as politics by confining the natives into compartments. There are no limits on 
sovereignty or the horizon that the imperial power can use to enact violence from the 
sky, but the natives, the people stuck on the ground, are trapped and immobilized. 
Drones allow the U.S. military to “project power without projecting vulnerability” — 
that is, “deploying military force regardless of frontiers,” effectively solving “the 
problem of extending imperial power from the center over the world that constitutes its 
periphery” (Chamayou 2015: 12). In a parallel manner, the first deployment of UAVs in 
surveillance policing of U.S. domestic space also began in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands 
as a way of reigning in the “dangerous periphery.”  
 Historically, national security and war have served as the major organizing 
principles of airspace; however, it was not always this way. Early legal discussions of 
airspace drew heavily from Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, which understood the sea as 
free and common to all. Physical occupation was the prerequisite to national 
sovereignty, just as it was to private property. With the advent of the balloon, and later 
the aircraft, airspace — which was originally considered as private property stretching 
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upward from land-based lines of ownership — was reconfigured into national sovereign 
space for the right of self-protection. After World War II, all understandings of airspace 
were framed by national security concerns. The Convention Relating to International 
Air Navigation was drafted at the same conference that produced the League of Nations 
and the Permanent Court of International Justice (Banner 2009: 65). Understandings of 
airspace centered on functional lines rather than any physical boundaries or locations 
(Banner 2009).  
 American-made global “battlespace” consists of “hyper-mobile kill boxes” — 
the three-dimensional grids used for targeted killing — judicially extending “the right 
of pursuit” to individual bodies rather than to sovereign state boundaries (Gregory 
2011; Gregory 2013; Chamayou 2012; Chamayou 2015; Elden 2009). Chamayou 
situates the emergence of this invasive power as based less on the rights of conquest 
than the rights of pursuit (2015: 53). Borders are the refuge of the fugitive, and the act 
of denying the “enemy” realms of sanctuary enables the state to cynegetically ferret out 
the “enemy” in service of the public good of the larger international community. The 
problem with this model is that it undermines state sovereignty, conferring on “hunter” 
states 
 
a right of universal intrusion or encroachment that would authorize charging 
after prey wherever it found refuge, thereby trampling underfoot the principle of 
territorial integrity classically attached to the state sovereignty. According to 
such a concept, the sovereignty of other states becomes a contingent matter. Full 
enjoyment of that sovereignty is recognized only if those states take imperial 
tracking to heart. If they do not — ‘failed’ states cannot, ‘rogue’ states will not 
— their territories can legitimately be violated by a hunter state. (Chamayou 
2015: 53) 
 
In this organization the temporal contingency of space is expedited and quite literally 
executed on the ground, but the state of contingency becomes permanent (Chamayou 
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2015: 55). In many respects contemporary national border walls present a very similar 
set of problems and sovereign contradictions that Wendy Brown (2010) identified. 
Walls have temporally and spatially ad hoc and provisional qualities and often undo or 
invert what they are meant to inscribe and generate an increasingly closed and policed 
collective version of identity instead of the open society they are intended to defend 
(Brown 2010: 24, 40). They are iconographic of the predicament of state power and the 
increasingly corrupted divide between internal and external policing with both police 
and militaries (24–25). What is politically at stake in this spatial organization is 
reconciling the neoliberal restriction of the aims of state power to security matters while 
maintaining the state’s prerogative to wage war (Chamayou 2015: 181). Aerial nomos is 
a creative syncretism of the two, a convergence of the principle of national security 
crafted in the context of just war combined with a perverted interpretation of property 
rights that organizes the shifting terrains of aerial sovereignty. Self-defense and 
humanitarian intervention are the two underscoring rationales for aero-interventionism 
— the only space on earth where there is no ceiling on sovereignty. 
 Currently, there is no international agreement that limits the vertical extent of 
sovereignty. The Kármán line, an informal line that demarcates the boundary between 
the earth’s atmosphere and outer space, is generally agreed upon but has never been 
formally recognized. During the early space exploration, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union were careful not to ever commit to any limits in determining their 
sovereignty in airspace (Banner 2009: 275). When the Soviet astronauts landed on the 
moon, the U.S. government declared that this did not mean they could exercise 
sovereign power over the moon. The U.S. State Department lawyer said there were “no 
views on how far you would have to go” to claim sovereignty on the moon, saying, 
“sovereignty doesn’t mean anything without possession” (Banner 2009: 279). The 
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beginning of an international legal regime in space emerged first in practice and was 
later formalized in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967; however, there is still no legal 
definition of space (Banner 2009). 
 Currently, the U.S. Air Force uses the idea of property rights to interpret the just 
war principal of self-defense in its use and engagement of armed unmanned vehicles. 
Drones are “national property” and considered as representative of the people who sent 
them (Singer 2009: 407–409). The historical precedents for the official U.S. Air Force 
policy for drones were formulated during the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the air battles 
with Libya in the Gulf of Sidra in the 1980s, allowing pilots to shoot first rather than 
waiting to be shot at (406). The preemptive right to kill is embedded inside this shifting 
idea of property rights, defense of property, and self-defense. These rights are often 
exercised and tested inside humanitarian emergency zones, interventions of force 
enacted from the skies in the name of protecting civilians and stopping genocide, like 
the drone strikes against Colonel Moammar Gadhafi’s troops in Libya in 2011. 
Humanitarian intervention “operating in the name of the universal but endangered 
subject of humanity, transcends the walled space of the international system” (Walters 
2011: 138). The masters of these interventions rule without any sanctions on their 
actions (Chamayou 2015: 96). In this way, walling and drones offer discursive exits for 
democracies and countries wanting to understand themselves as justice-minded and 
good, or at least as innocent (Brown 2010: 122).  
 The legal challenges that the rapid proliferation of aerial unmanned drones 
presents are addressed almost entirely in the realm of practice. As the boundaries of 
applicable legal policies for the use of unmanned armed drones expand, so does the 
tendency to expand who can permissibly be targeted (Kaag and Kreps 2014: 82). The 
use of drones is central to U.S. counterinsurgency warfare, which is premised in a 
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doctrine of preemptive self-defense against an “immanent threat” of a future terrorist 
attack. The unmanned armed drones are trumpeted as the new pinnacle of “bloodless” 
warfare protecting counterinsurgent state soldiers. Border doctrine in U.S. policy 
dangerously borrows and intersects with this counterinsurgency war doctrine in several 
ways. The line between citizen and noncitizen noncombatants is blurred because 
noncitizens can be characterized as potential threats managed through preemptive 
surveillance and policing responses, which claim management of a particular 
“population as the prize.” The standard of civilization is crucial to these systems of war 
and rule, and “a racial hierarchy resolves the tensions between illiberal methods and 
liberal discourse,” often through use of proxies by putting an indigenous face on the 
front of counterinsurgent actions (Khalili 2013: 4–5). Walls and drones stop would-be 
migrants at the border, and policies “push out the border” even farther to proxy 
countries, notably the European Union’s FRONTEX Mediterranean sea patrols and 
processing centers in North Africa, Australia’s turn back policy sending boats with 
migrants back to the last port of call, and the United States’ investment in “equipping” 
Mexico to deal with its southern border with Guatemala and Central America. 
Preventative measures in walling and securitization of borders make lethal force 
redundant because the infrastructure redirects human movements into more dangerous 
places, a spatial order that is socially authorized as more effective and humane. Often, 
the wider citizenry of border-building countries, as in war-making countries, are 
distanced from the direct and real affects that their taxpayer-funded state actions have 
on living people on the ground. Along borders and in “humanitarian emergency” zones, 
“jurisdiction is defined in discourse, text, and practice of law to make territories 
conform to bodies of law … to create variegated spaces” of law, even to the point of 
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making the individual bodies islands of sovereignty (Khalili 2013: 67, 100, emphasis in 
the original). 
 
The Body as Battlefield 
When the body becomes the battlefield, the world becomes the hunting ground. 
Chamayou writes that “a whole contingent of U.S. lawyers today claim that the notion 
of a ‘zone of armed conflict’ should no longer be interpreted in a strictly geographic 
sense” (2015: 57). The shift in the geographic scope of armed conflict from a land mass 
toward the body has also been accompanied by the emergence of a new kind of war 
doctrine in Israel that submits the principle of distinction and proportionality (jus in 
bello) to a form of nationalism that privileges the lives of national soldiers and agents 
over foreign civilians (Kasher and Yadlin 2005). This understanding of law in war is 
based on the idea of reciprocity, a reactive, quasi-moral norm that presumes an ideal of 
equal measures of restraint shown in war, a kind of tactical and moral symmetry in the 
rules of confrontation (Osiel 2009). In combat, only citizens lives are equally valued, 
informing a hierarchal distinction between national bodies and foreign bodies 
(Chamayou 2015: 132). The duties of the nation-state in conflict override the 
obligations of humanitarian law, and in this framework the preservation of the life of a 
single national soldier can justify forsaking an indefinite number of foreign civilians 
(Kasher and Yadlin 2005; Weizman 2011). When the technologies of war are 
transferred into domestic spaces, the ideologies and justifications behind them mutate 
and take on new formations that build on existing racialized structures and hierarchies. 
The border wall becomes a coordinate for the spectral optics of vertical sovereignty that 
takes the human as its target. I want to further explore how this spatialization of the 
“body as battlefield” is translated in the domestic sphere as UAVs, blimps, and other 
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military equipment and technologies are being recommissioned as tools of homeland 
defense in border states, predominantly on the U.S. southern border, but also lent out 
beyond the border for policing and to other federal agencies. By locating the battle in 
the body, we can think about the anatomy of power that centers on the body. It banishes 
certain groups of people, holds others for ransom, and fights for ideological foothold in 
the minds of others. This measurement of space opens up a point of entry where we can 
question and think about the limits and possibilities of citizenship and the racialized 
hierarchies of belonging and existing in an era when the “right to have human rights” is 
territorially confined to citizenship (Arendt 1968). 
 One of the central problems with the increased “situational awareness” that 
radars and drones along the U.S.-Mexico border provide, is that it is a form of seeing 
and then acting on living humans, but one that is fundamentally incapable of 
deciphering the main criteria for immigration policing, which is to differentiate the legal 
distinction between citizen and noncitizen. Border policing practices rely on corporeal 
schemas of intelligibility to catalog “threat” and then act upon it. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently maintained exemptions for racial profiling as legal in the context 
of immigration enforcement. This does two things: it categorizes large swaths of 
citizens and noncitizens in this “threat” category, and it authorizes a weaponized 
response toward them. In this expanded notion of “threat,” the context of the physical 
safety of the police agent is privileged. Personal security still prevails as the most sacred 
right over all other human rights (Osiel 2009: 130–131). In 2011 when a U.S. border 
agent was killed during a confrontation with a group of Mexicans trying to take his 
night vision goggles, the U.S. deployed a CBP drone into Mexican airspace to hunt for 
the suspects (Rodriguez 2011). It is one of the few cases where a U.S. drone operation 
over Mexican airspace was publically acknowledged. The reach of the law was 
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extended beyond U.S. territory to uphold the rights of the U.S. Border Patrol agent. The 
suspects were later found in Mexico and eventually extradited to the United States, 
convicted, and imprisoned.  
 However, when a Border Patrol agent standing in the United States shot through 
the U.S. border fence into Mexico and killed an unarmed teenage bystander, the agent 
was found by a federal U.S. court of appeals to be immune from prosecution and civil 
lawsuits by the boy’s family and to have done his job (Moore 2015). This ruling placed 
the federal agent’s actions outside the governance and restraint of the U.S. Constitution 
and exempted similar future actions from review by U.S. courts, making the only 
potential realm to redress violation of rights internal to the federal policing agency. In 
this case, the Border Patrol agent was placed on three days of administrative leave and 
returned to his regular duties after an administrative review. No criminal charges were 
filed in the 2010 case, and the U.S. government has refused to extradite the agent to 
Mexico to stand trial for murder (Moore 2015). The slain Mexican boy was beyond the 
territorial reach of U.S. constitutional rights simply because he was standing in Mexico. 
The bullets that killed Sergio Hernandez were shot through the air, and like an 
unmanned drone, were disembodied as an object separate from the human actor who 
initiated the violence. The expansion of rights to enact violence in an aerial nomos 
stands in stark contrast to the preclusion from rights for the human, which can be 
understood as a kind of contemporary form of banishment.  
 Banishment is not only the exclusion from the law, but also the prohibition of 
solidarity and hospitality. The radical insecurity that a person who is illegalized 
experiences draws from the historical practices in which the banished would become 
the walking dead — not recognized as a member of the community or even as a person, 
but fictively deprived of life. This practice of putting the banished outside of the law 
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was a tactic to flesh the person out of hiding — a kind of inverted penitentiary system 
where society imprisons itself and the delinquent runs free (Chamayou 2012: 57). 
Sovereign proscriptions faded away historically in precise proportion to the growing 
strength of the police state — historically sovereign power was relatively powerless 
(60). Banishment lies just under the surface of the recent resurgence of legal 
frameworks that deny citizens the possibility of rendering basic human care and aid, 
whether that is offering shelter to an undocumented person in Calais, France, or leaving 
water in the Arizona desert, or giving an undocumented person a ride from the Costa 
Rican border to the fields where they work. These are the bricks and mortar of socially 
normalized policing practices that cement complicit citizen participation and naturalize 
a discourse of “migrant humanitarian crisis” that can only be solved through urgent 
government-sponsored actions and interventions like aggressive U.S. media “danger 
awareness campaigns” in Central America (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2014). 
One way that these “crises” are organized is through marketized responses. Legality is 
monetized at a “fair” price, a form of government ransom of bodies through the rash of 
new immigration reforms and revisions that often accompany the construction of new 
border barriers, imposing record fees that squeeze and extort individual bodies in new 
ways.  
 In the same way that military ethicists and theorists are seamlessly blurring the 
line between alien civilian and combatant citizen in military hierarchies of engagement 
and just “humanitarian” wars (Kasher and Yadlin 2005), the new hierarchies rank 
citizenship and have generated a corresponding set of fragmentary temporalities of 
migrant legality that in many ways corresponds to the larger ad hoc temporal systems of 
warfare. It is a small leap from the military vein of justifications coming out of Israel 
and the United States — vertical sovereignty regimes that often prioritize the life of a 
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single citizen solider, even when the collateral damage of civilian bystanders is high, 
although always through a lawyer-approved moral calculus (Weizman 2011) — to the 
social policies that prioritize the “safety” and well-being of citizens at the expense of 
“aliens,” a logic that inevitably ends up back at overcrowded migrant gulags and a 
show-me-your-papers state of affairs. The actualization of violence at a distance can 
also be understood outside of war zones on the border, where the borderlands are 
constructed as both distant from the national body politic of belonging and “safety” and 
on the “frontline” of a war zone. The use of rural detention centers can also be 
considered as a form of actualizing violence at a distance, which strategically 
incarcerates undocumented people far from areas with concentrations of lawyers, civic 
support, and solidarity inside closed systems of privatized prisons (Loyd, Mitchelson, 
and Burridge 2012). When accusations of abuse and violence surface, these are usually 
silenced through summary deportations and the veil of secrecy that shrouds actions in 
the name of “homeland security.” 
 
Moving with the Wall  
How do we respond and engage with this new geography and vertical nomos of the 
earth? How do we understand freedom in the age of banishment? What are the changing 
ideas of humanity implicated in this new formation? W. E. B. Du Bois wrote that he 
was “born in a century when the walls of race were clear and straight; when the world 
consisted of mutually exclusive races; and even though the edges might be blurred, 
there was no question of the exact definition and understanding of the meaning of the 
word [race]” (1984: 116). The arrested dialectic of American imperialism parcels the 
world with walls and boxes, global theaters of war where the meaning of race, and its 
proxy citizenship, are still clear and straight and the proliferating global geographies, 
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systems, and ethics of global border control mark realms of acquisition in the name of 
security. In many ways the new walls reveal to us the ways in which the walls have 
become totalizing, encircling us all. Hungarian prison inmates and soldiers will be 
forced to build the new border wall with Serbia (Warner 2015). In 2009 Rohingya 
ethnic minorities — the thousands of “boat people” in Southeast Asia seeking asylum 
who were stranded on boats that had been turned back to sea during the summer of 
2015 — were forced to build parts of the 230-kilometer border fence to keep them from 
fleeing to Bangladesh under threat of violence toward their families (Haque 2009). In 
perhaps a sardonic sign of the times in global fencing, even the U.S. White House 
added a new extra layer of sharp spikes to its perimeter fence this summer (Bradner 
2015). It is the drones and walls that conjure the encompassing lines of confinement 
that set the state’s sights on both the living movements of people in the United States 
and that put the targets on buildings and backs of humans in U.S. attacks on people in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and many other places around the world. The line that encloses us all 
is also what connects our struggles, and there is a deep power in this spatial recognition. 
Like Fanon said, the recognition of these lines will allow us to mark out the lines on 
which change will happen and society will be reorganized (2001: 29).  
 The monumentality of walls is the repressive dialectic of the limitless, supra-
mobility of the nomos of the skies. But the living human is still stuck in the 
compartmentalized and immobile grounds that Fanon described as a “world of statues: 
the statue of the general who conquered the country, the statue of the engineer who built 
the bridge” (Macey 2012: 468). It is the kind of colonized world where walls serve as 
politically correct strong points and where the rise of the discursive category of 
immigrant works so effectively because of the way it can mobilize a blanket 
racialization, one that can simultaneously encompass the Muslim, the Mexican, the 
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Native American, the Nicaraguan as a suspect until proven a citizen. The resurgence of 
walling does not represent the erosion of citizenship rights, human rights, or even 
sovereignty, but serves as the social location where micro-practices and legal clauses of 
expansion are deployed from and that, like grains of sand, slowly accumulate to form 
the new beachheads where the battles to create new markets and secure scarce resources 
will be launched from. These are the rules of corporate governance prescribed by the 
state, and they are increasingly implicated in the larger global curtain of “national 
security” — a kind of “security” that British lawyer Gareth Peirce (2010) described as 
one of the most comprehensive structures for hiding democratic misdeeds and injuries. 
What terminology do we deploy to name the curtain or wall that has become totalizing? 
The shadowy realms of the global industry of wall building and war making offer up 
interconnected geographies of enclosure — where the same companies operate. A well-
known example of this is the subsidiary of Elbit Systems in Israel, which received 
contracts to build portions of the virtual surveillance of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. A 
lesser-known instance of this is the Indian companies that helped to build India’s 
national border fences, which were bidding against each other to land the contract to 
build Oman’s 288-kilometer border fence with Yemen (Dash 2013). Recent work 
(Loyd, Mitchelson, and Burridge 2012) has started to link prisons and border walls, 
showing how these penal and policing regimes of state violence are interconnected and 
the ways in which they produce and police social difference (3). One of the major tasks 
for abolitionist and liberatory movements is developing the conceptual tools that work 
“against the assumptive necessity, integrity, and taken-for-grantedness of prisons, 
policing, and the normalized state violence they reproduce” (Loyd, Mitchelson, and 
Burridge 2012: 2). This task is not as ideologically easy as espousing tearing down the 
walls around us. Global corporate interests and developers have been responsible for 
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taking down most walls in the new era of wall building. The Iron Curtain is being 
turned into a bike trail, a way of “experiencing history” along some 7,000 kilometers of 
borders, and which, according to the promotional literature, is “no longer a dividing 
line, but a symbol of a shared pan-European experience in a reunified Europe.” Often 
we spatially and temporally perceive walls as finite, finished projects. However, lines of 
division are constantly being redrawn. In 2002 South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique signed a treaty establishing the joint transnational park that crosses all 
three countries’ national boundaries. With the establishment of the park, “more than 
350 km of fence, which marked political boundaries and prevented animal migration, 
were uprooted, over 5,000 wild animals were relocated, and a border-control and 
tourism system set up. The conservation area, described as southern Africa’s ‘green 
lung,’ is 35,000 sq. km and encompasses the Kruger National Park in South Africa, the 
Limpopo National Park in Mozambique, and the Gonarezhou National Park in 
Zimbabwe. There are plans to expand it in the next decade to cover 100,000 sq. km, 
which would make it the world’s largest wildlife conservation area” (Kabukuru 2012). 
The first major change observed after 50 kilometers of fences were removed was the 
migration of 1,000 elephants, with the animals reclaiming historic trails (Kabukuru 
2012). These efforts were largely funded and organized by World Wildlife Fund 
Netherlands with the support of Fortune 500 companies and companies like De Beers.  
 The temporal and spatial conclusions of border walls are not fixed. Material 
walls are destructible, moveable, and can be repurposed, but walls and fences can also 
be rebuilt and reenforced. The razor wire atop the 11-kilometer border fence between 
the Spanish city of Melilla and Morocco was removed in 2007 after many people were 
injured scaling the fence. It was replaced with a three-dimensional structure, which is 
sometimes described as the “third wall” (Cué 2013). However, in the summer of 2013 
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the same razor wire was put up again along at least a third of the fence in response to a 
series of attempts, sometimes by hundreds of African migrants at a time, to enter Spain. 
The Spanish Interior Ministry issued a report that was never made public justifying the 
use of razor wire, saying that it is used in other locations like Spanish prisons, and even 
in Brussels to prevent access to EU summits, and that it does not cause serious injury 
(Cué 2013). 
 There is nothing sociologically new about the border walls of today and the 
violence they enact and reproduce. These structures reveal not only the latest contours 
of the political organization of the market, but perhaps more importantly, the limits of 
our changing ideas of humanity itself. Those who are fenced out are human enough to 
do the heavy lifting in building and becoming the living foundation of the latest global 
economic order. However, they are not human enough to move beyond the zone of 
indistinction, a realm that transcends both sides of the wall; they are both human and 
subhuman. What I have tried to methodically uncover in this work are the ways that this 
political arrangement of banishment is moralized and operationalized, and the ways that 
we are socialized and conditioned to accept these formations as real and to participate in 
perpetuating these absurd dramas. This telling upends the discursive perversion of 
“freedom” by security and underscores the continuities and perpetuities of racial 
hierarchies that ideologically orient the latest spatio-legal realms of acquisition through 
use of force in the blurring jurisdictions of both war and peace. National border walls 
give us a specific location where we can launch our questions about how definitions of 
race and rights are being redefined, reformulated, and recrafted in pernicious 
vocabularies of merit, rights, and citizenship in which baselines of equality have always 
been absented. 
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 I found myself returning to one of Du Bois’s discussions of the difficulties of 
organizing an effective response against the totalizing structural forms of racism, a 
discussion that proposes a different kind of relationship to addressing and engaging the 
walls around us. He describes the power in establishing cooperative and group 
consensus as being a juncture where we no longer have to “march face forward into 
walls of prejudice,” but instead, “[i]f the wall moves, we can move with it, and if it does 
not move it cannot, save in extreme cases, hinder us” (1984: 216). I want to end with 
his reflection because it brings us back to what the borderlands perspective offers, a 
way of theoretically, physically, and spiritually avoiding getting trapped and 
immobilized inside a moralized schema made material through violence and 
bureaucracy, both the older forms of it and the newest ones. The physicality of freedom 
to move, in this larger sense of having the “ability to respond,” is a source of power that 
allows us to not be hindered or stuck inside the shifting terrains of counterinsurgency, 
surveillance technologies, and increasingly restrictive laws, but instead to find power in 
creating the movements that we will need to be constantly responsive to these changing 
orders. The old wall has never left us, but we are equipped to keep moving, and to walk 
along the new coercive perimeters and challenge them.  
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Coda: Writing from the Shadow of the Wall 
 
The seed for this larger project first began when the U.S. border wall was only a bad 
idea. Nearly a decade later, I actually finished writing this dissertation back in the 
shadow of the U.S.-Mexico border wall in El Paso, Texas, at our family home, which 
sits within a mile of the grated silhouettes cast by the 40-foot steel posts along the dry 
banks of the Río Grande. It was an interesting place to conclude this larger, long-term 
reflection, to viscerally bring me back to think about my neighborhood national border 
wall one last time inside the mushrooming landscape of concertina wire and concrete 
fences around the world. Nearly everyday, my mother-in-law’s pack of Chihuahuas 
bark at the strangers who come up the steps of the small brick house to knock on the 
door, asking for a little money, offering to pull the weeds out front, selling small items, 
or even simply asking for a glass of water or something to eat. They have always come, 
and they have kept coming long after the border wall went up. We are the ones who 
have stopped crossing into Mexico. Little by little, my partner has forgotten the names 
and places along the streets in Juárez that he used to visit everyday as a little boy after 
school and on the weekends. During the time it took me to write this dissertation, the 
last young cousin in the family finally got his permanent residency card approved by 
the U.S. government, and now no one in our family lives in Mexico anymore. 
Registering these changes has been quite personal, and these are the real stakes that 
have always required me to orient my questions, my approach, and my political 
commitment to this intellectual project from beyond my writing desk. My sounding 
board for my project has always been my Mexican and Mexican American family who 
have lived in the sister cities of El Paso, Texas, and Juárez, Mexico, their entire lives, 
true borderlands experts in every sense. They were my best critics and the first to 
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remind me that nothing is new on the border. They would outdo each other with the 
stories of the constantly mutating legal, political, economic, and social modalities of the 
border and the creative ways they found to get around them. My favorite story is about 
my partner’s grandmother, who for a brief time would smuggle American mayonnaise, 
a lucrative commodity for a time, into Mexico to sell to her friends and neighbors.  
 Now more than ever, we hope and wait for the day that this wall will also come 
down, eventually in our lifetimes, when the budget and the political appetite for fences 
falls out of fashion like the illicit border market for mayonnaise eventually did. My 
partner’s grandfather came to the United States as a bracero worker in the 1940s. When 
the U.S. government offered him citizenship he refused. He refused it for years because 
he did not understand that the offer included this benefit for his family too. He would 
not consider citizenship without them. A life like that just was not worth it. Ironically, 
the U.S. border only existed in his mind; he said it had always been open to him all 
along. That is the understanding of the border that we recall when we drive through 
interior checkpoints on the highway, when the Border Patrol agent hassles us, when we 
face the guns, the German shepherds, and the prohibitory signs. We remember that it is 
not real. We cannot let it be real. 
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Appendix 
 
Global border barriers since 200125 
                                                
 25 This list builds from a smaller, dated list developed by Ron Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, which I saw presented by 
Jason Wittenberg at the “Fences and Walls in International Relations” Conference at UQÀM Institut d’études 
internationales de Montréal, October 30, 2009. 
26 Builder state constructing the border barrier is listed first. To my knowledge, the only wall on this list where 
cooperative, bi-national efforts to erect a national border barrier were enlisted was along the Thailand-Malaysia national 
border. 
27 The total length of these projects often varies substantially in different media reports and frequently these figures vary 
and change during construction and are often contested (see pp. 156-158). For example, funding runs out and the wall 
ends up being much shorter than originally proposed, or a fence can be extended or new portions of fencing are added or 
replaced. The figures used here have been cited in media reports previously. 
Border Wall or Fence26 Year Started Length27 
Algeria-Libya 2014 120 km 
Azerbaijan-Armenia  2011 3 km 
Botswana-Zimbabwe 2003 482 km 
Brazil-Paraguay 2010 1.5–3 km 
Brunei-Malaysia 2005 20 km 
Bulgaria-Turkey 2013 33 km 
Burma-Bangladesh 2009 210 km (under construction) 
China-North Korea 2006 and 2013 unknown 
Costa Rica-Nicaragua 2001 1 km 
Dominican Republic-
Haiti 
2014 proposed 
Estonia-Russia 2015 108 km (proposed) 
Egypt-Gaza 2009 11 km 
Greece-Turkey 2011 12 km 
Hungary-Croatia 2015 41 km (under construction) 
Hungary-Romania 2015 proposed 
Hungary-Serbia 2015 175 km 
Hungary-Slovenia 2015 unknown (under construction) 
India-Bangladesh 2002 2,500 km 
India-Burma 2003 1,624 km 
India-Kashmir 2013 179 km 
India-Pakistan 2003 700 km 
Iran-Pakistan 2007 700 km 
Iraq-Syria  2010 1,300 km 
Israel-Egypt 2010 394 km 
Israel-Jordan 2015 30 km 
Israel-Lebanon 2001 and 2012 79 km 
Israel-Syria 2013 104 km 
Israel-West Bank 2002 708 km 
Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan  2006 45 km 
Kenya-Somalia 2015 708 km 
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Border Wall or Fence Year Started Length 
Kuwait-Iraq 2004 217 km 
Latvia-Russia 2015 proposed 
Macedonia-Greece 2015 proposed 
Mexico-Guatemala 2010 and 2013 3 km 
Morocco-Algeria 2013 450 km (under construction) 
Namibia-Angola 2014 proposed 
North Korea-China 2015 unknown 
Oman-Yemen 2013 290 km (planned) 
Pakistan-Afghanistan 2007, 2009, and 
2011 
2,400 km (under construction) 
Saudi Arabia–Iraq 2006 965 km 
Saudi Arabia–Yemen 2003 and 2013 1,800 km 
Slovakia-Hungary 2015 unknown (under construction) 
South Africa-
Mozambique 
2013 150-km (proposed) 
Spain (Ceuta)–Morocco 2005 and 2009 
(rebuilt with 
significant 
extensions) 
8 km 
Spain (Melilla)-Morocco 2005 (rebuilt) 11 km 
Thailand-Malaysia 2001 (with 
significant 
extensions in 
2007 and 2013) 
156 km 
Tunisia-Libya 2015 168 km (under construction) 
Turkmenistan-
Uzbekistan 
2001 1,700 km 
Turkey-Syria 2013 and 2015 900 km 
United Arab Emirates–
Oman 
2002 450 km 
United Arab Emirates– 
Saudi Arabia 
2005 unknown portion of 457 km 
border 
United States–Mexico 2006 1,100 km 
 
Ukraine-Russia 2014 2,000 km (under construction) 
Uzbekistan-Afghanistan 2001 209 km 
Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan  2009 unknown 
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